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CONSCIENCE

ITS NATURE AND FUNCTION

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of

Concordia Seminary

St. Louis, Mo.

by

Richard R. Caemmerer

In Partial Fulfilment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Bachelor of Divinity

St. Louis, Mo.

April 15, 1927.

PREFACE

A digest of the material studied, with emphasis on the important elements, the line of proof adopted, and the general conclusions attained, are presented in double space type. Quotations forming, to some extent, the basis of the dependent portions of the study, are given in single space type. At times criticism of these source-materials is offered, and contrasting views are, as far as possible, logically arranged.

Indebtedness is acknowledged to Prof. Charles Scaer, of St. John's College, for the first interest and attitude to this subject; to Professors Graebner, Heintze, Kretzmann, and Mueller, of Concordia Seminary, and Mr. William Baehr, acting librarian of the Seminary Library, for suggestions in reference to form and sources, as well as loan of materials.

Richard R. Caemmerer

April, 1927.

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INTRODUCTION

1. The Subject

"Conscience, Its Nature and Function," was chosen from a group of topics suggested for investigation and discussion, as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Divinity offered by Episcopal University, because of the particular interest and value of a closer study of the subject. Its interest attaches to the

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fact that it occupies a prominent place in the moral life of every individual, and that it is one of the most important factors in the development of the human mind. It is the voice of God within us, the voice of our own conscience, the voice of the law of God written on our hearts.

"Nullam facultatem suarum minus
in potestate habet anima, quam
conscientiam" (Bengel Rom.2,15).

The subject of conscience is one of the most important and most difficult of subjects. It is the voice of God within us, the voice of our own conscience, the voice of the law of God written on our hearts. It is the voice of God within us, the voice of our own conscience, the voice of the law of God written on our hearts.

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I. The Subject

"Conscience, Its Nature and Function," was chosen from a group of topics suggested for investigation and discussion, as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Divinity offered by Concordia Seminary, because of the particular interest and value of a closer study of this problem. Its interest attaches to the fact that conscience is a general but vague item of experience in every person; that it occupies a prominent place in at least a portion of the Sacred Scriptures, yet does not seem to receive the position in ordinary exegetical, dogmatical, and ethical treatment warranted by this prominence; and that the various interpretations and theories of conscience in vogue in even the popular or unscientific conception are mutually at such odds. The value of a closer study of the subject accordingly consists in the clarification of meanings and uses of the term, with the attendant benefits for systems of Biblical theology, Christian dogmatics, and theoretical and especially practical ethics.

The subject as stated in itself excludes the problem of the origin of conscience, a large field especially in phylogenetic theories (theories of remorse, origin of duty, origin of the good); it excludes the practical aspects and applications of the doctrines of conscience (systems of casuistry; social sphere of conscience; freedom of conscience). The subject has been further limited, a procedure demanded by considerations of time and space, by a particular viewpoint applied to this discussion. This viewpoint permits formulation in the shape of state-

ment of the problem, namely: To determine the validity of the term "conscience" as an ethical and theological concept in our own time, and to ascertain whether a theory of conscience can be constructed satisfying at the same time the demands of revelation in Scripture, and of science in the more positive type of scientific psychology.

II. The Treatment.

The above problem demands a careful study of the material presented in Biblical literature, and the arrangement of this material according to the categories of psychological science. The whole investigation must needs center about the single term "conscience," since all parallels not expressed with, or in connection with, the term, are open to choice or rejection on the basis of the individual concept held under the name "conscience." Hence only such parallels are studies which may have influenced the content of the term. Pre-Christian use of the specific terms for "conscience," as well as a few outstanding parallels, are first considered, in order to estimate their bearing on the content and use of the term in the New Testament. Full discussion of all passages containing the term is then given; effort was made to attack the interpretation without bias in favor of any particular theory of conscience. Customary Biblical illustrations and parallels, especially a more detailed discussion of the idea of conscience in the Old Testament, were omitted in accordance with the above principle, their choice depending on already formulated theories.

A survey of theories of conscience is included, both because of historical interest attached thereto, and for the sake of possible approach to truth on the scientific side. The outline of this survey is not that implied by the title of this thesis, *Nature and Function*, since this would cause needless repetition of references, and

since the division adopted facilitates comparison with the Biblical doctrine. This final summarizing comparison is an attempt to set forth the conclusions of the study in terms conforming to Biblical as well as scientific thought.

III. Imperfections of This Study

Due to lack of time and facilities for research, not enough work was done with original sources (Stoic literature; Luther; Kant; modern philosophy and psychology). This defect is fatal especially in view of the fact that the terminology in systematized ethics in general, as well as in the discussions of this subject in particular, is far from standardized, and isolated quotations are apt to present a distorted abstract of the author's real opinion. Even with the use of secondary sources, this study cannot claim to offer the representative views for the several theories of conscience or interpretations of the Biblical doctrine. The discussion of the so-called "erring" conscience, of such importance in the practical ministry, is insufficient and may well form the basis of a special study. The customary and convenient division of the functions of conscience into "primary" and "secondary" has been dispensed with for the sake of wider grasp of the problem, and hence a limited but valuable group of writers may seem to have been overlooked (Lutheran dogmaticians). Hofmann's "primary" and "secondary" conscience has not been recognized because of the tedious distinction. Imperfections of this type of attack to the problem of conscience will be alluded to in the Conclusion. More definite choice of conclusions to the Biblical study as well as the whole problem is in place, but has been deemed inadvisable in view of the scope of this study.

PART ONE

THE CONCEPT IN ANTIQUITY

I. *Συνείδησις*

A. Etymology.-- *surideō*, or the later and more specific term *suridnōy*, are derivatives of *suridēai*, "to know with;" the object of this knowing is either an external matter known in conjunction with another person, or a matter concerning another by being together with him; *surideō* is then the quality of testimony, or the exact knowledge. With reference to one's own person *suridēai* means knowing as witness of one's own actions, and *surideō* simply consciousness. Ethical implications are a later deposit in the meaning of the word; the *sur* cannot imply a knowledge or consciousness "with God," etymologically (R. Hofmann p. 75).

"Auch in dieser reflexiven Bedeutung ist die Eigenschaft des zeugenmaessigen Wissens festzuhalten, und eben darin lag die Moeglichkeit, es speciell in dem Sinne von Gewissen zu gebrauchen, jedoch zunaechst so, dass es noch des naechst bestimmenden Objekts bedurfte, um diesen spezifisch ethischen Begriff auszudruecken. Auf dieser Stufe der Entwicklung tritt auch der Gebrauch des Wortes *suridnōy* in voellig identischer Bedeutung mit *surideō* ein, und beide Worte werden dann auch absolut als Bezeichnung fuer das Gewissen in allen Modis des deutschen Wortes gebraucht" (R. Hofmann p. 75).

B. Use.-- *suridnōy* is first found in Chrysippus (diag. Laert. 7, 85; quoted op. cit.), as consciousness of existence; it is a property of every living creature, also animals, but for man becomes a prerequisite of rational existence; this phase gives it an ethical meaning which was enlarged upon by the later Stoics, as Polybius (though perhaps *suridōy*), who describes this consciousness as an accusing witness (18, 26; op. cit. p. 17). Epictetus discusses it accordingly as pedagogue and watchman, demanding sense of responsibility to God (fragm. 97 Schweighauser; op. cit. p. 18).

"Die Bedeutung Bewusstsein, hymn. orph. 63, 3 ff. Chrysipp. Digg. Laert.; Kohelath. 10, 20; Doxith. ed. Boecking, p. 38, wird

bei Philon, Sap. 17, 10, Diodor und Dionys. Halik. besonders zu der des Bewusstseins um das fruehere Verhalten, und zwar als des bezeugenden Urtheiles ueber dessen Sittlichkeit" (Kaehler, p. 647).

Wisdom 10, 11 uses the term in a description vv. 3 ff. of the "bad conscience."

R. Hofmann translates: "Das sie meineten, ihre Sunden sollten verborgen sein...wurden sie durch Gespenster erschreckt...Da war Getoene um sie her, das sie erschreckte, und scheussliche Larven erschienen, davor sie sich entsetzten.. Es erschien ihnen aber wohl ein selbst brennendes Feuer, voller Erschrecknis. Da erschranken sie vor solchem Gespenst, das doch nichts sahen...Denn dass einer so verzagt ist, das macht seine eigene Bosheit, die ihm ueberzeugt und verdammt; und ein erschroekten Gewissen versiehet sich immerdar des Aergsten (*ὁ δὲ προσέειπε τὴν χάριν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν συνένοιάν τιν' αὐτοῦ*). Denn Furcht kommt daher, dass einer sich nicht trauet zu verantworten, noch keine Huelfe weiss...Wo etwa der Wind hauste, oder die Voegel suesse sangen unter den dicken Zweigen, oder das Wasser mit vollem Lauf rauschte...so erschreckte es sie und machte sie verzagt." (op. cit. p. 39 ff.).

C. Parallels.— *curidini*, Eurip. Med. 495; Orest. 398;

"to be conscious of a thing ethically" (Hofmann, op. cit. 15).

Hofmann (op. cit. p. 15) quotes as other instances of this usage connected with an ethical tinge: Xenoph. Cyrop. 1, 6, 4. Memor. 2, 9. 6; Apol. 24.; Anab. 1, 3, 10; Plato, Apol. 21, B; Phaedr. 235 C; Rpb. 1, 331 A; Aristoph. Equit. 184; Vesp. 999.

curidini (originally insight, comprehension, Plato Crat. 437 B; Aristotle eth. nic. 6, 11) gained a meaning identical with *curidini* in the course of time; Herodian hist. 4, 7, 1; Apoll. Tyan. 7, 7, Philostratus. (Material in R. Hofmann op.cit. 15 ff.N.).

The *daemónion* of Socrates is cited as a parallel or as a factor of conscience, or denied relation to conscience, in accordance with the theory of conscience maintained by the investigator.

Eisler, p. 203: "*Daemónion* nennt Sokrates die von ihm fuer goettliche Eingebung gehaltene innere Stimme oder praktische Vernunft, des Gewissens, des sittlichen Taktes, die ihm von der Begehung unziehmlicher, unvernuenftiger, mit der sittlichen Persoenlichkeit nicht in Einklang stehender Handlungen abhaelt; Xen. Memor. I, 4. 15; IV, 3. 13; IV, 8. 60; Plato Apol. 31D; Phaedr. 242B." Opposed to this Kaehler, p. 648, in accordance with the doctrine that in antiquity "wird eine religioese Beziehung diesem inneren Zeugen nicht gegeben" writes: "Das

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Daimonium des Sokrates drueckt eine religioes gefaerbte Zuversicht und den Takt des grossen Mannes fuer seine individuelle Mission aus, beruehrt sich aber durchaus nicht mit der antiken *euridenes*," and Luthardt p. 105 reaches the opposite extreme: "Das bekannte Daimonium des Sokrates hat mit dem 'Gewissen' nichts zu schaffen; sondern ist ein unum. innerer Instinkt in ihm fuer das Ratsame u. steht nicht in Beziehung zum Gegensatz des Sittlichen und Unsittlichen." Hofmann p. 16: "Das *daimonion* ist daher dem Sokrates in keiner Weise eine innere goettliche Gesetzesstimme, so dass es ein, wenn auch nur teilweiser, Ausdruck fuer die conscientia antecedens waere, noch haetes etwas mit der ethischen Selbstbeurteilung einer Tat zu tun, sondern es ist nur ein goettlich gewecktes Ahnungsvermoegen, dass etwas ungluecklich ausschlagen musse, in allen denjenigen Faellen, wo die menschliche Einsicht nicht ausreicht, den Ausgang bestimmt zu berechnen."

euridenes is prominent especially with Philo, as leader, judge, and executioner, accompanied by feelings of joy or remorse when its demands are acceded to or disregarded.

Hofmann p. 30 quotes from De eo quod deterius potiori insidiatur, I. p. 196; de Josepho 49; de Poster. Cain. 236; de decem orac. II, p. 195 sq.; quod deus sit immutabilis I, p. 291. Kaehler p. 647: "Philon macht verhaeltnismaessig reichlich Gebrauch von *euridenes* und laesst ihm stehend einen *typhos* bei; das beweist, der Hellenist habe die Betrachtung der alttestamentlichen Weisheit von der strafenden Erziehung durch Gesetz und Schickung...mit jenem Ausdrucke verknuepft, welchen ihm die Adoptiv-Muttersprache entgegenbruegt."

Non-etymological parallels from the early Greek philosophers and dramatists are customarily adduced, and are of value in illustrating theories of conscience based on more direct proof.

Tufsts, p. 139: "Conscience in the earlier poets and moralists was largely a compound of Nemesis, the external messenger and symbol of divine penalty, on the one hand, and Aidos, the sense of respect or reverence for public opinion and for the higher authority of the Gods, on the other. But already in the tragedians we find suggestions of a more intimate and personal conception.(p. 140)The whole Antigone of Sophocles is the struggle between obedience to the political rulers and obedience to the higher laws which as "laws of reverence" become virtually inner laws of duty." Luthardt adduces Orestes (Choeph. 1010ff.); the "bad conscience" of the Athenians, Xchoph. h. gr. II, 2.3.10; and the "good" of the Spartans, Thucid. VII, 18.2; the Erynies Aesch. Choeph. 283; also Plato's personification of *euridenes*, Legg. IX, 865D (Luthardt p. 105); but Hofmann claims: "Fuer Plato war der seine Gewissensbegriff nicht erreichbar infolge seiner Lehre von dem Eingeborensein der Ideen" (p. 16). Aristotle speaks of a consciousness of having done right, and of agony of remorse driving even to suicide (nic. eth. IX, f.10; Hofmann p. 17; Luthardt 105).

II. Conscientia

A. Etymology.--The development of the term conscientia is analogous to that of curiositas: knowledge gained through participation; exact knowledge; reflexively, consciousness, and in second place, with ethical implications, approximating the specialized "conscience." (Hofmann, p. 76).

Hofmann, p. 76: "Hat das lateinische Wort conscientia sich ganz dem Entwicklungsgange von curiositas angeschlossen, so wird es ebenso falsch sein, aus seiner Etymologie den Begriff des Gewissens gewinnen zu wollen. Das haben besonders Thomas Aquinas und die ihm folgenden Scholastiker getan." Kaehler, p. 647: "Ganz selbstaendig und fast durchaus entsprechend entwickelt sich bei den Roemern aus consciens und conscientia in der Bedeutung "bewusst, Bewusstsein" in fort-dauernd fliessendem Uebergange die engere Bedeutung des sittlich urteilenden Bewusstseins. Der Gebrauch, mit der juridis-chen Nomenklatur verschlungen, ist hier viel reichlicher, zumal bei Cicero und Seneca." "Jedenfalls aber eignet dem lateinischen Worte so wenig wie dem griechischen der Sinn eines sittlich-gesetzgebenden Vermoegens oder des sog. vor-angehenden Gewissens im strengen Sinne des Ausdrucks."

B. Use.--The word is used ethically by Seneca, as conscious-ness or memory of having done good or evil, a guardian acting as witness and judge of action.

Hofmann p. 17 ff, cites ap. 12; benef. 4, 11; clem. 1, 1; ep. 97; ep. 43(witness); de beata vita, 20; ep. 81. The well-known passage ep. 41: "Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum, bonorum nostrorum observator et custos; hic prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipsos tractat(Hof. p. 18). Kaehler considers "nur eine Anwendung des stoischen und mit-hin nicht religiösen "atheismus" (p. 648). Tufts (p. 140) considers Seneca an exponent of that stage of conscience in which inner reflection and the attainment of a social stan-dard is reached.

Cicero uses the word as consciousness of duty and conscious-ness of right and wrong, the latter expressing itself in the "good" and "Bad" conscience. He uses the concept extensively, a procedure necessitated by the downfall of objective moral standards of the times (Hofmann p. 19). Conscience includes also a consciousness of an innate, practically divine moral law (de legg. 2, 4; Tuscul. 3, 1), which requires education for its preservation (Tuscul. 3, 1; de fin.

2, 22). Thus Cicero attains a combination of legislative and judicial functions for his concept of conscience which approximates and surpasses many views tempered by the Christian standpoint; as a pagan he lacked only the objective function of a revealed divine will to give his theory of conscience validity. (Hofmann p. 22).

Besides the above Hofmann (p. 19 ff.) quotes famil. 3, 7; 6, 4; Brut. 71; Catilin. 2, 6; de legg. 1, 14; Roscio Amer. 24. Luthardt quotes De Rep. III, 22. 33, of the natural law, which Kaehler (p. 657) rejects as pertinent for conscience.

C. Parallels.--There are general references especially to the "bad" conscience in later Latin literature, partly in the terms of conscientia itself (Quintilian, inst. orat. 5, ll. 41: "Conscientia mille testes"), or conscire, (Horace ep. 1, l. 60) and consci (Plautus, Mostell. 31, 13); partly illustrative parallels in thought, as allusions to the doubting conscience, Pliny ep. 1, 8; Ovid, Metamorphos. 7, 19 ff.; or to the troubled conscience, Lucretius de rer. nat. 3, 100. ff.; Persius, satir. 3, 35-43; Juvenal, satir. 13, 1-4; 192-198; 208-228; Tacitus, annal. 6, 6 (pangs of conscience of Tiberius); Suetonius, Nero c. 34 (references in Hofmann p. 22 ff.).

III. Conclusion

Although it is useless to strive for a homogeneous notion to apply to the ancient usage of "conscience", yet a few points can be discerned as pervading Greek and Roman doctrine in this connection. Etymologically we can make no deductions. In use, the terms for conscience are applied throughout to an element of consciousness. This consciousness is very generally restricted to the ethical field, a consciousness related to actions, and one's own actions, as good or bad. Furthermore this consciousness is an active one, impelling to an attitude or an action either by intellectual presentation of duty and responsibility, or by emotional accompaniments of remorse

over bad conduct or satisfaction over good. These active elements of conscience are predominantly negative, the actual term in a majority of instances being used in connection with a conscience reproaching after the deed is done; antecedently it acts through memory of previous experiences (Seneca). Whether this consciousness as witness and judge of actions is autonomous, having its norm self-contained, or not, is left unexpressed till the full development of the term under Cicero and even he so defines the legislative side of his idea of conscience, that it assumes distinct and possibly separate entity. The development of the notion and use of the term in antiquity is parallel to a need for deriving standards from the inner self, since the outer and objective standards of social morality and consciousness were giving way. It is held that "conscience" was the new, subjective norm set up in place of the old, objective, failing ones.

Luthardt, p. 109: "...die Antike (hatte) im Gewissen einen subjektiven Anhalt der sittlichen Beurteilung und Gewissheit gegenüber den wankenden objektiven Mächten gefunden." Kaehler p. 647: "Die Untersuchung bei Kaehler leitet die Begriffsbildung aus der Gesamtentwicklung des sittlichen Bewusstseins in der alten Welt, namentlich aus dem Umschwunge von der unbedingten Beugung unter die überlieferte Gemeinsitte zu dem entschiedenen Rückgang auf den inneren Rechtschef ab, mit folgendem Ergebnisse: Das gewaltig von der Verfehlung überführende Zeugnis--und dieses findet in beiden Litteraturen überwiegende Erwähnung--wird zu einer lebendigen Schule und ihre Zucht lässt das Gesetz, nachdem sie sich vollzieht, mindestens ahnen." Similarly Hofmann p. 19.

However, from the material adduced in proof of this theory, we are not able to declare definitely that conscience in itself was or produced the standard of conduct; the alternative seems quite as possible that essentially it was merely a faculty enforcing responsibility to a newly recognized inner standard, in itself not conscience, although in figurative and popular language the norm was included in the enforcement of the norm. The principal value of this study then lies in outlining the scope of the term "conscience" at the dawn of the Christian era, and thus giving the first clue to New Testament usage of the term.

-10-

PART TWO

THE BIBLICAL CONCEPT

I. *Suridrosis*

A. Etymology.--Little addition is made by Biblical usage to the etymological study of the term. *sur* in composition can denote with other people, or mere intensification, i.e. completeness, or with one's self, in one's mind (Thayer, *sur* II, p. 599); thus in *suranidrosis*, to grieve with one's self, be inwardly grieved; *sur-epien*, keep within one's self, keep in mind; *sur-oida*, know inwardly, be mindful of, conscious of. *oido* means to see, discern, perceive, hence, to know; *sur-oido*, know in one's mind, with one's self. Hence *suridrosis*, a knowledge within one's self; this may indicate a knowledge independent of external or separate items of perception, self-contained; or a knowledge accompanying the faculties of perception and reasoning. Whether this knowledge is exerted for moral or intellectual purposes the etymology leaves undetermined.

Feine, 290 ff.: "Woertlich uebersetzt heisst das griechische Wort 'Mitbewusstsein.' Es soll also ausgedrueckt werden, dass ein Wissen sich mit den Handlungen verbindet. Man kann dabei an ein sich auf rein intellektuellem Gebiete bewegendes Bewusstsein denken (theoretisches, intellektuelles Gewissen) ohne dass ein ethisches Urtheil einbegriffen wird. Aber meistens wird an diese ethische Funktion gedacht (ethisches Gewissen)."

B. Non-Pauline usage.--The usage of the word *suridrosis* in the New Testament is limited at the most to 31 occurrences, of which the majority occur in Pauline speeches or epistles. In order not to force a Pauline cast upon non-Pauline use of the term, the latter will be first considered.

1. Not used by Christ.--The word is not put in the mouth of Christ in the Gospels. A plausible explanation for this remarkable fact is the fact that He dealt with Jews, and that the situation con-

sidered in the case of the Old Testament (see below II, A, 2) is here also the case. (Kaehler and Auberlen, cit. in Hofmann p. 31). We would accordingly expect to find Christ alluding to the functions of conscience under more general terms and in wider relations; the choice of these instances would again depend upon the theory of conscience derived from Biblical or other sources.

Hofmann, p. 32: "Da, wo sie sich hinter den Buchstaben des Gesetzes fluechten, verweist er sie auf ein 'gerecht Gericht' Joh. 7, 24. Da, wo sie sich der Wahrheit seiner Lehre entziehen, verweist er sie auf das ihnen inwohnende Vermoegen, den Willen Gottes als solchen zu erkennen, Joh. 7, 17. Die ganze Auslegung des Gesetzes in der Bergpredigt ist eine Appellation vom geschriebenen Gesetz an das Gewissen....Wenn der Herr das Gewissen nicht ausdruecklich benamh, und das Wort *συνείδησις* nicht in seinem Munde vorkommt, so hat dies denselben Grund, aus welchem die dogmatischen und ethischen Elemente in seiner Lehre noch nicht auseinander treten." Other passages adduced as illustrations by Hofmann are John 3, 21; Matt. 6, 22. 23; Luk. 11, 34. 36, the spiritual eye; Matt. 6, 23.

2. John 8, 9.--John 7, 53 - 8, 11 is textually unsound, and appears to be an early Western emendation, probably previous to 150 A.D.

Dods (p. 770) lists for rejection NABCL, a,f,q, Thab. Goth. Pesh. Memph. Arm. Chrys. Cyr Alex; for insertion, D, b,c,e, vg. Syr.-Hier.; Aesh. Origen, Theodor. Mops., Chrys. Cyr. Theophyl. as passing it by, Euthymius as commenting on it as unguene. Robertson (p. 210) judges from the textual evidence that it arose in the West and did not reach the Eastern branch of the Western class of texts. Zahn (p. 568) believes it to be an early emendation from a current and probably genuine report, very likely at the hand of Papias (ca. 60-150 A.D.); the oldest textual evidence being the 4th century, Latin MSS, while the earliest witness for the genuineness of the account, although not as part of this Gospel, is the Apost. Didaskalia, I, 24. 3 (also Nestle p. 29).

The use of *συνείδησις* in v. 9, however, though not indicating John's use of the term, does indicate that the word had a place in the thought of the Apostolic times, and that the stress laid upon the term by Paul and Peter had penetrated to the study of the Gospels. The words *καὶ ὁμοίως συνείδησις ἀποκρίσεις* are found only in E and G, and may therefore possibly be merely a gloss of those copyists, though the basis for the emendation would again go back into earlier times, not later than the third or fourth century, and probably into

the second century (the general time of origin of variants by emendation). (E 8th century; G 9th to 10th century).

After Jesus' reproof, v. 7, calling the attention of every accuser to the fact that he was guilty of sin equally as damnable as that of the adulteress, the scribes and Pharisees are represented as leaving "one by one", the emendation reading "reproved by their own conscience." Thus the function of conscience is represented as reinforcing the accusation of Christ, and causing such inward confusion and disapproval that the plea of guilty must be registered through the departure of the accusers.

Hofmann quotes parallels to the explicit use of conscience, from the writings of John, considering as such 1 John 3, 19-21, and concluding: "Das, was wir aus dieser Betrachtung als Lehre des Johannes gewinnen, ist ein Mal, dass das Gewissen die Funktion hat, unsere Schuld uns unverrückbar vorzuhalten; das andre Mal, dass ihm jede erlösende Kraft abgeht. Es hat in sich schlechthin nichts, womit es sich selbst beschwichtigt; es muss ein Mächtigerer ueber dasselbe kommen, so es seine Anklage ruhen lassen soll, das ist Gott mit seiner vergebenden Liebe." (pp. 33-35).

3. Peter's usage.--There are points of contact between the writings of Peter and of Paul (Fuerbringer, pp. 90. 91), but there is no reason for considering Peter's use of "conscience" entirely dependent on Paul. He employs the term three times.

a. 1 Pet. 2, 19.--Peter exhorts servants to be subject to their masters, and also to the harsh and unreasonable ones (largely pagan); and he bases his exhortation upon the fact that it is something pleasing to God to endure wrong patiently, especially if the suffering is endured because of the *outside world*. The genitive is objective; the conscience conscious of God, and therefore regulated by God; so Thayer: "Because conscience is impressed and governed by the idea of God and so understands that griefs are to be borne according to God's will," p. 602.

Vincent, I, 647: "The idea is not conscientiousness in the ordinary sense, but the consciousness of one's relation to God;

his consciousness of God. Thus one suffers patiently, not from a conscientious sense of duty, but from an inner consciousness, of his relation to God as a son, and to Christ as a joint-heir, which involves his suffering with him no less than his being glorified with him." Against this somewhat broader interpretation approving that expressed below, Stoeckhardt (p. 116): "Dem heil nischen Herrn war die Religion des Sklaven, das Christentum verhaest; das galt ihm, wie den Heiden ueberhaupt, v. 12, als Uebeltat. Und um des Gewissens willen zu Gott, dessen eingedenk, was er als Christ Gott schuldete, weil er sein Christengewissen nicht verletzen wollte, ertrug nun ein rechtschaffener christliche Sklave willig alle Widerwaertigkeit, alle ungerechte Behandlung, die ihm sein Christentum einbrachte."

Some stress this passage as an instance of the primitive meaning of *suridnais* as "consciousness," "consciousness of God;" but this consciousness by the context has a definitely ethical function, prompting to a certain mode of conduct, and hence under the category of "conscience."

Harless, p. 58: "Gottesbewusstsein...mit dem Worte Gewissen koennt wir hier nicht uebersetzen." Hofmann p. 35: "Es ist das Bewusstsein von Gott, und somit auch von seinem Willen, welchem zugleich das sich Gebundenfuehlen an Gott and seinen Willen bewohnt; in diesem Sinne allein kann es als das Gewissen nach seiner wissenden und verpflichtenden Seite angesehen werden." This statement practically reverts to real conscience.--Curious is an interpretation listed by Hart p. 61, "because God is conscious of your condition," parallel to Matt. 6, 4; hardly tenable in view of the restricted usage of *suridnais*.

Conscience according to this passage is a faculty prompting to conduct, modified by a relation to God, this relation being a consciousness of responsibility to God; and this consciousness is authoritative over demands of comfort or expediency.

b. 1 Pet. 3, 15.--The Christians are to lead an impeccable life, in order that all accusations brought against them by the revilers of the Christians may prove false and the revilers as slanderers. As prerequisite for this type of conduct is mentioned *suridnais* *exortis* *iyadnir*. *iyadnir* is used "of the feeling awakened by what is good, pleasant, agreeable, joyful, happy," Th. p. 2. Evidently the "good conscience" is here a comforting, confirming consciousness in the face of accusation that one's conduct has been free from blame. This con-

consciousness must be dependent upon an analysis or investigation mentally of one's actions, with the result that they appear blameless; according to what standard they appear blameless, is not stated, but the standard agrees with that used also by the world at large; conscience itself is not considered the standard here, since that would lead to a meaningless contradiction of a standard rendering a verdict. The resulting verdict of the conscience has an element of "goodness," of pleasurable feeling; the whole is a testimony as to the moral status of the individual, particularly with reference to those actions concerned in the accusation.

Stoeckhardt, p. 138: "Das gute Gewissen bezieht sich nicht auf den Akt des Bekenkens, sondern auf den Wandel der Christen. Dieselben sollen, wenn sie vor den Richterstuhl der Welt vorgefordert werden, gleichsam mit reinen Haenden erscheinen...Die Welt laestert das Christentum, weil es seine Bekenner scheinheilig, kopfhaengerisch, menschenfeinlich mache. Wenn nun aber die Christen in allen Stuecken ein gutes Gewissen bewahren, sich auch vor der Welt eines ehrbaren, rechtschaffenen Wandels befleissigen...so machen sie jene Verdaechtigungen zuschanden und liefern ihren Gegnern den Beweis, dass sie keine Heuchler, keine Menschenfeinde sind." Vincent's discussion is extended beyond the scope of this passage; Vol. I, 654: "(Conscience) denotes the consciousness which one has within himself of his own conduct as related to moral obligation; which consciousness exercises a judicial function, determining what is right or wrong, approving or condemning, urging to performance or abstinence. Hence it is not mere intellectual consciousness, directed at conduct, but moral consciousness, contemplating duty, testifying to moral obligation, even where God is not known; and, where there is knowledge of God and acquaintance with him, inspired and directed by that fact."

c. 1 Pet. 3, 21.-- *συμείνηται* again stands with *ἐὰν*, hence as the approving conscience; here the approval is gained, not by spotless living before men, but by the effect of baptism because of the saving work of Christ summarized in His resurrection. Hence the conscience does not assert itself as a consciousness upbraiding for sin, because the sin is forgiven for Christ's sake, washed away through the spiritual washing of baptism. The latter point is clear through the antithesis to *ὡς ἐὰν ἐπιθυμῶμεν*; whether *ἐπιθυμῶμεν* is taken as "earnest desire, seeking" (Th. 230; Hart 69), making the sense that

the Christians have sought a good conscience, or that the conscience is seeking after God; or as "stipulation, agreement, covenant," (Pieper, III 323, N 1096; Stoeckhardt 179 ff.); or demand, and thus indirectly, avowal of consecration, passively (Thayer 232), does not affect the sense of *our sidhoy yad*, since its sense must be analogous to that of five verses previous. Hence the same conclusions can be drawn for the nature of conscience from this passage as from the preceding, with the addition that, for the Christian, the atonement of Christ and the forgiveness of sins bestowed in baptism has the effect of making conscience actively positive and peaceful; hence conscience as the "bad" conscience is specifically consciousness of guilt.

Stoeckhardt, p. 179: "Der erste Teil der Apposition: Die Taufe 'ist nicht das Abtun des Schmutzes am Fleisch,' fordert eine Fortsetzung wie diese: Sondern die Taufe ist vielmehr eine inwendige Reinigung des Menschen, eine Reinigung, Abwaschung des Gewissens von Sünden, oder, was dasselbe ist, verschafft dem, der getauft wird, ein gutes Gewissen vor Gott." Cp. Weiss Biblical Theology I, p. 207 N4.

4. The use in the Epistle to the Hebrews.-- *our sidhoy* occurs five times in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Although the authorship of this letter has been ascribed to Paul, any definite opinion has been made insecure by arguments on the basis of language and style, as well as content, in favor of the possible authorship of Barnabas, Luke, Aquila and Priscilla, or Apollos (cf. Fuerbringer, 79-82; Dods 224-230). Accordingly, although there are parallels in content with the Pauline epistles and therefore indications of dependence upon Paul (Fuerbringer p. 80), it is more objective to discuss the usage in Hebrews before formulating the specifically Pauline concept.

a. Hebr. 9. 9.--The gifts and sacrifices of the Old Covenant were not in themselves sufficient to make him that offered them up perfect in respect to conscience, *havi our sidhoy tashuvot*. If the worshiper would be perfect, completed, by an act of worship signifying

forgiveness of sins, expiation of sin, and this perfection would be *needed* *considered*, then *considered* as a specific type of knowledge of consciousness would of necessity be the consciousness of perfection in God's sight, that the demands of God's will prerequisite for entrance into eternal life were complete; and lack of this perfection "according to conscience" would be the consciousness that there was still a measure of guilt barring the saving perfection. (Cf. Th. 619, *referred*.)

Thayer, p. 602: "So to perfect one that his own conscience is satisfied, i.e. that he can regard himself as free from guilt." Dods p. 331 more specifically: "To give to the worshipper the consciousness that he is inwardly cleansed from defilement and is truly in communion with God; to bring conscience finally back into peace." Delitzsch (Bibl. Psych.) quoted with approval by Harless p. 59, speaking of Hebr. 9, 9 and 11, 2 as "Wissen von sich selbst im Verhältnisse zu Gott" so generalizes to an extent here correct, but possibly dangerous.

Consciousness of guilt, furthermore, implies knowledge of shortcoming of one's actions with respect to a certain standard, in the above connection naturally the standard of God's will.

b. Hebr. 9, 14.--This passage expands upon the thought contained in the preceding, showing that the blood of Christ *as sacrifice and consideration* *and repair* *effort*. Human effort is dead spiritually, hence defiling.

Th. p. 424: "*works* (*ἔργα*) powerless and fruitless;" p. 248: "Works devoid of that life which has its source in God, works so to speak unwrought, which at the last judgment will fail of the approval of God and all reward." Dods p. 334: "Works that defile; as the touching of a dead body defiled the worshipper. Works from which a man must be cleansed before he can enter God's presence."

Works without Christ are consciously imperfect and insufficient to meet God's demands; hence consciousness of guilt, far from being removed by them, is only intensified, and pervading all thought seems to be polluted. This pollution is cleansed by the blood of Christ, which expiates all guilt of sin, and sin; the consciousness with respect to fulfillment of God's will is one of harmony and peace, and therefore clean. Conscience is so represented as being rooted in judgment of action with respect to a high standard, and a resultant sense, evidently emotional to some extent, of guilt or pureness, proceeding from that judgment.

c. Hebr. 10, 2.--In demonstrating the supremacy of Christ's sacrifice on the cross, the writer points out that the law sacrifices had to be done repeatedly, and hence could not purge from sin completely; had they been efficacious in themselves, the worshipers would have had *undemir considhoun amprum* Thayer (p. 602) adduces this passage as an instance of the primitive use of *considerous* as consciousness in general, *amprum* object. gen.; this becomes plausible in view of *undemir amprum* or *hadapir* being expected with *considerous* as conscience specifically. But also the "good" or "cleansed" conscience is essentially the absence of "badness" or "pollution;" hence, in a sense "good conscience" is parallel to "no conscience of sin."

Dods (p. 342) considers the usage parallel to 9, 14, and harmonizes the difficulty somewhat artificially: "The sinner once cleansed may, no doubt, be again defiled and experience a renewed consciousness of guilt. But in the writer's view this consciousness is at once absorbed in the consciousness of his original cleansing." Harless (p. 58) considers this an instance of simple consciousness. But Lange argues: "(c. a.) not the consciousness of sin in general, but that which brings back upon the man the personal criminality and punishableness involved in his sin."

"Conscience of sin" implies consciousness of having "missed the mark" of the Divine law, and hence presupposes analysis and judgment of one's actions. The turn of the phrase as discussed may indicate that the negative aspect of conscience is the more predominant in consciousness, if not entirely so.

Weiss II 202 N2) "According to 10, 2, he who has been actually freed from the consciousness of the guilt of sin no longer has any *considerous amprum*. There is consciousness of forgiven sins according to Bible phraseology when the sins along with the guilt which they contract are regarded together, not that one may not with Riehm p. 566 distinguish between the consciousness of sin and the consciousness of guilt."

d. Hebr. 10, 22.--In accord with the previously developed doctrine of the efficacy of the blood sprinkled by the Great High Priest, the believers are described as approaching God with hearts *ipparousios* *and considhoun amprum*. Sprinkled with Christ's blood means cleansed by faith in the atonement of Christ, according to the doc-

trine of the Epistle; hence the heart or inner, mental life in general of the Christian is freed from *συρίσκειν νόμον*. *νομιζέω* describes anything ethically bad (Th. p. 530); the consciousness or knowledge of the *συρίσκειν* cannot be intrinsically, subjectively bad, but the phrase must apply to the consciousness of wickedness; Thayer (p. 530; 603): "Soul conscious of wrong-doing." The forgiveness of sins assured in Christ's blood removes this consciousness in the believer; for, because of the responsibility to God, consciousness of sin is synonymous with consciousness of guilt. Hence conscience is represented as a consciousness within the *καρδιά*, based upon a judgment of action with reference to God's own standard, and existing for ethical purposes as an accusing, and hence possibly also emotional, entity.

Weiss (II, 169 N5): "The *συρίσκειν* here, just as with Paul, is not men's consciousness as to their moral relation to God, as Riehm p. 676 defines it, but their consciousness as to their moral qualities of their actions and dispositions, and that no doubt determined according to the Divine Law."

e. Hebr. 13. 18.--In asking for the prayers of those receiving the Epistle the writer states that he has a *συρίσκειν καλόν*, *καλόν* is used antithetically to *πονηρόν* in the preceding passage, and synonymously to *γαρόν*, morally good, praiseworthy; hence as in the preceding objective construction, "consciousness of good deeds" (Th. p. 322). The good conscience of the writer is the result of his *ἐν πειρασμοῖς διήκοντος ἀναστρέφεται*. The volitive element has been stressed in this connection; but *ἐκείνη* in itself is not emphatic, stressing inclination rather than deliberation (Th. p. 286), and it would appear to be included for the sake of modesty of expression.

Kaehler (Gewissen p. 34 ff. quoted with approval by Hoffmann p. 188): "Die Grundforderung des Gewissens richtet sich an die Gewinnung des Menschen, er soll gewissenhaft, sittlich sein wollen. Fehlt ihm die Einsicht in das wahre göttliche Recht, so besteht die Verpflichtung nur Rechtlichkeit, d.h. zum subjektiv rechtlichen Verhalten nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen. Darum leitet der Verfasser des Hebräerbriefs sein gutes Gewissen daher, dass er gut handeln will c.13, 18.²

Conscience is here inclusive of judgment of action on the basis evidently of general popular ethical standards (*ἡ ἀποστολική* used of conduct in wider sense, Th. 42); emotional content can hardly be deduced here, and volitive elements, as stated, unsafely.

C. Pauline usage.-- *conscience* finds its most extensive usage in the New Testament with Paul. The explanation for this may lie in the fact that Paul was preeminently the teacher of the Gentiles; and as such he would, first, strive to give this term, evidently general in philosophical and even popular thought at his time, specifically Christian significance; and second, he would endeavor to utilize the phenomenon to advantage in convincing his pupils, unaccustomed to and sceptic of a revealed Divine Law, of the futility and vanity of self-righteousness, by appealing to that recognized channel to the innate remnant of a higher will. We should, therefore, find the roots of his concept of conscience in that of antiquity at approximately the stage of Seneca; a specialized ethical consciousness acting as judge and guardian (cf. p. 7). (Cf. Sanday p. 61).

Luthardt (p. 109) argues that "das N.T. u. speziell Paulus nicht e. eigene Lehre v. Gewissen aufstellt, sondern Begriff u. Tatsache nur heruebernahm u. sie durch die Verknuepfung mit dem neutest. Heil in das rechte Licht stellte..." Hofmann (p. 35): "So tritt auch hier (Petrus) der Gewissensbegriff sofort in Verbindung mit der Rechtfertigungslehre auf. Es laesst dies erwarten, dass er bei dem Apostel, welcher recht eigentlich alle Begriffe nach ihrer Bedeutung fuer die Rechtfertigungslehre misst, bei Paulus, noch viel mehr in den Vordergrund treten musste. Er hat den Begriff erst zu einem wahrhaft christlichen erhoben."

The two reports in Acts may be considered as trustworthy (cf. Knowling 20-22; Fuerbringer p. 41), and hence the use of the word authentically Pauline. The usage in the speeches and in the earlier writings of Paul is the earlier usage of the term in the New Testament.

1. Acts 23, 1.--This speech was probably spoken in Aramaic, and this translation is one made by Luke with his knowledge of Paul's diction and thought (cf. Knowling p. 22).--Paul wishes to attest the purity

of his past life, and asserts that to the time of speaking he had conducted himself (*πολιτεύων*), act as a citizen; Hellenistic, conduct one's self as pledged to some law of life; Th. 528) responsibly to God (Th. 528: "Live in accordance with the laws of God") *πρός συνείδησιν ἡμῶν*. The dative is evidently locative (parallel to Matt. 5, 8; Robertson Gram. p. 107), expressing the resultant accompaniment of right conduct. For *ἡμῶν* we can then choose the subjective meaning as in 1 Pet. 3, 21 (cf. p. 14 b), as pleasant; or, parallel to Hebr. 13, 18 (p. 18), objectively, consciousness of morally good conduct; the former would seem more natural. In any case, conscience is here consciousness of preserving obedience to God's will as ethical standard, and hence again presupposing judgment of action; while, in its assuring scope, an affective element is introduced.

Harless argues on the basis of this passage (p. 59): "Weil aber wie in (dieser) Stelle gesagt wird, der Mensch sich in seinem Verhalten nicht bloss in eine Beziehung zu sich und zu den Menschen, sondern auch zu Gott gesetzt weiss, so geht sein Bestreben dahin." But that does not imply that it is conscience itself which informs of the relation to God, that conscience is merely consciousness of a relation to God.

2. Acts. 24, 16.--Paul, in proving the integrity of his religion and his conduct before Felix, points to the fact that he strives to preserve *ἀπρόσκοπον συνείδησιν*. Conscience is thus represented as a faculty which is wounded or aggrieved by an act of the possessor; upright conduct is necessary to keep the conscience "void of offence" in relation to (*πρός* , Th. 543 3b) God and all men, in relation to the standards which God and men set up for conduct. With an element of knowledge, *ἀπρόσκοπος* can only refer to a consciousness cognizant of no offense; the almost personified term here, however, indicates that this registering of offence on the conscience produces a reaction, just as *ἡμάρτης* positively, a feeling of wrongness. Thus the term here implies a judgment on the basis of Divine law and general ethical principles; and a reaction confined to the individual, affective.

Thayer (p. 70) renders: "Not troubled and distressed by a consciousness of sin," i.e. conscience is represented as receiving, and the consciousness of sin as giving the hurt; hence conscience could not be the discrimination between good and bad, since discrimination could hardly be considered as suffering, and arguing for a purely emotional reflex. So also Meyer (p. 506): "Das gute Gewissen ist als keinen Anstoß erlitten habend, passiv, d.i. unerschuettert, in seinem unversehrten Gleichgewicht geblieben, gedacht." This seems to sacrifice too much of the etymological meaning of *suridenai*, as one element of general consciousness.

2. Rom. 2, 15.--This passage is considered to represent Paul's concept of conscience most clearly. To prove his contention that the heathen, who have no revelation of the will of God, nevertheless have a law of God in their hearts which is sufficient to make them responsible for sin, Paul points out that the heathen show, namely outwardly in their life, that they are obeying the dictates of a law which is "engraved in their hearts;" this outward testimony is reinforced by two factors, the witness of their conscience, and the thoughts which "mutually accuse and excuse one another." Much depends on interpreting these two factors as distinct, or the second as part of the first.

Denny, considering *suridenai* as reflection on conduct, regards the *λογισμοί* as separate (p. 598). Meyer (I, 120) considers the object of the "accusing and defending" the other members of the pagan society, and so distinguishes the factors: "While they make known outwardly by their action that the *νόμος* of the law is written in their hearts, their inner moral consciousness accords with it, namely (1) in reference to their own personal relation, the testimony of their own conscience; and (2) in regard to their mutual relation;" so Frank (p. 505): "*λογισμοί*, welche untereinander verklagen oder auch verteidigen, keineswegs identisch sind mit jenem Gewissen, sondern daraus hervorgehen." Strong (p. 255): "In Rom. 2, 15 we have conscience clearly distinguished both from the law and the perception of law on the one hand, and from the moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation on the other.."

Thayer takes the clause *καὶ αὐτοῖς*...as further explanation of *suridenai* (p. 602). Likewise Stoeckhardt (p. 90): "Die Gedanken, *λογισμοί*, sind hier nicht Erzeugnisse des denkenden, reflectirenden menschlichen Ich, sondern nach dem Zusammenhang die einzelnen Urteile, die einzelnen Actionen des Gewissens. Diese Gedanken stehen in Wechselverkehr *αὐτοῖς ἀλλήλων*, halten ein Zwiesgespräch unter sich." Cf. Robertson Gram. p. 148 on uses of *καὶ*, also Thayer 316 II.

If the *λογισμοί* are taken as a part of *suridenai*, then a distinctly intellectual activity is ascribed to conscience, which according to this passage consists in evaluating the data concerning right and

wrong (accusation or defence of other people is hardly tenable; nor the notion of "moral sentiments"), and balancing them for the sake of defence of one's own actions. To separate the *συμμετοχή* and the *λογισμός* tends to make the former an autonomous faculty, raising the question as to the nature of the *συμμετοχή* and its standard.

Thayer (p. 596): "To bear witness with, bear joint witness (with one);...their conscience also bearing witness, (i.e. together with the deeds of the Gentiles, which accord with the law of God and witness." Harless (p. 71): "το ἵψος τοῦ νόμου ist nach Analogie von ἵψος δούλου, ἵψος συγγενήτων usw. einfach so viel, als das Geschaeft, die Funktion, Wirksamkeit, Verrichtung des Gesetzes." P. 72: "Das positive Gesetz ist Anklager und Richter; Anklager und Richter sind die Heiden sich selbst im Zeugnis ihres Gewissens und in den Gedanken, die sich untereinander anklagen oder auch entschuldigen...Das οὐκ in συμμετοχῆς ist nicht zu beziehen auf das faelschlich gedeutete und ohnehin zu fernstehende ἵψος τοῦ νόμου, sondern als die sittlichen Handlungen begleitend, vielmehr ergaenzt sich als Objekt, womit das συμμετοχῆς, contestare, zusammentrifft, einfach νόμος, welches ja gleich vormansteht; das dem positiven Gesetz Analoge will ja der Apostel in den Heiden nachweisen, dies ist die Haupttendenz des ganzen Satzes....In ihrem Herzen klagen sie sich an und richten (rechtfertigen) sie sich--damit zeigen sie an, dass, was das Werk (Funktion) des positiven Gesetzes ist, ihren Herzen eingegraben ist.--Wer die Stelle so versteht,---der haelt weder το ἵψος τοῦ νόμου fuer das Tun, durch welches das Gesetz vollzogen wird, noch das ὁμοῦς ἐν τῷ, ἡτοίμη fuer eine den menschlichen Herzen eingegrabene Gesetzesvorschrift."

Conscience evidently testifies, along with the outward show in works of the inner law, that the heathen are a law unto themselves (v. 14). It tells the heathen person that he has a law within himself. The question is whether this law in itself is conscience or not.

Stoeckhardt (p. 90): "Das Gewissen ist eben nicht identisch mit dem Naturgesetz. Das Naturgesetz ist Norm, Forderung, Forderung Gottes, bezeugt dem Menschen in genere, was gut und boese ist, schreibt ihm vor, was er tun und lassen soll. Das Gewissen hingegen fordert nicht, sondern beurteilt die konkreten einzelnen Handlungen des Menschen, sagt dem Menschen, ob das, was er jetzt tun will oder tut oder getan hat recht oder unrecht ist oder war. Und da urteilt es eben nach jener dem Menscheninnern eingepraegten Norm; es ist nicht an sich selbst Quelle der Erkenntnis des Boesen und Guten, sondern schoepft sein Urteil aus der natuerlichen Gesetzeserkenntnis." Scaer (p. 6): "St. Paul distinguishes between natural law (Naturgesetz) and conscience; for he speaks first of the law written in their hearts, and then of something else additional, in the words, 'their conscience also bearing witness.'" Meyer (I 120 N1): "The inward law is not the conscience itself, but the regulative contents of the consciousness of the conscience; consequently, if we conceive the latter, and with justice is pre-

sented in the form of a syllogism, it forms the subject of the major premise of this syllogism." Frank (p. 505): "Das Gewissen... (welches) zwar in engster Beziehung zu jenem *νόμος ὁμοίων ἐν τοῖς ἰσχυρίσιν* steht, es selbst aber nicht ist.... Das Gewissen bezieht sich auf das ins Herz geschriebene Gesetz, empfaengt von daher seinen Inhalt, insofern es Bewusstsein um dieses Gesetz ist, aber nicht dies allein, sondern zugleich ein die Betätigung des Subjekts damit vergleichendes Bewusstsein, woraus sich dann begreift, dass verklagende oder die Anklage abweisende Gedanken daraus hervorgehen." Cf. also Strong (quoted p. 21).

Opposed to this negation of legislative faculty seems Denny (p. 598): "There is a triple proof that Gentiles... are a law unto themselves: 1) The appeal to their conduct... their conduct evinces, at least in some, the possession of law written on the heart; 2) the action of conscience; it joints its testimony, though it be only an inward one, to the outward testimony borne by their conduct; 3) their thoughts." More definite Sanday (p. 61): "Conscience with the ancients was the faculty which passed judgment upon actions after they were done, not so much the general source of moral obligation. In the passage before us St. Paul speaks of such a source (*ἐντολὴν τοῦ νοῦ*); but the law in question is rather generalized from the dictates of conscience than antecedent to them." Harless on the basis of the discussion quoted p. 22 concludes: "Von einem in die Herzen der Heiden unauslöschlich eingegrabenen Dekalog weiss die Stelle im Brief an die Römer ebensowenig, als die Geschichte der Heidenwelt, namentlich was die erste Tafel betrifft." (p. 73). Hofmann endeavors to suppress the autonomy of conscience somewhat by calling it a formal rather than material norm, p. 84: Das will heissen, es ist ein Massstab, der nicht unmittelbar in einen konkreten Fall bezogen sagt, ob dieses recht beschaffen ist." p. 85: "So vermag er allerdings Gesetzesstelle zu vertreten, und das ist seine hohe ethische Bedeutung, sofern er dem Menschen *ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ νόμος*, das dem Gesetz entsprechende Tuen, an der Hand giebt" (Rom. 2, 15). This somewhat obscure reasoning is rendered completely illogical by the comment to *συμμετρύουσιν* p. 86: "Er beruft sich auf das Mitzeugnis des Gewissens, als auf eine Bestätigung, die seine Behauptung in dem Bewusstsein des Menschen selbst findet, sofern dies, wie während der Lebenszeit, so am Gerichtstage, bezeugen wird das Gekannthaben einer Norm, nach welcher man sich richten konnte."

Contrary to Harless we conclude that *το ἔργον τοῦ νόμου ὁμοίων ἰσχυρίσιν* refers to the work which the law prescribes ("collectively" Denny p. 598) engraved in the hearts of natural man (*νόμος* v. 14). But it is necessary to admit, that from this passage it cannot be claimed that the witness of conscience reinforcing this first innate law is not autonomous; the *συμμετρύουσιν* goes back to *ἐντολὴν τοῦ νοῦ* v. 14; the passage does not state that the norm of conscience is the "law written in their hearts." Whether the *ἀγνοοῦσι* find their impulse from a self-contained law in conscience or not, must be decided

from other passages, since the *πνεῦμα* clause cannot be considered as the entire description of *conscience*, if apposite at all. What we do gain from this passage for the concept of conscience is: Reflection on the rightness or wrongness of actions (not necessarily only consequent, cf. Stoeckhardt p. 90), implying an urge to ascertain the right (this urge is not necessarily a part of conscience); testimony on the part of conscience that man in an unenlightened condition is a law to himself.

Hence we voice some of the disappointment of Harless, though on different premises, and without entering into the questions he propounds, after investigating Rom. 2, 15 (p. 73): "Ebenso wenig (wie von dem Dekalog im Herzen der Heiden) dient diese Stelle zur Erläuterung des Ursprungs und des Wesens des Gewissens. Denn jetzt erst hebt sich recht die Frage an: Wie kommt das menschliche Herz dazu, unter dem Zeugnis des Gewissens und der gegenseitigen Anklage oder auch Entschuldigung der Gedanken zu tun, was des positiven göttlichen Gesetzes ist, nämlich über sich selbst ein gerechtes Gericht zu fällen?"

4. Rom. 9, 1.--Paul cites the testimony of his conscience in affirming the truth of his statement concerning his grief over the rejection of Israel after the flesh. It is hardly tenable that *πνεῦμα ἵν'* directly modifies *conscience*, the essence or nature of conscience being changed by becoming included with the whole being of the Christian in the spirit of God, "in whom all the functions of the Christian life are carried on" (Demy p. 657).

Meyer (II, 112): "*πνεῦμα ἵν'* is by no means to be connected with *conscience* (Grotius and several others, Semler, Ammon, Vater: *Conscientia a Spiritu sancto gubernata*) because otherwise *πνεῦμα* would not be wanting; but either with *ὁ πρὸς* or, which is the nearest and simplest, with *συνειδήσις* ... The testimony of his conscience, Paul knows, is not apart from the *πνεῦμα* that fills him, but 'spiritu sancto duce et moderatore' (Beza) in that *πνεῦμα*." But Hofmann (p. 36): "In der Erneuerung durch den Heiligen Geist ist das Zeugnis des Gewissens aufgenommen in das Zeugnis des heiligen Geistes selbst; vgl. mit Roem. 8, 16." So Demy p. 656.

Lying is ethically reprehensible even to the pagan; and Paul is further asserting truth as a Christian *πνεῦμα ἵν'*; so his conscience testifies to the truth of a statement according to general

and Christian norms. Thus again conscience is spoken of as the judgment of action according to a norm, this judgment leaving a specific deposit upon the consciousness, in this instance favorable; satisfaction affectively with this verdict would have to be read into the passage, though it is not contradictory.

5. Rom. 13, 5.--An exact parallel to 1 Pet. 2, 19 (p. 13 ff.). Paul is admonishing toward obedience to government. Disobedience to government rightfully brings the wrath of government upon the offender. But the Christian must also obey government because of his Christian conscience. Because the Christian knows that God has instituted government, and government even in its tyrannical or cruel excrecences is divinely instituted, v. 4, therefore disobedience to government means disobedience to God, and this disobedience, being consciously disobedience, will be accompanied by an expression of conscience, consciousness of having disobeyed God. The wrath of government prompts to obedience because of the unpleasantness of punishment; conscience prompts to obedience in pointing out responsibility to God's will and ordinance. Conscience is thus operative through the intellectual process of discerning obedience to government as obedience to God; disobedience, disobedience to God. In that way conscience possesses a prompting function antecedent to action.

Denny (p. 697): "It is because conscience recognizes the moral value of the State as an ordinance of God that we pay taxes." Similarly Stoeckhardt (p. 582).

Feine (p. 291), Kaehler (p. 648), Hofmann (p. 36) call attention to the prompting, as well as binding power of conscience exhibited in this passage.

6. 1 Cor. 8, 7.--The first *version* (T.R.) is less preferable textually, though the more difficult reading, giving the notion of "consciousness of an idol" with specifically ethical implications.

Findlay lists for *version* DGL, Western texts; for *version* N*ABP 17, 46, 67**, cop. Euthal. Dam.; the latter would read: "By reason of their habituation up till now to the idol," while the former: "Through relation of the conscience to the idol;"

the interpretation being: They eat "under the consciousness that it is such, with the sense haunting them that what they eat belongs to the idol and associates them with it." (p. 842). So Schaff-Lange: "*συνείδησις* does not mean opinion in general, or judgment, or conviction, but, as uniformly in the New Testament, it means conscience, a person's consciousness in its moral and religious aspect. *συνείδησις τοῦ ἰδωλέω* then, denotes this consciousness as having for its contents or object an idol, and that too, according to the context, as a real influential power, just as in 1 Pet. 2, 19 *συνείδησις τοῦ Θεοῦ* means a conscience testifying of God. Here it denotes a conscience possessed with the idea that an idol is a real being; so that this idea influences his judgment in regard to his conduct; and in this case it stamps the eating of that flesh as an immoral sinful act, altering the whole religious state and relations of the Christian who eats, because it is the eating of something connected with a veritable idol, and therefore defiling in its nature." (p. 174). (*συνείδησις* preferred ICC. p. 168).

συνείδησις τοῦ ἰδωλέω in this connection would appear to be a consciousness of doing wrong, namely with reference to the First Commandment, based on a (false) notion that worship-relations clung to this meat of the offering; hence a comparison of action with law.

The people who eat of the idol-offering with the notion that it is still such when they eat, are said to have a conscience *ἀσθενής*, weak, infirm. The question arises whether the sense is a transferred one, or whether conscience is spoken of as being impaired in function.

Thayer (p. 80): "Wanting in decision about things lawful and unlawful." Choice of interpretations given by ICC (p. 168): "It is not quite clear what is meant by *ἀσθενής*. It may mean 'too weak to resist the temptation of following the example of others,' or 'weak through being unilluminated' (Note: Perhaps XI, 30 indicates that *ἀσθενής* here means unhealthy, morbid, and so incapable of healthy action; cf. Luke X, 9; Acts V, 15. Words signifying weakness of body easily become used of mental and moral weakness. A healthy conscience would not be uneasy about eating such food, and eating would then cause no defilement. Eccles. XXI, 28)...The weakness consists in giving moral value to things that are morally indifferent. That must lessen the power of conscience." Schaff-Lange (p. 174) adopts the latter view: "The weakness is found in the fact that it cannot deliver itself from these false notions; nor assure the person of the entire nullification of his relations to idols and to all their defiling influences by his fellowship with Christ, or of the restoration of his true relations to God, and consequently also to the totality of all things, as dependent on God alone and belonging to him."

ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἰδωλέῳ would imply that with the proper *ἰδωλέω* the *ἀσθενής* of the *συνείδησις* would be removed; hence

"weak through being unilluminated" seems the proper interpretation. This does not necessarily make a normative content essential for conscience, but merely signifies that without sufficient norm conscience is unreliable with respect to ethical value. Hence this passage is a proof for the fact that conscience is not normative in itself, but dependent on a norm, which it utilizes in evaluating action.

When the people with this *übersichtliche Gewissen* eat of the idol-offering, *übersichtliche Gewissen*. Conscience in the condition proper for the Christian is thought of as being *richtig*, right; the consciousness of sin, produced by recognizing failure to comply with God's will according to a valid norm, here mixed with the false opinion concerning the idol-offering, is a blot upon the normally spotless surface of the good conscience.

Thayer (p. 417): "Conscience reproached by sin"; is figuratively true. Schaff-Lange (p. 174): "The defilement consists in a conviction of guilt, the conscience being troubled by a sense of the Divine displeasure perfracting it. 'Conscience--the moral sentiment of honor--the watchman of our moral purity, is itself pure so long as it remains true to its own determinations; hence *verunreinigt* to be defiled, is a striking expression, denoting the desecration of that which according to its nature and intent is holy.' Oslander." (ICC (p. 168): "It is defiled, not by the partaking of polluted food, for food cannot pollute (Mark VII, 18. 19; Luke XI, 41), but by the doing of something which the unenlightened conscience does not allow. Cf. 2 Cor. VII, 1."

But even though the ultimate action in which conscience played a part, namely conscientious objection to eating the idol-offering, is wrong, the operation of conscience is to be considered as important and demanding of all consideration.

Hofmann (p. 37): "Jeder ist an sein eignes Gewissen gebunden, aber es ist auch die *überwiegende* des Andern zu respectiren von dem, der die *primäre* des Rechten hat; denn ein, wenn auch indirektes, Einwirken auf den Schwachen, welches zur Folge hat, dass er wider sein Gewissen handelt, schwächt seine Gewissenhaftigkeit und macht, dass er verloren geht, 1 Kor. 9, 10." ICC (p. 168): "An uninstructed conscience may condemn what is not wrong, or allow what is; but even in such cases it ought to be obeyed (Rom. XIV, 231)." Cf. Findlay p. 842.

7. 1 Cor. 8, 10.--Arguing for consideration of the members of the church which have not yet attained to a full knowledge regarding matters of Christian liberty, St. Paul ironically asks whether the conscience of a brother who is weak, *edifying*, will be edified, strengthened, by seeing another with correct knowledge eating of the idol offering.

Thayer (p. 440) adopts the A.V. rendering of *oikodomein*: "Disposed...to do even what is wrong." It seems much closer to clear interpretation to gather with Findlay: "The vb. 'edified'--instead of 'persuaded' or the like--is used in sad irony;... the eaters of idolothyta thought their practice 'edifying' to less advanced brethren--'edifying, forsooth!--to what end?'"

The "weakness" of weak conscience is thus ascribed directly to the man himself, as imperfection of knowledge; strengthening of conscience is thought to take place, therefore, by instruction, carried on in the right manner, concerning those things in which conscience may register scruples; hence conscience operates on the basis of knowledge (implying an analytic or reflective function), presence or absence of correct knowledge impairing the effectiveness of conscience as a moral agent, not necessarily the essence of conscience itself. Despite the fact that conscience is active in leading to a false attitude, the operations of conscience itself must be fully respected; for failure to do so may lead to loss of salvation, v. 11.

ICC (p. 172): "His conscience is not sufficiently instructed to tell him that he may eat without scruple, and yet he eats. Doing violence to scruples is no true edification; it is rather a pulling down of bulwarks."

Hofmann is led by his peculiar theory of conscience to claim with reference to 1 Cor. 8, 7. 10. 12: "Worin liegt ihre Schwache?...nicht darin, dass ihnen das noethige Mass sittlicher Erkenntnisse fehlte,--denn das ist abermals keine Schwache, i.e. Mangel an Kraft, sondern Mangel an einem Gute,--vielmehr darin, dass sie es nicht ueber sich vermoegen, in dieser Frage an ihrem Gewissen selbst zu recurriren und seinen Ausspruch energisch zu befolgen, sondern an einem Vorurtheil haften bleiben, welches genug Autoritaet fuer sie hatte, um sich an die Stelle ihres Gewissens zu setzen und an seiner Statt ihr sittliches Verhalten zu bestimmen." (p. 183). This is refuted by the fact that in this verse the adjective *edifying* is applied directly to the man opposed to the *idolothyta*.

8. 1 Cor. 8, 12.--The weak conscience, or conscience of the weak brother (hence used interchangeably), by the harsh action of the stronger, is wounded, disquieted (Thayer, *word*, p. 632). The weak Christian is led to believe that his conscience is faulty, and thus it is rendered useless in respect to its guiding function. This is a sin against Christ, since the convert is made to do things against conviction and thus made consciously to sin, Rom. 15, 23, an action fatal to faith and salvation.

ICC (p. 172): "Wounding and weakening are in emphatic contrast; what requires the tenderest handling is brutally treated, so that its sensibility is numbed. The wounding is not the shock which the weak Christian receives at seeing a fellow-Christian eating idol-meats in an idol-court, but in the inducement to do the like, although he believes it to be wrong. His conscience is lamed by being crushed."

This passage thus implies that conscience is impaired by disregard of its reactions. But according to the previous exposition, the conscience laboring under misinformation is particularly open to such deterioration. Hence we conclude, that the misinformed conscience is disregarded, its function made inoperative in the ethical life, because agreement with its "sanction" leads to consciousness of sin or a "bad" conscience, as well as disagreement with the norm immediately acknowledged. The only escape from a conscience constantly bad is disregard of its decisions by whatever means can be employed. Hence again it is not conscience itself that is weakened in nature or function, but its decisions are merely set aside.

9. 1 Cor. 10, 25 and 27.--The two uses are analogous; the Christians are advised to take the meat sold in the shambles, or to eat that set before them, *under circumstances not to be considered*. It is best to take *de' consideration* as "simply defining the kind of question deprecated" (Findlay, p. 867); conscience should not come into question at all, should not be required to give negative or positive reactions concerning this question, since "the earth is the

Lord's, and the fulness thereof. Ps. 24, 1 is a standard clearly defining all action on this matter; hence there need be no more examination or *εἰσέταξις* (Findlay: "Enquiry with a view to judgment at the bar of conscience" p. 867), to discover whence the food comes, and therefore no more alignment of this action under further categories of right or wrong. Thus the judging function of conscience appears to be implied in this passage.

We do not understand Kaehler's reference (p. 648) to this passage as an instance of conscience being a "Beweggrund" parallel to Rom. 13, 4.

10. 1 Cor. 10, 28 and 29.--The second occurrence is appositive to the first.--Those that have the proper view of the matter of idol-meat should, nevertheless, yield to the man who, out of scruples, calls attention to the fact that it is meat offered to idols. The strong should not eat "for the sake of him that disclosed and for conscience' sake." *διὰ* is used but once, showing that *καὶ τῆς συνείδησός* is one idea (Findlay p. 868), indicating that it is the conscience of him that did the disclosing. This is made clear by v. 29, "conscience, I say, not that of thyself, but that of the other," namely the one calling attention to the idol-meat. To eat in the face of the circumstances mentioned would be the situation described 1 Cor. 8 12 (p. 29). Hence the discussion at that occasion applies here; to eat despite the scruples of the brother would lead to sin in either alternative, by confusing right norms with wrong, and not informing of the right.

11. 1 Cor. 10, 29b.--St. Paul justifies his statement in the preceding part of the verse and sentence, that the strong should yield to the scruples of the weak, by the rhetorical question: "For what purpose (*ἵνα*) is my freedom judged by another conscience?" i.e. what good does it do to flaunt one's liberty, if it is thereby subjected to the censure of an uninstructed conscience? None, but only harm, since thereby the brother is involving himself in the

dilemma of sin against conscience or sin against Christian freedom. Conscience is thus represented as a faculty exercising censure, passing judgment, on the actions of another person (cf. Feine p. 291). Hence a judging activity is ascribed to conscience, moral, since it applies to right and wrong in the ethical sense, but extended to actions outside one's own deeds, not only one's own.

Cf. Findlay (p. 869); he also suggests that "*ἐλπίς συνειδήσεως* indicates a distinction not merely in the persons but in the consciences severally possessed." But just *ἐλλος* in distinction to *ἑκαστος* denotes numerical, individual differences, as opposed to distinction in kind, qualitatively; cf. Thayer p. 29.

12. 2 Cor. 1, 12.--Paul wishes to assure the Corinthians of the integrity of his conduct and teaching, especially with reference to their own congregation; and he sums it up as his "boasting," namely the *μαρτυρία τῆς συνειδήσεως*, that he behaved in the world in holiness and sincerity of God. "*μαρτυρία* is the thing testified to by conscience, as contrasted with *μαρτυρία*, the act of testimony." (Bernard p. 42). Paul's especial cause for boasting is not simply that he did behave thus, implying that his outward life was upright, but that his conscience testifies to the fact; his own consciousness, registering the inner motives and hidden deficiencies, is clear of infringement of divine and human standards. Thus this passage indicates a function of conscience of bearing witness to outward assertions; and it indicates an element of the nature of conscience, since this witness must be based on analysis of action according to an accepted norm. The latter point, however, is not essentially contained in this passage.

Bernard (p. 42): "*conscience* represents the self sitting in judgment on self, a specially Greek idea." Plummer (p. 24): "Reflection on the value of the actions which we are conscious of doing." This is rather vague and extensive. Harless (p. 59): "Das richtige Bewusstsein um den ethisch richtigen oder unrichtigen Stand des Menschen..."; he quotes also 1 Tim. 3, 9; 1, 19.

Hofmann (p. 36) goes too far in saying: "...Individuell die hoechste Instanz, welche dem Menschen die Gewissheit fuer sich und die Legitimation nach Aussen giebt, dass er in der Wahrheit stehe." This seems to ascribe to conscience an independence.

13. 2 Cor. 4, 2.--St. Paul commends himself to the Corinthians, showing that he kept himself pure in conduct, that he did not corrupt the Word of God, but by "manifestation of the truth" commended himself to every conscience of men before God. *paripuros* occurs also 1 Cor. 12, 7 of manifestation of the Holy Spirit. Paul evidently means by *paripuros* *τῆς ἀληθείας* the manifestation of truth in himself, according to the foregoing, the refraining from evil life or corruption of doctrine. Thus it was particularly his moral rectitude which he presented to his hearers for approval of their conscience; and where this was approved, his doctrine had ready access. In view of the preponderantly ethical tone of the verse this seems the correct interpretation, although many have endeavored to prove from this that conscience is an immediate point of contact for the Gospel.

This point of contact is considered aptitude for truth in general: Harless (p. 58): "Das Bewusstsein des Menschen, kraft dessen man ihm beifälligen Sinn fuer Wahrheit und Wahrhaftigkeit zutraut. Das Gewissen faellt dem bei, was wahr ist. 2 Kor. 4, 2; 5, 11." Thus it is considered the organ of reception of revealed truth: Hofmann (p. 31): "Dadurch erst war auch eine Instanz im Menschen gesetzt, an welcher alle geoffenbarte Wahrheit in ihm selbst ihre Legitimation (vgl. Kaehler und Auberlen) und dadurch ihren Anknuepfungspunkt suchen konnte (2 Kor. 4, 2; Roem. 8, 16; Joh. 7, 17)." p. 36: "Es ist das auch im natuerlichen Menschen restitirende Apperceptionsvermoegen und Distinctionsvermoegen fuer das Goettliche, und als solches eine generelle Instanz, welche dem an sie appellirenden Goettlichen ihr Mitzeugnis nicht versagen kann (2 Kor. 4, 2.5.11)." Thus it is considered receptive specifically for the Gospel: Oosterzee (p. 276): "In this very conscience does the Gospel seek and find in every man its secret point of contact; 2 Cor. 4, 2; 11b."

The conscience thus appealed to for ratification of his own conduct (another instance of approval of another's conduct, Feine, p. 291) is *non cursivus*, every conscience, not necessarily "every kind of conscience." The consciences of men, analysing Paul's conduct by the norm afforded them (Rom. 2, 15), would render the judgment that his actions were right, and hence not unworthy of a message

purporting to be absolute truth.

Plummer (p. 112): "Unto the human conscience in all its forms; passion and prejudice are no safe judges; reason cannot always be trusted; even conscience is not infallible, for the conscience of this or that individual, or class, or profession may give a faulty decision. St. Paul takes a wider range. He appeals to every kind of conscience among men, confident that they will all admit the justice of his claim." Schaff-Lange (p. 66): "The word is said to signify that mental power which makes us conscious of and certifies to us those thoughts and emotions which pass through our minds, shows us what is truth and duty, and enforces its assertions and claims only on the ground that everything it approves must be true and right, and that our spirit and motives must be conformed to our conceptions of truth and duty....The Apostle intended to say...that the way in which he preached was such that every man's conscience approved of him, and hence that all who attended to the verdicts of conscience, and were not led by corrupt inclinations to reject such decisions, would be obliged to confess that his conduct sprang from a pure and honest heart. Such an explanation seems to us more conformed to the context than that of Oslander, who defines the *conscience* here to be the essential organ for the recognition of truth, and which must assent to the Gospel as the truth and power of God, because it corresponds to man's necessities and is effectual to awaken and tranquilize his moral nature."

Bernard draws this conclusion from the "point of contact" interpretation (p. 59): "The appeal to conscience can never be omitted with safety, and any presentation of Christianity which is neglectful of the verdict of conscience on the doctrines taught is at once un-Apostolic and un-Christlike."

14. 2 Cor. 5. 11.--The use here is parallel to that in the preceding passage. St. Paul strives to please men in view of the fact that Christ will judge all things at the last day; he acknowledges that God understands him, knows his nature and the things which he has done; and he hopes, earnestly, to be thoroughly understood, openly and clearly in all his motives and actions, also in the consciences of those to whom he is writing. Thus the reference is again on the field of conduct; Paul trusts that his actions and his preaching have been such that their consciences, applying such norms of faith and morals which they had, would judge Paul blameless.

15. 1 Tim. 1. 5.--Paul says that the final cause or purpose of the commandment or charge, the Law of God with respect to right living, is love from a clean heart and good conscience and sincere faith.

As the Charge is something which asserts itself in action, the love spoken of is actual, practical love; hence deeds of love are spoken of which proceed from a clean, regenerate heart. They proceed also from a good conscience, the same phrase as 1 Pet. 3, 16; 21 (pp. 13-15), as there the consciousness subjectively of no accusation of guilt for sin committed, objectively the consciousness of having done the right thing. Thus "love from a good conscience" is unfeigned, genuine love and its exercise. Closer insight into the nature of conscience, besides the fact that it presupposes evaluation of deeds according to a standard, is thus not afforded here.

Kretzmann (p. 31) includes more in the consciousness of conscience: "Dies schliesst vor allem in sich, dass der Mensch von dem Bewusstsein der Schuld Gott gegenueber frei ist, dass er also die Glaubensgewissheit habe, dass er von aller Schuld freigesprochen sei, dass er voellig gerechtfertigt vor der ganzen Welt dastehe. Dieses gute Gewissen schliesst nun aber auch das Bewusstsein, das Gute zu wollen, in sich.."

Harless (p. 60) stresses the difference between *symploke* and *symploke* on the basis of this passage.

16. 1 Tim. 1, 19.--"Good conscience" is used here in the same way as in the preceding passage, with the application limited to the pastor's life. The good conscience is a perpetual guarantee for integrity of conduct morally, a prerequisite for constructive Christian living.

17. 1 Tim. 3, 9.--The context admonishes the deacons to good character and mode of life; and thus in general the verse indicates that the deacons should lead a life which is able to keep their faith pure and undefiled. If the deacons become guilty of manifest constant sins such as are mentioned in v. 8, their faith will become forfeited. Hence a clean conscience ("clean") parallel to *καθαρός*; in the specifically ethical sense, free from every admixture of what is false, sincere, Thayer 312), as a guarantee of Christian living, is necessary for holding faith. (Cf. Kretzmann p. 96).

18. 1 Tim. 4, 2.--Those who depart from the faith are said to speak lies in hypocrisy, and in respect to their own conscience (or acc. with pass verb Robertson p. 96) *κακαυτηριασμένοι*, burned with a branding iron, (or CD Rec. *κακαυτηριασμένοι*, branded). The interpretation varies widely; the best seems to employ the figure of the branding of criminals, that these apostates have burned into their souls the consciousness of doing wrong in their hypocrisy.

So Thayer (p. 342): "Whose souls are branded with the marks of sin, i.e. who carry about with them the perpetual consciousness of sin." Similarly, with picture of the criminal's brand, Kretzmann (p. 117). Shared by Bengel and Alford, and rejected by White with alternative: "Their conscience is callous from constant violation, as skin grows hard from searing; or it may mean that these men bore branded on their conscience the ownership marks of the Spirit of evil" (p. 121). Ummelow rather remotely: "False principles were burnt into them."

Thus with the general meaning of consciousness of sin, produced by recognizing actions as incompatible with God's standard, may possibly be joined a reference to the emotional side of the bad conscience, that the consciousness of sin pains as does a searing iron (Kretzmann p. 117).

19. 2 Tim. 1, 3.--The Apostle says that he has served God from the time of his forefathers with a pure conscience, *ἐν καθαρῇ συνείδησει*. It is thus practically parallel to 1 Tim. 3, 9 (p. 34); and according to the underlying discussion, conscience untinged with the consciousness of having done wrong. *καθαρὰ* refers specifically to worship (Thayer p. 373). Dispute has arisen whether the phrase "pure conscience" is applicable to Paul before his conversion.

Hofmann quotes Kaehler: "Paulus kann auch trotz seiner vorchristlichen Verirrungen, ja mit Bezug auf diese sagen, 2 Tim. 4, 3 etc." (p. 188). But Kretzmann (p. 199): "Der Apostel redet von seinem Gottesdienst, nicht von etwaigen in Unwissenheit begangenen Sünden."

But from the usage throughout ethical we apply the phrase here to the consciousness of moral rectitude necessary for right worship; even if some sort of consciousness of correct worship were meant,

a worship combined with persecution of Christ would be a sin committed in ignorance as well as persecutions in general. The fact remains that Paul acted consistently according to norms which he regarded as valid, whether Pharisaic or Christian. Thus the general consciousness of moral integrity based on judgment of action obtains here likewise.

20. Tit. 1, 15.--The Jewish fables and commandments of men, v. 14, set up standards of morality which were both impossible to fulfill and opposed to God's own revealed will; hence those trying to fulfill these ordinances were beset by the perpetual consciousness that they could not, did not fulfill them; and since Christ's forgiveness was spurned, conscience could never attain peace. Those who had attained a clean conscience, free from all sting of sin, through faith in Christ, could enjoy everything given to man by God, untrammelled by the notions induced by man. But the unbelievers, who through their own work-righteousness and self-imposed ordinances defiled, ~~unmoral~~, their understanding, defiled also their conscience, since their actions were contrary to the will of God. Thus the figure is parallel to ~~conscience~~ 1 Tim. 4, 2 (p. 35), of the defiling consciousness of sin, measured by the Divine norm of what is commanded and what is forbidden. (Cf. Kretzmann p. 316 ff.)

Harless (p. 60) and Hofmann (p. 36) direct attention to the division from the ~~conscience~~. Oosterzee generalizes the reference in a dangerous manner (p. 276): "But in the sinner, understanding and conscience are both defiled." Similarly White (p. 190): "The statement that the conscience can be defiled is significant. While conscientious scruples are to be respected, yet, if the conscience be defiled, its dictates and instincts are unreliable, false as are the song-efforts of one who has no ear for music." It is just this type of conscience that is active, since it is conscious of defilement. The "bad" conscience is not faulty with respect to nature or function, but with respect to the content of its consciousness.

II. Old Testament Parallels.

A. No special word for conscience.--If it is true that Paul borrowed the term *conscience* from contemporary philosophical thought, then the absence of a word covering the same notion in the Old Testament does not appear so surprising. We should, however, expect to find functions of conscience as delineated in the New Testament, expressed in the same terms and ascribed to faculties generally approximating the New Testament conscience.

1. Iscl. 10, 20.--In this passage *קִרְיָה* is translated in the LXX by *conscience*. *קִרְיָה* in Dan. 1, 4, 17, as also 2 Chr. 1, 10-12, is used for understanding, mental penetration, comprehension, parallel to *דַּעַת* and *מַחְשָׁבָה*. In this passage some for the sake of the parallelism derive it from *קִרְיָה* and translate: Briadal chamber; therefore, bed-chamber; this seems plausible. In the former sense of a psychological faculty it would have to mean consciousness or thought in general; "Curse not the king in thy thought," i.e. without even speech. In any case nothing definite could be derived from the word for the concept of conscience, though the notion of conscience held by the LXX might be illuminated by this translation. *קִרְיָה* surely does not correspond to an ethical consciousness. (Cf. Gesenius p. 400).

Hofmann (p. 26 N 1): "*קִרְיָה* Pred. 10, 20, welches die LXX durch *conscience* uebersetzen, ist keineswegs damit identisch; es bedeutet nur das Bewusstsein in seiner Innerlichkeit und Verborgtheit, das innerliche Geschehen im Gegensatz zu dem nach aussen hin sich kundgebende Geschehen."

2. Reasons for no specific term.--Explanation for the lack of a specific term depends largely upon the theory of conscience adopted. The most plausible explanation is, that the full presentation and application of an objective law, with a complete system of penalties for every misdemeanor, did not permit conscience so fully to

assert itself as a judging, warning, and reproving agent as was the case with the later pagan world, where every subjective ethical reaction was called into play because of the decay of objective norms.

Faulty exegesis is responsible for Hofmann's theory (p. 35): "Die noch nicht eingetretene Erneuerung des Gewissens durch die Gabe des Heiligen Geistes (*et sanctificatio in novam vitam*, Roem. 9, 1) machte das Zurueckgehen auf das Gewissen als auf die individuelle sittliche Instanz, zu einem gefaehrlichen Subjectivismus." Better the next sentence: "Die Gewissensnorm fand in dem geoffenbarten Gesetze so sehr ihren adequate Ausdruck, dass sie in ihrer Selbststaendigkeit neben jenem nicht empfunden wurde." Similarly Frank (p. 505): "Wir verstehen damit (einem die Betaetigung des Subjektes mit einem Gesetze vergleichenden Bewusstsein) auch die Tatsache, dass im A.T., wo das positive geoffenbarte Gesetz dem Bewusstsein des Volkes innewohnte und undeswillen das natuerlicherweise ins Herz geschriebene Gesetz nicht zu einer selbstaendigen Grosse sich entfalten liess, sondern dieses gewissermassen in sich aufgenommen, sich mit ihm amalgamiert hatte, ein einzelner bestimmter Ausdruck fuer das "Gewissen" fehlte; freilich nicht so, dass die Sache ueberhaupt fehlte, indem hier vornehmlich dem Herzen diejenigen Funktionen zugeschrieben werden, welche sonst als solche des Gewissens erscheinen." This is based partially on the radical assumption that the norm acknowledged by conscience is particularly the innate norm; hence the self-contradiction between the denial of a name for a specialized function and the admission that these functions existed. (cf. Luthardt 108).

3. **לֵב**.--The heart in Old Testament psychology was the seat of all mental life, including sensation and emotion, motive and aesthetics; therefore also the center of ethical life. 1 Sam. 24, 6; 2 Sam. 24, 10 describe the heart as being "smitten" presumably with the pangs of a bad conscience; Lev. 26, 36. 37; Deut. 38, 67, describe the weakness of a heart convicted of misdeeds; Jer. 20, 9, the impelling power of responsibility to God's law; 1 Kings 2, 44, consciousness of sin; Job 27, 6, consciousness of sin and guilt (Luther: "Mein Gewissen beisst mich nicht."). But the use of **לֵב** in wider relations makes it useless to attempt the extraction of specific elements of conscience from this Old Testament term.

Hofmann (p. 25): "Das Herz...das nun freilich als Central-sitz aller geistigen Taetigkeiten einen so unbestimmten Untergrund fuer das Wesen des Gewissens bildet, dass wir schliesslich nichts weiter daraus entnehmen koennen als dies, dass die empfundenen Erscheinungen des Gewissens auf das innerste Personenleben zurueckgefuehrt wurden."

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B. General parallels.--Besides the parallels adduced to the New Testament concept of conscience under the ethical usage of $\lambda\gamma\omega\varsigma$, general parallels, usually chosen on the basis of a particular theory of conscience, and thus possessing merely illustrative value for the doctrine, are pointed out: The reactions in Adam and Eve at the Fall, Gen. 3; the rationalization of Cain and his restlessness upon earth after his conviction, Gen. 4; the consternation of Abimelech, Gen. 20; the weakness of the person convicted of sin, Prov. 28, 1; even the scattering of nations after building the tower of Babel, Gen. 11, all are ascribed to phases of conscience (Hofmann, pp. 25-30; Graebner pp. 15-17).

III. Conclusion.

From the above discussion it becomes evident that the Biblical doctrine dealing explicitly with conscience must be derived from the New Testament. The etymology of the word *conscience* would incline toward a content of consciousness or knowledge to be sought in every use of the term, but the etymology is not in itself sufficient grounds for assuming this content, and may even recede before the popular usage of the term. It may be questioned whether a homogeneous usage of the term is to be expected or sought at all. It is legitimate to assume a unified usage of the term, since the word in the Apostolic Age had attained to general significance and would, therefore, be used alike by different writers; and the previous investigation warrants the conclusion that the two passages considered not to treat of conscience, Hebr. 10, 2 and 1 Pet. 2, 19, (pp. 13 and 17) warrant the same activity for conscience as do other instances.

A. Nature of conscience.--Under this section of the conclusions must be considered conscience as an entity, either a specialized or a synthesized psychological faculty or capacity.

1. Universality of conscience.--Conscience is everywhere spoken of as a self-evident part of the human equipment; this universality of conscience is directly made the basis of argument Rom. 2, 15.

Kaehler (p. 648) lists as "allgemeines Menschengewissen" 2 Cor. 4, 2; Rom. 2, 15; 13, 5.6; 1 Cor. 8, 7; 10, 23.

2. Conscience as a special organ or faculty.--If conscience is to be considered a special organ in the psychological composition of man, we should expect it throughout to be spoken of either as a particular type of consciousness, or a special intellectual function, or a specialized emotion.

a. Conscience as a special form of consciousness.--That conscience acts in consciousness is evident from etymology and usage, in every instance. The question is whether this consciousness is caused by conscience, or whether this consciousness is in itself conscience, or whether conscience contains nothing besides simple consciousness. The first question must be answered under the discussion of conscience as an intellectual faculty or an emotion. Conscience is a specialized consciousness, as will be shown under function; it is the knowledge or consciousness of having done wrong, or no wrong, or of others having acted ethically. Thus the consciousness itself is conscience. This consciousness, however, psychologically engenders further reactions; Adjustments mentally, responses emotionally, with consequent further items of consciousness. Whether conscience, then, is to be regarded as simple consciousness or not, depends upon Biblical usage including or omitting intellectual or emotional accompaniments as intrinsic parts of conscience.

b. Conscience as a specialized intellectual process.--If the second phrase in Rom. 2, 15 is assumed to represent the entire activity of conscience, then we define the nature of conscience as

reasoning on the basis of acknowledged innate or external norms for the purpose of ascertaining ethical guilt or innocence. But even if it could be established that the second phrase is purely expository, it would not prove that the whole nature of conscience is thereby expressed. An analytical faculty is presupposed in the presentation of conscience (cf. par. 3, b below); yet it is not possible on the basis of Scripture to assert that this judging function embraces the whole nature of conscience.

c. Conscience as a specialized emotion.--Emotional aspects of a psychological arc are the most predominant in consciousness; and hence we are prone to align whole reactions under the limited scope of emotion. "There seems to be a distinct feeling side to the "good" conscience, the "clean" conscience, especially in the assuring scope; cf. pp. 13, 14, 16, 21. Yet it would be difficult to regard conscience approving of another person's actions as a pure emotion; pp. 31, 32, 33; if the person is visualized as imagining himself acting in the manner of the actions presented to him for approval, then a variety of functions is added to conscience beyond those ascribable to an emotion.

3. Conscience as a combination of faculties.--The above discussion should prove that it is very difficult to define conscience as any single psychological "faculty." A survey of possible conclusions in regard to conscience as a faculty integrated from capacities of perception and consciousness, judgment and knowledge, feeling and emotion, and will and motive, hence conscience as a type of instinct, is in place.

a. Perceptual features.--Aside from the consciousness in every act of conscience, in connection with the functions of conscience there are specifically perceptual features: Perception of the relation to God (p. 13); consciousness and retention of the fact and

message of Christ's atonement (p. 150); consciousness of guilt with reference to sin, and hence perception of standards and their validity (p. 16); perception of life as clear of sin (p. 34). In no case, however, as far as we can judge, save in the last, is this perceptive act regarded as an essential part of conscience, or as conscience altogether; but neither is it possible from the passages to state that these features do not belong to conscience.

b. Intellectual features.--A process of reflection is mentioned in connection with conscience (p. 24), without specification whether it is antecedent to conscience or consequent, or whether it is in itself conscience. A process of judgment, evaluation of the deeds of another person, is mentioned as a distinct activity of conscience (pp. 31-33); and in almost all instances of the use of the term an activity whereby one's own actions are judged according to some standard is a presupposition for the essential consciousness of having done wrong. The latter cases (cf. pp. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 32, 36) clearly imply the necessity of a comparing or judging operation, but do not warrant, in themselves, the ascribing of this operation to conscience itself. The former cases (pp. 31-33), concerning conscience with reference to other men's acts, depress the activity of simple consciousness to a minimum and emphasize the judging function; yet they could be harmonized with other passages by assuming, on the basis of their specifically ethical content and in view of the fact that the actions considered are evidently regarded in relation to the possessors of the conscience, that the persons appealed to gain their reactions of conscience by putting themselves in the position of the appealing person; i.e. when Paul commends his actions to the conscience of the Corinthians, he asks them to recognize what their conscience would register if they would behave in the manner of Paul's past life. This same difficulty arises in connection with the discussion of the emotional side. But if this is the meaning of an appeal to

another person's conscience, then the analytical or judging side of conscience in addition to mere consciousness is not only not removed, but we have added an intellectual function of imagination. In general, therefore, we feel warranted to conclude that a critical, hence reflective, specifically intellectual character, is ascribed by Biblical usage to conscience.

c. Affective features.--A feeling of satisfaction attendant upon the conscience free from guilt of transgression, and of dissatisfaction and unrest connected with the consciousness of having broken a standard of conduct, has been observed to be more or less prominent in various passages dealing with conscience (cf. pp. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 35). The negative feeling appears especially predominant (cf. p. 17); and the view would not be impossible that the "good" feeling would be simply the absence of the "bad" conscience." However, we do not find instances where the consciousness of conscience is purely a feeling. It seems always to be bound up with the sense of ethical wrongness, as applied to definitely known actions. Thus we find no warrant, though no opposition, for ascribing affective or emotional phases to the essence of conscience, as presented in the New Testament.

d. Volitive features.--Simple consciousness leaves no room for volitive reactions; the question of volitive aspects arises with the assumption that a critical and reflective faculty is embraced in conscience. Conscience is represented as an incentive to action (pp. 13, 25), although indirectly; and through this means may be thought to influence action against obstacles, one element of "will." Conscience may present a consciousness which is the result of voluntarily controlled activity (cf. p. 18); but this does not add a volitive element to the essence of conscience. The fundamental function of conscience of judging dependently rather than asserting autonomously (see below B 1a) would imply, moreover, that conscience is bound in a more reflexive manner to objective norms, and hence independent of volition.

B. Functions of conscience.--The principal question in this section of the conclusion are: Has conscience functions beyond its ethical activity? and, Is conscience a norm for itself in its activities?

1. Ethical functions.--In every instance where the term was used, we have found conscience active with respect to conduct or duty, if not explicitly so, at least indirectly (cf. p. 32). This function is considered so important, that the results of its execution are to be heeded, even when a collision is effected with intrinsic right (cf. p. 27, 28); and neglect or suppression of its function will lead to loss of salvation. This ethical function is carried out in several specific functions.

a. Legislative function.--This function, implying that conscience of itself is a norm for conduct, deriving its standard from no other source, and laying down rules for conduct, distinctions between right and wrong as applied to specific instances, and the notion of duty in general, is assumed by some on the basis of Rom. 2, 15. We cannot find this notion expressed in this passage (cf. p. 22 ff.), although not foreign to it; however, from other sources (cf. p. 14), and in general from the emphasis on the nature of conscience as consciousness induced by purely critical reactions, it seems that autonomy is excluded from the New Testament notion of conscience.

Valuable for this conclusion is the concurrence of Kaehler (p. 648): "So unbedenklich Paulus die Zusammenstimmung der Regel, nach welcher dieses Urteil gefällt wird, mit dem offenbarten Willen Gottes ausspricht, deutet er doch nirgend auf eine bewusste Theonomie durch das Gewissen hin; und ebenso wenig bemerkt er an dem vorchristlichen Gewissen eine geringere Wirkungskraft als an dem christlichen....Das sogenannte befehlende Gewissen ist nicht aus dem Neuen Testament zu beweisen."

Likewise there is no indication that conscience is or contains the sense of duty; such a sense of duty would be found rather in the acknowledgment of a revealed Divine law, or in the nature and function of the natural law.

b. Critical function.--In accordance with the rational elements in the nature of conscience (p. 42), we find as the outstanding function of conscience, and thus directly opposed to a legislative activity, the analysis of an action, one's own or another's, with reference to an established and acknowledged norm (innate, social, revealed), for the purpose of rendering judgment on the compatibility or variance of the action with the norm (cf. pages listed p. 42).

c. Testifying function.--A testifying function is usually ascribed to conscience considered as autonomous, and hence rendering statements of duty alongside of other norms, on the basis of the narrower exegesis of Rom. 2, 15. But the testimony there ascribed to conscience is not necessarily of that type, but a general testimony for the existence of a natural law; this testimony, as far as the passage defines, may be the result of pure critical activity and the resultant consciousness of guilt, on the basis of a separate norm (cf. p. 23, 24). Conscience is spoken of as witnessing or testifying to the sincerity of a statement (p. 31); but this is more of a figurative expression describing the judgment rendered by conscience in its critical capacity (see b above.).

d. Prompting function.--The consciousness of conscience may be a motive for acting in a certain way (cf. pp. 13, 25). A motivating process must take place before the action occurs; this may be effected in the critical process, through the consciousness of the responsibility to the standard (p. 13) or of the derivation of the standard (p. 25), or, by the nature of the case, there may be a broader antecedent motivation through the memory of the disagreeableness of a bad conscience and the attendant desire to keep it good.

e. Reproving function.--The bad conscience uniformly seems to have reproving force; however, it is necessary to sharply distinguish between sources of this reproof, whether it is conscience in itself,

or whether it is not simply a heightened consciousness of the responsibility to the Divine or social standards in question, hence, fear of divine punishment or of social displeasure. These latter elements cannot on Biblical grounds be assigned to the nature of conscience, and hence these outstanding types of reproof are not necessarily the function of conscience.

2. Wider functions.--No instance appeared conclusive to us of conscience functioning beyond an ethical sphere. However, the two functions commonly ascribed to conscience, on Biblical grounds, beyond ethical ones, may be adduced here.

a. Functions relative to revelation.--In a sense the above-mentioned and rejected legislative function of conscience (p. 44) is one of revelation; this fact constitutes the gravest objection to it. For conscience is always to be obeyed (pp. 27, 28), but yet it may lead in faulty directions (cf. pp. 26-31). Hence an evidently God-given legislative (hypothetically speaking) faculty would lead to a collision with the revealed law. Secondly, the notion that conscience is an organ of revelation is open to the dilemma customarily adduced in dogmatics against post-Biblical revelation in general: If it is in accordance with the revealed Will, it is superfluous; if it is opposed to it, it is to be rejected. Thirdly, outside of the arguments mentioned p. 44, there is no instance, as far as we can see, that speaks for a general revelative function. (Cf. p. 32).

b. Functions relative to redemption.--Passages adduced to prove a function of conscience with reference to revelation (2 Cor, 4, 2, Hofmann p. 31; see our p. 32), at least an assurance of redemption (see note p. 34), to us do not appear to indicate more than a specifically ethical function. Conscience is made "good" through the redemption of Christ (cf. p. 15), but this is in a purely ethical way, as far as we can determine; and conscience would accordingly possess no more activity in the plan of redemption than remorse.

C. Effect of sin and regeneration on conscience.--It is customary in Biblically derived presentations of conscience to ascribe derogatory effects of sin upon conscience, and beneficial effects of regeneration. These claims may be briefly illuminated by the previous investigation.

1. Effects on the nature of conscience.--Conscience, according to one exegesis, may become calloused through constant disregard of its function (p. 35). It is a question, however, even if this interpretation is valid, whether this blunting is not due rather to an opposition of other experiences and modes of thought which submerge conscience. "Defilement" of conscience (p. 36) is not a result of sin, but of sins, and occurs also in the regenerate; it is really a sharpening of its function, thus surely not destruction of its nature. Regeneration in the Christian adds responsibility to God to his norm of conscience, and forgiveness of sin through Christ to his consciousness as "good" conscience (pp. 13, 15); but this is not a modification of the essential nature of conscience. A specific modification through the Holy Spirit on the basis of Rom. 9, 1 (p. 38, Hofmann) is untenable exegetically (p. 24).

2. Effects on the function of conscience.--The conscience called "weak" is not so through the effect of sin in general (pp. 28, 29); and hence the wrongness of its judgments is not the result of intrinsic deterioration, but of confusion of norms. This confusion of norms may be considered the result of sin to the same extent that any mental powers of discrimination have become less dependable, or rather more dependent upon instruction and especially Divine guidance, through the Fall of man and hereditary sin. But our impression of the previously examined Biblical material is, that conscience in natural man is considered equally as efficient an ethical capacity as in regenerate man (cf. quot. from Kaehler p. 44).

PART THREE

SURVEY OF MODERN THEORIES OF CONSCIENCE

I. Remarks

A. Terms.--From the Latin the English has derived "conscience," with predominantly ethical application. The German "Gewissen" is a specialized term, again with ethical use. The etymology of the words gives no clue for their use.

Hofmann (p. 36): "Die deutsche Sprache ist die einzige, welche fuer die bestimmte ethische Bewusstseinsform sich ein besonderes Wort 'Gewissen' neben dem allgemeinen Begriff 'Bewusstsein' gebildet hat. Das franzoesische conscience, ebenso wie das englische conscience werden gleichzeitig fuer den allgemeinen und den besonderen Begriff gebraucht, wenn auch im Englischen das allgemeine Bewusstsein meist durch consciousness ausgedrueckt wird. Wir werden aus dieser Eigentheumlichkeit der deutschen Sprache schliessen duerfen, dass das deutsche Volk, mehr als ein andres ein Volk des Gewissens, sich in bewussterer Weise den fuer seine Vorstellung ad-gequaten Bofirr geschaffen hat...Gewissen wird im Althochdeutschen ebenfalls gemeinschaftlich fuer die allgemeine und fuer die bestimmte ethische Bewusstseinsform gebraucht. Es heisst bald allgemein das Wissen, die Wissenschaft um etwas, die Kenntniss (bis ins 18. Jahrhundert), bald speciell das Gewissen. In jener Bedeutung findet es sich auch als Neutrum, in dieser nur als Femininum, z.B. bei Notker, Psalm 68, 20: 'diu mihi pizzet in minero geuizzeni' (oder gauizani)."

B. Acceptance or denial of the concept.--The existence of any specialized moral faculty such as conscience has been denied structurally especially by evolutionistic philosophers, and by Utilitarians on logical grounds. By Hedonists and mechanistic psychologists the specialized functions have been admitted, but have been ascribed to general capacities. In the latter case the argument may approach mere questions of terminology.

Rashdall (p. 55): "Many recent writers on Ethics, who approach the subject from a purely anthropological or psychological point of view, altogether deny the existence of any such specific moral feelings or emotion. They treat the moral consciousness as a complex of many different feelings or emotions. And further, they rest their position, not upon a mere analysis of the moral consciousness as it exists in the developed mind of the modern civilized man, but upon a wide survey of the evolution of morality out of the non-moral consciousness of the lower animals and the imperfectly moral consciousness of the savage." Dewey (p. 419) decries the popular notion of

conscience: "The good man and the bad man have been endowed with the same faculty; and this faculty has been treated as automatically delivering correct conclusions."

Martineau (p. 100) sketches the objections of the Utilitarians: "It is the standing accusation of the Utilitarian philosophers against any doctrine of conscience, that it lays down an arbitrary personal dogmatism as ground of Duty, or a phantom of pretension which, being but the shadow of one's self, the self may shift away. Bentham denounces all appeals to a moral faculty as sheer 'ipse dixitism', a fraud by which incompetent philosophers would palm their own tastes and fancies upon mankind. And Paley, it is well known, ridicules as futile a moral authority which a man can disregard if he chooses, and which leaves it his own affair to give the obedience or pocket the consequences."

Hedonistic objections are expressed by Leslie Stephen in the words of Martineau (p. 407): "To the recognition of an autonomous and independent character in conscience Mr. Stephen advances two objections: 1. it sets up the conscience as a separate and permanently fixed faculty, 'an ultimate factor' privileged against analytical scrutiny; and such a claim is inconsistent with the conception and with the evidence of evolution; and 2. it requires us to coordinate the conscience with the particular instincts; from which, however, it is so different in its object and method, that the coordination is impossible." Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, VIII, par. 5 (quoted by Martineau p. 411): "Conscience in any case means the pain felt by the wrongdoer, or rather the sensibility implied by that pain. Now a separate instinct--a physical appetite, for example, such as hunger or lust--may give us pain when its dictates are suppressed by some conflicting impulse. It corresponds to a particular function of the organism...But it is impossible to conceive of the conscience in accordance with this analogy as a particular faculty coordinate with others, or as possessing a separate province within which alone it is applicable."

The opposition of modern psychology to the entity of conscience is expressed by silence. Morrie (p. 143): "An examination of 20 secular psychologies (1887-1921)...revealed the fact that out of 10,070 pages not one page was devoted to the conscience. One of the twenty, 'Educational Psychology' (Vol. I, "The Original Nature of Man," p. 202), by E. L. Thorndike, pauses just long enough to say that man does not have religious instinct, nor does he have innate conscience."

The objections to the existence of a conscience are often due to the fact that conscience is conceived of as a mechanical or transcendental function, an assumption not rendered imperative by the Scriptural exposition. The warrant for affirming the existence of a conscience, aside from Biblical evidence, is usually consciousness a priori; and the wide discussion afforded the term by every type of philosophy is sufficient indication that it is a valid subject for study also today.

Mendenhall (p. 351): "Conscience per se is a structural principle, an original and necessary moral function of man. Without conscience he is not a man."

C. Theories of conscience.--The composite of the theories of conscience advanced in moral philosophy since Apostolic times would embrace every psychological function of the human organism, every influence of environment and society, and every activity, whether personal, ethical and social, or aesthetic and rational, executed by the normal human being.

Eisler (p. 429): "Das Gewissen wird bald auf die goettliche Stimme in uns, bald auf die Stimme der Vernunft, bald auf das Gefuehl und den Willen zurueckgefuehrt; die Einwirkung der Gesellschaft auf das Individuum im Gewissen wird ebenfalls betont."

The theories of conscience are so multifarious, with their differences often very poorly defined, that most presentations adopt a historical, rather than logical division. A division according to empirical and intuitional schools of moral theory is insufficient, since it does not embrace presentations approaching Scriptural views.

Dewey (p. 306): "Intuitional view is associated with theories, which, like the Kantian, emphasize attitudes, not results and intentions; while the view which holds that there is but one form of thought which, in morals, concerns itself with results, and with their association with the present aim, is the empirical." The Scriptural theory of conscience, as far as we can see, emphasizes an attitude in man; yet it is not intuitional in the exact sense of the term; and the norms of conscience are only partially empirical.

A division according to Nature and Function of conscience is impracticable, since many theories define only one of those aspects, their view of the other being left to inference. The division used facilitates comparison with the preceding section of this study, and embraces as many views concerning conscience as we have been able to investigate.

II. Theories Involving Only Ethical Functions.

A. Theories ascribing legislative functions.--Theories of conscience are preponderantly ethical; a few include wider functions, which will be studied in a separate section (cf. III below). Theories

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of conscience recognizing only ethical functions are divided into those ascribing a legislative function to conscience, hence affirming that conscience has its norm self-contained and is autonomous--to this group are appended such theories which include functions ordinarily ascribed to a dependent conscience--, and those regarding conscience as purely dependent upon norms objective to it and hence assigning it functions not legislative.

1. Conscience absolutely or predominantly intuitive.--To this group of theories belong those views of conscience which regard it as purely informative of ethical standards, or else so much so that its other processes are subordinate.

a. Ultra-intuitive.--Essentially the popular view of conscience considers it as acting independently of external norms, and affording a separate normative assistance. Even popularly the insecurity of this view is evident, because of the varying "dictates" of conscience in different persons under similar circumstances, and because of collisions of duty or expedience with the dictates of conscience.

Sidgwick (p. 99): "When a man is bidden, in any particular case, to trust to his conscience, it commonly seems to be meant that he should exercise a faculty of judging morally this particular case without reference to general rules, and even in opposition to conclusions obtained by systematic deduction from such rules... On this view, we shall have no practical need of any such general rules, or of scientific ethics at all. We may of course form general propositions by induction from these particular conscientious judgments, and arrange them systematically; but any interest which such a system may have will be purely speculative." (p. 100) "The view above described may be called, in a sense, 'ultraintuitional,' since, in its most extreme form, it recognises simply immediate intuitions alone and discards as superfluous all modes of reasoning to moral conclusions; and we may find in it one phase or variety of the Intuitional method,--if we may extend the term 'method' to include a procedure that is completed in a single judgment. But though probably all moral agents have experience of such particular intuitions, and though they constitute a great part of the moral phenomena of most minds, comparatively few are so thoroughly satisfied with them, as not to feel a need of some further moral knowledge even from a strictly practical point of view. For these particular intuitions do not, to reflective persons, present themselves as quite indubitable and irrefragable; nor do they always find when they have put an ethical question to themselves with all sincerity, that they are conscious of clear immediate insight in respect of it. Again,

When a man compares the utterances of his conscience at different times, he often finds it difficult to make them altogether consistent; the same conduct will wear a different moral aspect at one time from that which it wore at another, although our knowledge of its circumstances and conditions is not materially changed. Further, we become aware that the moral perceptions of different minds, to all appearance equally competent to judge, frequently conflict; one condemns what another approves. In this way serious doubts are aroused as to the validity of each man's particular moral judgments; and we are led to endeavor to set these doubts at rest by appealing to general rules, more firmly established on a basis of common consent.

n An illustration of putting this ultra-intuitional conscience into practical use is afforded by the sect of the "Gewissener," which seems to have obeyed lower impulses rather than conscience.

Hagenbach (p. 654): "Gewissener heissen die Anhänger des Matthias Knutsen, eines fahrenden Kandidaten der Theologie aus dem Schleswigschen, der im Sept. 1674 nach Jena kam, um daselbst seine deistischen und atheistischen Grundsätze auszubreiten, nach welchen selbst bei Verwerfung des Glaubens an Gott und Unsterblichkeit das Gewissen die einzige Auktorität sein sollte, aber freilich ein Gewissen, vor dem auch die unsittlichsten Verhältnisse ihre Rechtfertigung fanden, indem z.B. die Ehe mit Hurerei auf eine Linie zu stehen kam."

Eisler (p. 431) cites the names of Pascal, Price, Reid, Stewart, Calderwood, Porter, Janet, as holding the view that conscience is "unmittelbare Erkenntnis des Sittlichen."

B. The "Voice of God in man."--Tertullian speaks of conscience as an immediately attained consciousness of God. Hutcheson's school of "Moral sense" ethics, as also J. Chr. Hofmann and Schenkel, held the view that conscience is essentially the judging voice of God.

R. Hofmann (p. 41): "Tertullian statuirt ein urspruengliches Gottesbewusstsein, animae a primordio conscientia Dei dos est (adv. Marc. 1, 10), aber er leitet dies nicht von einer lex Dei im Gewissen ab, wie er denn auch zu Roem. 2, 15 nicht von einer solchen, sondern von einer natura, quae legis est instar ignorantibus legem (adv. Marc. 5, 13) redet."

Rashdall in speaking of Hutcheson's "moral sense" theory says: "The very reason why such a man did not see in the moral sense theory anything destructive of the fullest belief in moral obligation was this--that he thought of this distinctive faculty as divinely implanted, a sort of divine monitor specially implanted in the human heart by an essentially righteous and benevolent God to prompt us to actions agreeable to his will and to warn us against those which He disapproved." (p. 13). "It was assumed that God Himself, in giving us this sense, took care to connect it with the right objects." (p. 14. See f below)

Hofmann in his Schriftbeweis, I, 572 (quoted by Graebner p. 14): "Das Gewissen ist seinem Wesen nach nicht ein Etwas im

Menschen, noch eine in ihm erzeugte Wirkung, dass er es sich zuschreiben koennte, sondern unmittelbare Selbstbezeugung Gottes an ihn." In Theologische Ethik (p. 41): "Das Gewissen schreibt dem Menschen nicht vor, was er je und je zu tun habe, sondern spricht das Urteil Gottes aus ueber das, was er Uebles zu tun im Begriff ist oder Uebles getan hat."

Schenkel (christl. Dogmatik I, p. 135 ff., quot. in Hofmann p. 101): "Gott ist uns im Gewissen unmittelbar gegeben. Das Gewissen ist der Ort im menschlichen Geist, wo dieser den absoluten Geist in sich selbst findet, wo er sich seiner in jenem bewusst wird. Im Gewissen sind wir zunaechst uns unserer selbst bewusst, jedoch nicht lediglich wie wir als solche sind, sondern immer so, wie wir auf Gott bezogen sind...Die Gewissensfunktion ist somit eine urspruengliche und unmittelbare; denn sie ist durch kein uns bekanntes Vermoegeen, weder durch die Vernunft, noch durch den Willen, noch durch das Gefuehl, an sich irgendwie vermittelt."

The objections to this theory are: It does not account for discrepancies in the judgment of conscience; conscience leads sometimes to action opposed to the absolute will of God as revealed in law.

Graebner (p. 14): "Wenn das wahr waere (conscience the voice of God), so gewiss Gott die Wahrheit ist und sich nur in der Wahrheit selbst bezeugen kann, koennte das Gewissen niemals ein irrendes sein; so waere jeder Irrtum des Gewissens von vornherein ausgeschlossen." Similarly Luthardt (p. 116). Pitt-Rivers: "To some men it appears strange that the voice of the same God should frequently induce men to oppose each other with such particular bitterness. This objection is sometimes met by the explanation that although it is the voice of God speaking through the medium of our souls, we fail to recognize or interpret rightly its significance. This explanation, again, is not altogether satisfactory, since, if that were the case, the voice of God must be so uncertain a guide it were better not to rely on it...When we look back through the pages of History and consider the actions of men and the motives to which they ascribe them, and see what an orgy of blood, of persecutions, of burnings, of torturings, of blind passions and religious frenzy, of diabolical imaginings and monstrous eschatology has been conceived at the instigation of conscience and religion, and prescribed in the name of God, we are inclined to inquire more deeply into the meaning and credentials of this watchword of all ages." (pp. 5 and 6).

c. Immanence of God.--Related to the preceding notion of conscience is the view that conscience is essentially God Himself, by nature of His indwelling in the human being, or the view that conscience is essentially dependent upon the indwelling of God.

Methodius (according to Luthardt p. 110) considered conscience the *ἐνδοκον νόμον* itself, which is in all and *κατανοούμενος* (Opp. p. 118).

Wuttke (Handbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre, I, 383; quoted by Hofmann p. 76): "Mitwissen mit Gott kraft dessen Einwohnung in den vernuenftigen Kreaturen."

Harless (p. 62): "Ob es freudliche oder feindliche Gedanken, ob es Gedanken der Zustimmung oder des Widerspruchs seien, so ist der Inhalt ihres Eindrucks doch immer der, dass das, was mir beistimmt oder auch widerspricht, etwas in mir ist, das doch nicht mein Ich ist. Und doch weiss ich, dass diese Gedanken nicht von aussen kommen, sondern lediglich vom Innern meines Geistes aus in mir aufsteigen." P. 53: "Die Wirkungen des Geistes als Gewissen explicieren sich zwar nicht selbst als etwas Goettliches, und sind auch in der Tat nichts denn Regungen des menschlichen Geistes; aber sie implicieren etwas, was ich, wenn ich darueber nachdenke, nicht aus dem Wesen des Geistes erklaren kann, wenn derselbe bloss als ein mir menschlich angeborner Naturgrund meines individuell-persoenlichen Lebens zu denken ist." P. 80: "An sich waere das Gewissen als Gottesbewusstsein widerspruchsloses Innesein Gottes als des Wahren und Guten, um welchen sich alle Kraefte des menschlichen Wissens als um ihr Zentrum in verlangernder Liebe bewegten. Es waere in seiner Wirkung auf mein Selbstbewusstsein zwar Bewusstsein der Abhaengigkeit meines Wesens und Willens von einem hoeheren Wesen und Willen, aber als Band der Gemeinschaft unseres Wesens mit Gott Bewusstsein um die Einheit meines Willens mit dem ueber mir stehenden goettlichen Willen. Das ist es nicht mehr."

Frank (p. 506): "Das Gewissen ist das Ergebnis dieses Doppelton: Der Immanenz des goettlichen Geistes in dem Menschen und der Gegenwirkung des Menschen auf jenes Innesein und Innenwalten Gottes."

Luthardt (p. 116): "Es hat eine objektive Seite: die Beziehung der Gottesabbildung sittl. Persoenlichkeit des Menschen zu Gott als seinem Urbild u. hoechsten Norm, wie diese sich dem Menschen durch die Einwohnung des Geistes Gottes lebendig bezeugt, bildet das zugrundeliegende innere Gesetz des sittlichen Bewusstseins (*deus in nobis regnans*).

Although it is true that God is omnipresent, and that "in him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts 17, 28; also Col. 1, 18), yet it is contrary to Scriptural doctrine to assume that by means of this omnipresence God enters into the composition of a creature. This applies also to regenerate man (cf. Pieper I pp. 544, 546). And logically this theory is subject to the same criticism as the preceding one, in that inconsistencies of judgment in favor of the wrong is not explicable on the basis of its premises.

d. Pantheistic.--The preceding two views, pursued to their logical conclusion, result in pantheism, with definitions of conscience as the self-assertion of God, hence God as a part of the human being.

Marheinecke (Hofmann pp. 66, 96): "Das Sich-Selbst-Wissen des absoluten Geistes." Hofmann (p. 67) accuses Schleiermacher of pantheistic leanings in his definition: "Das Sein des Gewissens in uns als ein Sein Gottes" (Christl. Glaubenslehre p. 460 ff).

The critique of the preceding view (p. 53) is applicable here also, with the additional point that a conscience is logically impossible for a pantheistic organism, leading to dissolution of personality.

Harless (p. 67): "Wo habe ich denn eine Sinneswahrnehmung einer mit sich selbst im Streite liegenden Natur, einer concordia discors naturae meae? oder wenn das empirische Ich zu seinem Faktor nicht bloss die angeborne physische Organisation, sondern auch die mannigfachen, durch die Sinne vermittelten aeussern Einwirkungen hat, was ist das fuer eine korrupte Organisation, die nicht einmal im Stande ist, jene 'durch die Sinne vermittelten aeusseren Einwirkungen' mir vom Leibe zu halten, welche mir die Uebereinstimmung mit meinem jedesmaligen empirischen Ich verkuemmern?" Less tenable is his argument (p. 68): "Die Schrift redet zwar von einem Theilhaftigwerden goettlicher Natur 2 Petr. 1, 4 durch Christus; aber sie sagt nicht, dass wir ihrer theilhaftig seien ausser Christo. Das Non est pars Dei anima des Augustin ep. 28 ad Hier., hat seine zweifellos schriftbegruendete Richtigkeit,"--at least in the earlier portion.

e. Emotional.--The "moral sense" of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson is intrinsically an emotion reacting pleasantly or unpleasantly to the contemplation of action, and thus indicating the rightness or wrongness of such an action.

Kaehler (p. 651): "Das Neue an dieser Fassung ist weder der Ausdruck (Calvin) noch dass man die Beteiligung der Affekte betont und aus ihnen die Macht der Bindung erkennt; vielmehr einerseits die mit der Hervorhebung dieser sittlichen Bindung verknuepfte Skepsis gegen das allgemeingiltige Sittengesetz und andererseits die Leugnung der religiösen Beziehung."

Rashdall (p. 10): "These writers (the third Lord Shaftesbury ...and the Ulster Philosopher Francis Hutcheson, with their followers) sought to place morality upon an unassailable foundation by treating moral approbation as a distinct kind of idea or feeling--a 'reflex idea' as they called it, which entered into our minds when we reflected--turned our thoughts back--upon our own thinking and our own acting. On contemplating an act of cruelty, or rather, on contemplating the motive which inspired such an action, we immediately and spontaneously experience another idea--an 'idea of disapprobation' in contemplating the passion of benevolence in our own breasts, or an action suggestive of such a passion in another, we experience a distinct idea or feeling of approbation." P. 11: "The distinctive--indeed, the authoritative--character of this feeling was strongly insisted upon. It was supposed to be given us by a distinct kind of sense--which they called the moral sense."

Aside from the fact that this feeling-theory does not account for reactions to an objective revealed law, it confines standards of right and wrong to a subjective operation which is open to destruc-

tive or confusing items of rival feelings and experiences; and it is open to attack on logical grounds, in that it presupposes at least notions of right and wrong, if not definite standards; if all such pre-suppositions are denied, scepticism toward all morality must result.

Rashdall (p. 14): "Hutcheson forgot to ask himself what reason, if Conscience meant nothing but a comfortable feeling, he had for believing in any essential or eternal distinction between Good and evil." P. 30: "Feelings or emotions possess no objectivity. And 'without objectivity,' in the words of Edouard von Hartmann, 'ethic has no meaning.' Das sittliche Bewusstsein, p. 92." "It would be senseless to ask which was right, Nero and the Roman mob of his time to whom the torments endured by Christians in the amphitheatre were simply good sport...or the early Christians to whom they were brutal murders, and the modern world which for the most part agrees with the early Christians. The difference is merely a difference of taste. Of course, if you suggest that the one taste is higher than another, if you insist that the feeling which condemns such atrocities is something higher or more authoritative than the feeling which exults in them, you are really appealing to a judging faculty at the back of the mere emotional approbation; and then you have really dethroned the moral sense from the position of chief arbiter in morals and set up this new judging faculty in its place. That is really to give up the moral sense view altogether." (pp. 32,33). "Do we not often feel most certain that there is a really right course of action just when we find our individual judgment in collision with somebody else's, or when we ourselves feel most in doubt as to what is actually the right course of action in some particular complication of circumstances?...No mere emotion could give me such an idea. Such a concept may be accompanied by emotion; it may inspire emotion, but it is not itself mere emotion. The emotion itself presupposes the intellectual notion or category of duty." (pp. 35, 36).

Leslie Stephen, according to Martineau (p. 416) raises the objection that conscience as a simple emotion is more or less arbitrary.

Bosanquet (p. 113): "We cannot judge by the feeling of being good or bad; that is absolutely deceptive. The best people often have a feeling of being bad, and Emerson writes of a lady who told him that 'the sense of being perfectly dressed affects the mind with an inward comfort which religion is unable to bestow.'"

With the purpose of discrediting conscience altogether, Hedonists in conjunction with Moral Scepticists depress the function of conscience to that of registering pleasantness or unpleasantness of useful or delightful states or objects.

Rashdall (p. 5): "The only writers who attempted to deny the existence of distinct intellectual concepts of good and evil were men like the ancient Epicureans, or Thomas Hobbes and his followers, who reduced the ideas of good and evil to pleasant and painful." P. 17: "Hume: If the idea of approbation is simply a feeling, there is no reason why it should not be attended to except in so far as it is

found pleasant." P. 25: "Virtue (by Hume) is defined to be 'whatever mental action or quality gives to the spectator the pleasing feeling of approbation' Enquiry, vol. IV, p. 261. Actions, in fact, are not approved because they are moral, they are moral because they are approved."

Butler, Sermon XI (quot. in Sidgwick p. 119): "Our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most important to us...that, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good as such; yet, when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it."

W. Jerusalem defines conscience in his Lehrb. d. Psychol. III 169 (Eisler p. 433): "Eine Gefuehlädisposition, die zur Folge hat, dass wir es vorausfuehlen, ob eine Handlung, die wir zu tun im Begriffe sind, Billigung oder Missbilligung finden wird."

Gizycki (Moralphilos. 282 in Eisler 433): Gewissensschmerz "ein Gefuehl der Unzufriedenheit mit uns selbst, welches entsteht, wenn die Erinnerung ein Verhalten uns vor die Seele fuehrt, das unserm gegenwaertig vorwaltenden Pflichtgefuehl widerstreitet."

Spinoza (Eth. III, def. aff. XVII, Eisler p. 430): "Conscientiae morsus est tristitia concomitante idea rei praeteritae, quae praeter spem evenit."

Descartes (Eisler p. 430): "Morsus conscientiae est species tristitiae ortae ex dubitatione sive scrupulo qui iniicitur, num id quod fit vel factum est bonum sit necne."

The same critique applies to this more hedonistic principle of a conscience--feeling which was adduced above, that objectivity of moral action is destroyed, and "right" and "wrong" still remains unexplained.

Rashdall (p. 19): "If I happen to prefer to do without the pleasant feeling of self-approbation and so to avoid the unpleasantness of being laughed at or thumbscrewed for adopting a particular course of conduct, nobody can give me any reason why I should not do so, even if the immunity could only be purchased by the accusation of an innocent person."

f. Rationalistic.--Ethical rationalism considers conscience the faculty of apprehending axiomatic moral truths, and rendering judgment in view of such truths. The latter function is predominant in the doctrine of Kant. The underlying concepts of good and evil, and of duty, are considered products of reason, and, in loose terminology, a part of conscience viewed rationally.

Rashdall defines "reason" in this connection (p. 134): "By Reason, of course, those who believe that our moral judgments are the work of Reason do not mean merely the faculty of drawing inferences, but the faculty of apprehending a priori or immediately those axiomatic truths upon which in the last resort all knowledge depends."

For the existence of the objective and axiomatic character of the standard of right and wrong apprehended by Reason in this theory, Rashdall argues (p. 38): "Or does any one suggest that, though as a matter of psychological fact there is this notion of an objective good and evil in the human mind, it possesses no objective validity, but is, as one distinguished philosopher has put it, a merely 'subjective category'? Simmel, *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft*, vol. II, 347. I answer: 'What reason have you for supposing that the judgment two and two make four may not be a subjective illusion, or that two straight lines cannot enclose a space?' Cf. also Martineau's justification of his theory of "graduated scale of excellence" (p. 413): "As there is an intuitive estimate of the relative beauty of colors, and intervals of tone, and intensities of light, why should there not be the same of the relative worth of the several springs of action" (p. 417) "The discrimination of beauty is no less a judgment and a feeling too, than the discrimination of right; nay, so, for that matter, is the discrimination of pleasure as well; why then is the moralist alone to be hoist in this cleft stick, till he declares which prong he prefers?"

Rashdall directly connects the good with its duty (p. 45): "The idea of the good implies the idea of right. The good means just what ought to be promoted--by everyone who has the power of doing so...The good and the right are correlative conceptions which imply each other, just as the convex implies the concave and the concave the convex. They both involve the same single analysable idea which can be expressed in many ways but can never be defined--the good, oughtness, value, duty, the reasonable in conduct, the end of life, and so on."

Rashdall endeavors to combine this rational conscience with Divine will (p. 50): "If our judgments of value are valid pronouncements of Reason, we have the right to claim that in the moral consciousness of man at its highest there is contained a true revelation of the rational Will which expresses itself in nature."

Kant's doctrine of conscience is summarized by Luthardt (p. 114): "Kant sicherte mit seinem kategorischen Imperativ dem Gewissen von neuem seine Geltung, aber im Sinn der Unabhaengigkeit der Sittlichkeit von der Religion. Das Gewissen ist ihm 'die sich selbst richtende moralische Urteilkraft' (X, 225), 'die in jedem Falle eines Gesetzes dem Menschen seine Pflicht zum Lossprechen oder Verurteilen vorhaltende praktische Vernunft' (IX, 248), 'das Bewusstsein eines innern Gerichtshofs im Menschen (IX, 293), allerdings mit der 'Vorstellung des Sittengesetzes als des Willens Gottes.'" Kant thus differs from the preceding rationalists in emphasizing a forensic function of conscience, and in identifying the rationally derived, subjectively contained moral law with the divine will. The relation between reason and duty in Kant's system Dewey analyses (p. 344): "A duty, in Kant's words, is a categorical imperative--it claims the absolute right of way as against immediate inclination...Over against the course of action most immediately urgent, most easy and comfortable, so congenial as at once to motivate action unless checked, stands another course, representing a wider and more far-reaching point of view, and hence furnishing the rational end of the situation. However lacking in intensity, however austere this end, it stands for the whole self, and is therefore felt to be rightly supreme over any partial tendency. But since it looks to realization in an uncertain future, rather than permission just to let go what is most urgent at the moment, it requires effort, hard work, work of attention more or

less repulsive and uncongenial. Hence that sense of stress and strain, of being pulled one way by inclination and another by the claims of right, so characteristic of an experience of obligation." P. 347: "Hence duty and its authority must spring from another source, from reason itself, which supplies the consciousness of a law which ought to be the motive of every act, whether it is or not."

Objections to this theory have been raised, that its norm, being so self-contained, is too subjective, and its dictates, arising from self, logically cannot be influential over the personality, if conscience is merely rational apprehension and application of a hypothetical a priori body of moral truth. Many of the difficulties of the theory would be removed, and the notion of conscience as a function of reason made fairly valid, if it would be considered as dependent upon an innate law viewed as an entity in itself, and also upon revealed Divine law or formulated and acknowledged bodies of social regulations.

Gf. Argument of Simmel quoted from Rashdall; p. 57.

Pfleiderer (p. 238): "The very consciousness that there is a binding law to which we owe obedience implies that we are not the authors of that law, for we cannot be both sovereigns and subjects."

Paulsen (Syst. d. Eth. I, 320; quot. in Eisler 432) represents the more recent expansion of the Kantian idea: "Das Organ, wodurch die Pflicht erkannt wird und sich in unserem Innern vernehmlich macht;" or (Einl. i.d. Phil. 432, loc. cit.): "Die ganze Seite unseres Wissens, wodurch wir uns urteilend zu uns selbst als vollenden oder handelnden Wesen verhalten."

G. Sensibility to moral distinctions.--A theory of conscience laying about equal stress on rational as on emotional expression of the fundamental intuition of duty regarding right or wrong considers conscience merely sensibility to right or wrong; hence both the norm and the reaction toward it.

1) Knowledge of right and wrong.--Right and wrong are considered to be objective realities by the older school of moral philosophers, while more sceptical schools, such as hedonistic and pragmatic ones, regard the concepts as dependent upon other circumstances. Distinction

is made between knowledge of right and wrong and perception of right and wrong as applied to individual cases, what is right and what is wrong. The former is accordingly considered intuitive or open to modification, or both, by the varying types of theory; while the latter, as a function of judgment, is admittedly open to error. This knowledge of right and wrong, or application of this standard to particular cases, have been called conscience.

Cf. Rashdall's discussion of right and wrong; p. 57. Rashdall believes that right or wrong is pronounced without reference to consequence, but as self-evident truths: Greater good ought always to be preferred to the less; one man's good is of equal intrinsic value with the like good of any other; Sigggwick: Where my own good is concerned, it is always reasonable for me to prefer my own greater good to my own lesser good (p. 40). "At bottom the real ethical judgment is the judgment of value which affirms that such and such things are good."

William James (The Will to Believe, p. 201; quot. Rashdall p. 149): "The essence of good is simply to satisfy demand."

See discussion of Hedonistic views with quotations, p. 55.

Pitt-Rivers (p. 9) defines conscience as "that mental act which takes place in our minds when we call certain conduct 'right' and certain conduct 'wrong.'" He elaborates (p. 16): "What an individual conceives to be morally right and good, when he is conscious of having acted so according to his own standard, may be either 1. wholly irrational, illogical, anti-social and undesirable from every point of view except his own, even though arrived at solely by an intellectual and reasoning process; or 2. an entirely instinctive, blindly impulsive or emotional action, afterwards endorsed by the intellect (i.e. subsequently rationalized); or 3. the result of thoughtful deliberation, carefully and logically designed to bring about certain preconceived 'moral' ends such as social happiness, justice, fulfillment of duty; all of which are artificial and conventional standards, and good only because they are desirable, not because they are universally valid--irrespective of time, locality, and circumstances; or 4. any combination of these three."

Haven (p. 435): "Right and wrong, as also the beautiful and its opposite, are not mere conception of the human mind. They have an actual objective existence and reality, and, as such, are cognized by the mind, which perceives a given act to be right or wrong, and, as such, obligatory or the opposite, and approves or condemns the deed, and the doer, accordingly."

Knowledge v. perception of right and wrong, Haven (p. 324): "The one a simple conception, the other an act of judgment; the one an idea derived from the very constitution of the mind, connate, if not innate, the other an application of that idea, by the understanding, to particular instances of conduct. The former, the idea of moral distinctions, may be universal, necessary, absolute, unerring; the latter, the application of the idea to particular instances, and the decision that such and such acts are, or are not, right, may be altogether an incor-

rect and mistaken judgment. Now it is precisely at this point that the diversity in the moral judgments of mankind makes its appearance. In recognizing the distinction of right and wrong, they agree; in the application of the same to particular instances, in deciding what is right and what is wrong--a simple act of the judgment, an exercise of the understanding, as we have seen--in this it is that they differ."

Strong (p. 256): "The original sense of right and wrong is intuitive--no education could ever impart the idea of the difference between right and wrong to one who had it not. But what classes of things are right or wrong, we learn by the exercise of our logical intelligence, in connection with the experiences of utility, influences of society and tradition, and positive divine revelation. Thus our moral reason, through a combination of intuition and education....furnishes the standard according to which conscience may judge the particular cases which come before it." Similar to this explanation of the conflict between empirical and intuitional theories is that of Unold as summarized by Eisler (p. 432): "Unold erklart die Anlage zum Gewissen fuer angeboren, Inhalt, und Ausgestaltung desselben seien aber durch Erfahrung und Erziehung bedingt. Gr. d. Eth. 275."

2) Martineau's theory.--Martineau held that conscience is the sensibility of the mind to gradations in a scale of excellence among the propensities of the human mechanism for certain types of action. The theory has not gained credence because of the objection that a systematized scale of excellency, such as the theory requires, for all the human motives is not general for all persons or all circumstances.

Martineau (p. 49): "The whole ground of ethical procedure consists in this, that we are sensible of a graduated scale of excellence among our natural principles, quite distinct from the order of their intensity, and irrespective of the range of their external effects." p. 53: "The sensibility of the mind to the gradations of this scale is precisely what we call Conscience; the knowledge with one's self of the better and worse; and the more delicate the knowing faculty, the finer are the shades perceived. Whoever feels no difference of worth between one propensity and another, and yields himself with equal reluctance to appetite or affection, to resentment or compassion, and emerges from them with equal cheerfulness, is without conscience..." p. 54: "Conscience, then, is the critical perception we have of our several principles of action. The sense of that authority is implicitly contained in the mere natural strife of these principles within us; when explicitly brought into view by reflective self-knowledge, it assumes a systematic character, and asserts its prerogative as the judicial regulator of life." P. 402: "Its (the idea of right) form of growth is the simplest possible; every case in which the springs of action solicit us in pairs introduces a fresh consciousness of relative right; and as the instances accumulate, the feeling, is deepened, if they are repetitions, and widened, if they are new; with the effect of condensing at last the

whole of these experiences, gathered by the sense of relative right, into one large affection of special type, whose love and aversion work only within this relation."

Martineau's table of "springs of action" arranged according to their moral validity from lowest to highest (p. 266): "1. Secondary passions; censoriousness, vindictiveness, suspiciousness. 2. Secondary Organic Propensions; love of ease and sensual pleasure. 3. Primary organic propensions; appetites. 4. Primary animal propensions; spontaneous activity, unselective. 5. Love of Gain (reflective derivative from appetite.) 6. Secondary affections (sentimental indulgence of sympathetic feelings). 7. Primary passions; antipathy, fear, resentment. 8. Causal energy; love of power, or ambition; love of liberty. 9. Secondary sentiments; love of culture. 10. Primary sentiments of wonder and (approximately) generosity and gratitude. 12. Primary affection of compassion. 13. Primary sentiment of reverence."

Sidgwick (p. 369) criticises the system: "I think it impossible to assign a definite and constant ethical value to each different kind of motive, without reference to the particular circumstances under which it has arisen, the extent of indulgence that it demands, and the consequences to which this indulgence would lead in any particular case." P. 372: "If a serious question of conduct is raised, I cannot conceive myself deciding it morally by any comparison of motives below the highest; it seems to me that the question must inevitable be carried up for decision into the court of whatever motive we regard as supremely regulative; so that the comparison ultimately decisive would be not between the lower motives primarily conflicting, but between the effects of the different lines of conduct to which these lower motives respectively prompt, considered in relation to whatever we regard as the ultimate end or ends of reasonable action."

h. Interest toward doing good.--The newer theories of conscience or general ethics endeavor to minimize the notion of moral standards whatsoever, even the subjective ones, and thus dilute conscience to "interest in finding out the good." To use the term "conscience" in such a connection is poetical concession to "outworn" terminologies rather than scientific presentation of facts by means of valid terms.

Dewey (p. 419): "Modern conscientiousness contains less of the idea of intellectual accomplishment, and more of the idea of interest in finding out the good in conduct. 'Wisdom' tended to emphasize achieved insight; knowledge which was proved, guaranteed, and unchangeable. 'Conscientiousness' tends rather to fix attention upon that voluntary attitude which is interested in discovery." P. 420 "Moral knowing, as a fundamental or cardinal aspect of virtue, is then the completeness of the interest in good exhibited in effort to discover the good...The individual who is not directly aware of the presence of values needing to be perpetuated or achieved, in the things and persons about him, is hard and callous or tough. A 'tender' conscience is one which is immediately responsive to the presentation of good and

evil. The modern counterpart to the Socratic doctrine that ignorance is the root of vice, is that being morally 'cold' or 'dead', being indifferent to moral distinctions, is the most hopeless of all conditions. One who cares, even if he cares in the wrong way, has at least a spring that may be touched; the one who is just irresponsible offers no leverage for correction or improvement."

1. Sense of duty.--Isolated examples are at hand of calling conscience simply the sense of duty. This, of course, involves no logical inconsistencies. But duty is a fact already implied in the acknowledgment of a standard or norm as binding; to acknowledge a God as standing over one, and His law as governing, includes the acknowledgment of duty to this God and His government; the same truth applies to any governing entity and the standard which it institutes. And the Biblical concept of conscience includes, not a consciousness of duty, but of obeying duty.

Luthardt asserts (p. 110): "Das Mittelalter faest in Abaelards 'nosce te ipsum' c. 13, 14 das Gewissen als Pflichtbewusstsein."

Kaehler (p. 649) applies this interpretation of conscience to the Reformation and Luther: "Ihre Aussuerungen knoepfen eher an Bernhard und Abaelard an; bald ist es das selbststaendige Pflichtbewusstsein, dem Luther zu Worms den klassischen Ausdruck gegeben hat, nach seinem Grundsatz, 'Wo man beiden nicht helfen kann, da helfe man dem Gewissen und enthelfe dem Rechte,' EA 23, 152."

Kaehler says of Fichte (p. 652): "Ihm heisst das Gewissen 'das unmittelbare Bewusstsein der bestimmten Pflicht;' das bedeutet aber die unbedingte Gewissheit des Pflichtbewusstseins, mit welcher ein folgerecht aus anerkannten Praemissen abgeleitetes praktisches Urtheil bekleidet erscheint."

2. Conscience legislative through wider activities.--The above group of theories concerning conscience represented conscience as autonomous, and gaining its norm or putting it into effect ethically by means of simple consciousness (pars. a, b, c), emotional consciousness (par. e), or reflection, cognition, and application, hence rational activity (par. g, f), or consciousness of motive (par. h, i). This section deals with theories recognizing wider functions either in the acquisition of the norm of conscience, or in the execution of its functions in the ethical life.

a. Interaction of factors.--It is a scientific fact that every item of experience tends to develop or modify the personality of the human being. Furthermore, sensation or experience reacts, not upon a single isolated sphere of the psychological organism, but the reaction is distributed throughout all functions; intellectual activity is always accompanied by emotion and feeling, while the latter through channels of perception becomes a new stimulus; and mental activity through effect on blood and glands influences physiological processes, and vice versa. These facts are taken into account by theories of conscience, especially by those ascribing to conscience itself a normative content.

Pitt-Rivers, upon the view of the origin of right and wrong quoted p. 59, presents an interactive view of conscience (p. 17): "It will then...be shown that the factors of conscience are: 1. emotional, 2. intellectual, 3. internal (including hereditary and organic elements), and 4. external (environment, material and psychic); and that its validity, in ultimate analysis, can but rest on codes, which may be not only Conventional and Artificial, but also Rational or Intellectual, Social and Utilitarian; and in any case variable, in the same way that the soundest and most logical policies must, to a certain extent, be variable, or capable of adjustment as circumstances change; the only elements which should be constant and invariable in any policy (which is not a misnomer) being logic and truth."

John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism, 15th ed. p. 42, quot. in Pitt-Rivers): "In that complex phenomenon (of conscience) as it actually exists, the simple fact is in general all encrusted over with collateral associations derived from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all forms of religious feeling; from recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement."

Rickaby (p. 288): "The natural conscience is no distinct faculty, but the one intellect of man, inasmuch as it considers right and wrong in conduct, aided meanwhile by a good will, by the use of the emotions, by the practical experiences of living, and by all external helps that are to the purpose."

The most of the difficulties concerning conscience which broader theories of this type make for themselves are due to the destroying of objective, externally formulated standards for conscience, and the setting up of conscience as a capacity dependent on itself, and hence influenced by every condition influencing the individual possessing it.

b. Cognition and perception as factors.--Perception of moral distinctions (analogous to theories pp. 56-60) is considered the prime requisite for the operations of conscience; this perception is thought of either as observing the norm and recognizing it as binding, or as observing the action and applying the norm, or as recognizing merit or demerit consequent upon the action. This perception or cognition is considered prone to error.

Sheldon discusses the source of this power (p. 290): "A moral perception that inevitably appears with the moral personality, or inevitably is realized in the course of its normal development, has just one adequate explanation. It is founded on man's moral constitution."

G.B. Smith (p. 111) presents the simpler view of perception as a part of conscience: "Conscience--the perception of moral distinctions accompanied by the feeling of personal obligation to do what is morally right--feeling of obligation."

Tufts (p. 182 ff.) presents two types of function of perception in conscience: "The person must himself set up a standard, recognize it as 'law,' judge his conduct by it, hold himself responsible to himself, and seek to do justice...A conscientious person is in so far one who has made the law of God or man an inward law of life--a 'moral' law. But the act of making the process inward makes possible a deepening of meaning. Governments and courts are necessarily limited in purview and fallible in decisions. They are sometimes too lenient, sometimes too severe. Conscience implies a knowledge of the whole act--purpose, motive, and deed. Its authority makes claim for absolute obedience. The laws of the State are felt to be binding just because they are believed to be, on the whole, right and just as measured by this moral court of appeal. When they conflict, the power may be with the political sovereign, but the man whose conscience is clear believes that he follows a 'higher law.'"

Havens outlines the functions of perception in an act of conscience. P. 315: "First of all, the act contemplated strikes us as right or wrong. This involves a double element, an idea, and a perception or judgment. The idea of right and its opposite are, in the mind, simple ideas, and, therefore, indefinable. In the act contemplated, we recognize the one or the other of these simple elements, and pronounce it, accordingly, a right or wrong act. This is simply a judgment, a perception, an exercise of the understanding.--No sooner is this idea, this cognition, of the rightness or wrongness of the given act, fairly entertained by the mind, than another idea, another cognition, presents itself, given along with the former, and inseparable from it, viz. that of obligation to do, or not to do, the given act." p. 316: "There follows a third element, logically distinct, but chronologically inseparable, from the preceding: The cognition of merit or demerit in connection with the deed, of good or ill desert, and the consequent approval or disapproval of the deed and the doer."

Concerning the error of conscience in this phase, Havens says: "It does not follow that our moral perceptions and judgments are invariably correct, because they spring from our native constitutions" (p. 321).

c. Reflection as a factor.--Reflection upon action with reference to its ethical goodness is sometimes stressed as a part of conscience.

Irenaeus (adv. haeres. 4, 18; quot. by Hofmann p.40) speaks of the sacrifice of Cain and Abel: Igitur non sacrificia sanctificant hominem,--sed conscientia ejus, qui offert, sanctificat sacrificium, pura existens; conscientia he previously defines as interior eorum voluntas et cogitatio.

According to Rashdall (p. 10), the Moral sense theorists regarded the feeling of approbation as consequent upon reflection of the previous action.

Tufts, in speaking of the change from "custom to conscience" says (p. 179): "The greater number of duties and rights of which present morality consists are of just this type (demanding for their detection an intelligence more than perception). They are relations, not just outward habits. Their acknowledgement requires accordingly something more than just to follow and reproduce existing customs. It involves power to see why certain habits are to be followed, what makes a thing good or bad. Conscience is thus substituted for custom; principles take the place of external rules."

d. Intellectual judgment as a factor.--Aside from the theories emphasizing the apprehending and discriminative faculty of reason as inclusive of and parallel to intuition of ethical standards, judgment is considered a part of the perception and application of the categories of right and wrong with reference to moral conduct.

Havens uses cognition and perception almost synonymously with judgment (cf. quot. p. 64). Sheldon (p. 292) speaks of the sentence following upon judgment of right and wrong: "Whence comes this swift sentence which breaks through all sophistical excuses, and reveals a man to himself as condemned, as often as he does despite to any ethical principles which he recognizes when in a dispassionate frame of mind? It is the offspring of a nature that is intrinsically moral."

e. Sense of duty as a factor.--Many theories adopt the notion of consciousness of obligation or duty as apart, though not all, of the complex of conscience.

1) The sense of duty as such.--More conservative theories regard the sense of duty as an innate and a priori ingredient of human nature, while sceptical and evolutionistic theories endeavor to trace its development and origin.

Sheldon says of the sense of obligation (p. 291): "A person may hesitate in his judgments of right and wrong, and may make mistakes in these judgments. But he is ever certain of the fact that there is a right and a wrong, and of his obligation to follow the one to the rejection of the other; and he cannot put aside this conviction without ceasing to be human."

Sidgwick (pp. 31, 32): "It seems then that the notion of 'ought' or 'moral obligation' as used in our common moral judgments does not merely import 1. that there exists in the minds of the person judging a specific emotion (whether complicated or not by sympathetic representation of similar emotions in other minds); nor 2. that certain rules of conduct are supported by penalties which will follow on their violation (whether such penalties result from the general liking or aversion felt for the conduct prescribed or forbidden, or from some other source)...The notion which these terms have in common is too elemental to admit of any formal definition." The second point seems directed against notions such as that of Bain (quoted by Rickaby, p. 269), who "exaggerates the predominance of punishment as the source whence the sense of obligation comes."

Kant's doctrine of duty as a categorical imperative is quoted p. 57.

Tufts (p. 141) after tracing notions of "conscience" through the early literatures, finds it attaining autonomous proportions in Seneca and Epictetus, and summarizes the origin of duty: "Man who read his duty at first in the judgments of his fellows, in the customs and laws and codes of honor, and in the religious precepts of the gods, has again come to find in gods and laws, in custom and authority, the true rational law of life; but it is now a law of self. Not a particular or individual self, but a self which embraces within it at once the human and the divine. The individual has become social and has recognized himself as such. The religious, social, and political judgments have become the judgments of man upon himself. 'Duty,' what is binding or necessary, takes its place as a definite moral conception."

Dewey's theory of duty (p. 362): "Duty is what is owed by a partial isolated self embodied in established, facile, and urgent tendencies, to that ideal self, which is presented in aspirations which, since they are not yet formed into habits, have no organized hold upon the self, and which can get organized into habitual tendencies and interests only by a more or less painful and difficult reconstruction of the habitual self. For Kant's fixed and absolute separation between the self of inclination and the self of reason, we substitute the relative and shifting distinction between those factors of self which have become so definitely organized into set habits that they take care of themselves, and those other factors which are more precarious, less crystallized, and which depend therefore upon conscious acknowledgment and intentionally directed affection. The consciousness of duty grows out of the complex character of the self; the fact that at any given time it has tendencies relatively set, ingrained, and embodied in fixed habits, while it also has tendencies in process of making, looking to the future, taking account of unachieved possibilities. The former give the solid relatively formed elements of character; the latter, its ideal or unrealized possibilities. Each must play into the other; each must help the other out."

2) Duty as a part of conscience.--Since duty means different things in different theories, in evolutionistic theories forming merely another insecure link in a chain designed to let man drift free from all objective morality, it readily fits into varying types of theory of conscience.

Cf. p. 55, argument of Rashdall that the Moral Sense theory implies a category of duty.

Pfleiderer (p. 237): "We find in ourselves, as the fundamental moral fact, the consciousness of duty, the 'I ought,'--absolute, independent of all our personal desires, and totally distinct from any extraneous compulsion. That is the one constant element in all the movements of our conscience. The form of our consciousness of duty remains ever the same, however diverse and variable the content and scope of duty may be."

Haven deprecates the objective authority of the sense of duty as evinced in conscience (p. 316): "The ought, and the ought not--also simple ideas, and indefinable...This, like the former (perception), is an intellectual act, a perception or cognition of a truth, of a reality for which we have the same voucher as for any other reality or apprehended fact, viz. the reliability of our mental faculties in general, and the correctness of their operation in the specific instance."

Cf. note on Fichte and Paulsen, p. 58.

Duty logically becomes a part of conscience in theories which make conscience its own standard, or the sole exponent of its own standard. But in such views of conscience as the Biblical one, in which ethical standards have divine sanction and an existence outside of and normative for conscience, the sense of obligation becomes identified with the acknowledgement of the standard itself, with the obedience to government exercising power over the individual. (cf. p. 62).

f. Will as a factor.--The "will" is spoken of as the faculty which carries out the dictates of conscience, and hence is included in theories regarding conscience as a combination of faculties. But the fact that conscience asserts itself independently of will, reproving acts previously prompted by conscious direction, makes the inclusion of will in conscience logically unsound.

Rickaby (p. 269) speaks of the intellect "aided by a good will" in acts of conscience; and Strong (p. 256) of the good conscience as the "conscience obeyed by the will."

g. Emotion as a factor.--The feeling or emotion of approbation or disapproval naturally consequent upon an intellectual judgment of a moral act is stressed by some writers as an important part of the nature of conscience. This assumption is just, although it is merely a matter of terminology whether the feeling is called an essential part of conscience or merely a consequence of essential acts of conscience. Theories stressing the consciousness-phase of conscience, such as the Scriptural view, naturally incline toward considering it an essential part of conscience, since emotion is always the most prominent item in a state of consciousness. The "emotional complex" of evolution could hardly be called conscience.

Cf. Rashdall's view of emotion combined with moral judgments, p. 55.

Sheldon speaks of the spontaneity of the moral emotion (p. 292). Haven (p. 326): "In our analysis of an act of conscience, it is impossible to view our past conduct as right or wrong, and to approve or condemn ourselves accordingly, without emotion; and these emotions will vary in intensity, according to the clearness and force of our intellectual conception of the merit or demerit of our conduct." Haven regards the emotion of conscience as arising from the recognition of good or ill, just as the perception of the right awakens feelings of pleasure, admiration, and love; the idea of obligation, impulses and motives to action (p. 316). It becomes hard to follow Haven when he produces this analogy (p. 436): "The emotion of which we speak is not limited to the occasion of our own moral conduct; it arises also in view of the moral actions of others...No small part of the interest with which we trace the records of history, or the pages of romance, arises from that constant play of the feelings with which we watch the course of events, and the development of character as corresponding to or at variance with the demands of our moral nature."

Cf. Rashdall's summary of the evolutionistic view of conscience, p. 48. Similarly speaks Simmel (Einl. in d. Moral. I 407, in Eisler, p. 433): "Die Vererbungsfolge derjenigen Schmerzen, die viele Generationen hindurch dem Faeter als Strafe fuer die unsittliche Tat auferlegt wurde;" or Th. Ziegler (Das Gefuehl, II, 174; in Eisler p. 433): "Ausdruck fuer die Gesamtsumme der Gefuehle und der darauf sich bauenden Urteile des sittlichen Menschen ueber sich selbst."

3. Conscience a legislative complex.--A few theories remain in this connection which represent conscience as a psychological complex guiding man in his moral life. The complex in these views is composed of such multifarious psychological units or results in such a remote abstraction, beyond analysis, that it cannot be fitted in with the preceding theories.

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a. Conscience an instinct.-- Chiefly in the interest of the evolutionary theory conscience is often spoken of either as a derivative of instincts, an unanalysable feeling-remnant of submerged drives, or as an instinct in itself, isolated by the development of the race from cognate instincts of self-preservation and gregariousness, and prompting to duty. Such a theory of conscience removes, of course, all objectivity of moral standards. And it is logically inconsistent to hold that an instinct serving no definite moral ends (according to the theory), and opposing some of the most primitive and fundamental urges of the human organism, should survive as an impellent and valid force over will and reason.

McDougall in his Social Psychology derives moral sense from the instincts (with their corresponding emotions) of reproduction, pugnacity, gregariousness, acquisition, self-abasement and -assertion; thus love, hatred, respect, admiration (quoted by Rashdall).

Hoefding (according to Luthardt, p. 115) regards conscience "Entwicklung des Instinkts und Triebes zur praktischen Vernunft;" the operation of this is described by Eisler (p. 432, quoting Eth. 69) as "Reaktion des Zentralen in uns gegen das Peripherische, ein Beziehungsgefuehl." Simmel on the basis of his feeling-complex-theory (quoted p. 68) calls conscience "ein rueckwaerts gewandter Instinkt" (Eisler p. 433 quoting Einl. in d. Moral. I, 408). Crusius (Kurze Begriff der Moralthologie, 165, quoted in Kaehler, p. 651) calls conscience "das Gefuehl vom moralisch Guten und Boesen...Der Gewissenstrieb, instinctus religionis, machet in der That das Grundwesen des Gewissens aus." Rousseau, in endeavoring to remove all ethical obligations, weakened conscience into the vaguest sort of instinct, as Kaehler says (p. 651): "Die letzte Folgerung aus diesem unwahren Gegensatze zwischen Natur und Geschichte (Skepsis gegen das Sittengesetz) zieht Rousseau, dessen natuerliches Gewissen als Gefuehl fuer das Sittliche, angeblich das Tat-Zeug is fuer die unverdorbene Menschennatur, die Woerter Schuldigkeit und Verpflichtung austreiben soll--ein leitender Instinkt, der keine Aehnlichkeit mehr mit dem anklagenden Zeugen des Altortums und den beaengstigenden Eindruecken der Reformatoren zeigt."

Cf. Leslie Stephen's arguments against the instinctive nature of conscience, p. 49.

Scaer (p. 9): "We will ask the evolutionist, how could man, or why should he, develop or evolve something within himself that speaks with such an imperative tone, with such unappealable authority as does conscience? If he has himself evolved this so-called 'moral sentiment', it is getting the mastery of him, and the creature is above its creator, a scientific impossibility."

b. Conscience the "whole self."--As an effort both to account for the thoroughness with which conscience does its work and to obviate the necessity of analyzing its somewhat interwoven elements, conscience has been called "the whole self." This notion is open to the objection voiced against the view of conscience as an instinct, namely that conscience acts normative for the self, and the self must acknowledge the authority of conscience.

Richardson (Conscience, its Origin and Authority, p. 69; quoted by Pitt-Rivers) Defines conscience as "the whole personality acting ethically; or, more precisely, conscience is the reaction, pleasurable or painful, of the whole personality in response to a human or Divine standard." His view is theistic (p. 13): "Its activity is set in motion by an impulse from the Divine Personality, and does not originate in the individual nor the world, yet it reacts to public opinion, is often unreasonable and inconsistent, is subject to evolutionary growth, and is not infallible, is capable of infinite variety of interpretation, and reacts to a human standard, which, however, trails some clouds of glory from its Divine original, and in conclusion, if we regard conscience not as a phosphorescent gleam playing upon the surface of consciousness, but as a vital impulse, partly rational, partly instinctive, welling up from the depths of personality, we shall not run the risk of denying its authority" (Pitt-Rivers, p. 13).

This view on its psychological side is expressed by Spiess (Psychologie des Nervensystems, 346): "Das Gewissen ist nicht ein besonderes Vermoegen in uns, durch das wir un ehlbar das Gute vom Boesen, das Schoene vom Unschoenen unterscheiden; es ist ueberhaupt nichts von unserm sonstigen empirischen Ich Verschiedenes, am wenigsten eine unmittelbare Stimme Gottes in uns, sondern es ist unser ganzes empirisches Ich selbst, diese Verbindung von Vorstellungsweisen und Masson, wie sie sich aus den zwei Factoren, der angeborenen physischen Organisation und den menschlichen, durch die Sinne vermittelten aeusseren Einwirkungen im Laufe der Zeit und unter der Mitwirkung der willkuerlichen Aufmerksamkeit gebildet hat. Was mit diesem jedesmaligen empirischen Ich uebereinstimmt, das erscheint uns, je nachdem es einen moralischen oder aesthetischen Gegenstand betrifft, als recht und als schoen, und umgekehrt." (Quoted Graebner p. 14 and Hofmann p. 92).

On the philosophical side, Hegel (Phaenomenol. 493; Rechtsphil. 179; in Eisler p. 431) calls conscience "das wissende und wollende Selbst, der seiner unmittelbar bewusste Geist;" Luthardt according to the latter work (p. 180; L p. 114): "Die tiereste innerliche Einsamkeit mit sich, wo alles aeuesserliche und alle Beschraenkt-heit verschwunden ist, diese durchgaengige Zurueckgezogenheit in sich selbst."

In refutation Harless (p. 67) quotes J.E. Mueller (Philosoph. Aufsaeetze, 91): "Eben weil der innere Zeuge uns oft zur Last wird, ist klar, dass wir ihn nicht durch Eingildung selbst in uns gepflanzt, und dass wir einer hoehern Macht unterworfen sind." Cf. Harless p. 54.

c. Conscience as "the impartial spectator."--In recognition of the objective nature of the whole reaction of conscience and the fact that it assumes normative authority, conscience has been called "an impartial spectator" of action. We are here approaching very closely to a judicial function of conscience, although the exponents of the somewhat unscientific term do not distinguish between conscience as legislative and discriminative, and regard conscience as standard.

G. A. Smith (Tufts p. 140 N): "Smith held that we 1. approve or disapprove the conduct of others; 2. see ourselves as others see us, judging ourselves from their standpoint; 3. finally form a true social standard, that of the 'impartial spectator.'"

Martineau, in endeavoring to give higher authority to his system (cf. p. 60) asserts (p. 105): "Each of us is permitted to learn, in the penetralia of his own consciousness, that which at once bears him out of himself, and raises him to the station of the Father of Spirits; and thence he is enabled to look down over the realm of dependent minds, and apply to them the all-comprehending law which he has reached at the fountain-head."

d. The social conscience.--The widest, and also the most modern, development of conscience is the concept of the "social conscience," the consciousness, and resultant obligation, of the widest possible social good, a reflection upon custom for the purpose of consciously evaluating conduct in terms of purposive cooperation and progress. While, in itself, the giving of the term "conscience" to this concept cannot be hindered, yet it tends to draw attention away from the fact that conscience has to do with the personal and individual life, and attests to objective, authoritative standards also for the individual; and it tends, in accordance with modern ethic in general, to place the source of ultimate moral authority in the hands of man himself, when, if there is to be authority in the final analysis, it must come from above and beyond.

Eisler (p. 429) summarizes this notion: "Das Gewissen ist zum Teil der Niederschlag sozialer Wertungen und Imperative, die (durch Vererbung, Erziehung, Usw.) das individuelle Fühlen und Denken im Sinne sozialer Zweckmässigkeit formen, wobei aber die Einsicht und Wertung der Persönlichkeit selbst ein aktiver Faktor des Gewissens ist." L. Stephen calls conscience the voice of "the public spirit of the race" (Sc. of Eth. 311; Eisler p. 432). Ratzenhofer

(Posit. Ethik. 123; Eisler p. 433) Calls conscience "ein Produkt der Entwicklung des angeborenen Interesses und tritt in dem Augenblicke hervor, wo sich dem Gattungsinteresse Spuren des Sozialinteresses entwinden."

Cf. Tufts on the reflective conscience (§. 65) representing a phase of the modern theory of social conscience. Dewey shows the authority of "the social order" crystallized in "conscience" in this theory (p. 344): "When an appetite is in accord with those habits of an individual which enable him to perform his social functions, or which naturally accrue from his social relations, it is legitimate and good; when it conflicts, it is illicit, it is lust; we call it by hard names and we demand that it be curbed; we regard its force as a menace to the integrity of the agent and threat to social order. When the reflective habits of an individual come into conflict with natural appetites and impulses, the manifestation of which would enlarge or make more certain the powers of the individual in his full relation to others, it is the reflective habits which have to be held in and redirected at the cost of whatever disagreeableness." The direct influence of society he presents (p. 362): "Social influences enable an individual to realize the weight and import of the socially available and helpful manifestations of the tendencies of his own nature and to discriminate them from those which are socially harmful or useless. When the two conflict, the perception of the former is the recognition of duties as distinct from mere inclinations."

B. Theories ascribing legislative with wider functions.---Several authors, while regarding conscience as normative of its own nature, ascribe non-legislative functions to it, such as judgment of action on the basis of general standards, and testimony of this judgment combined with influence upon action; this combination of legislative and forensic character really sets these views of conscience apart from the foregoing, allying them with the next group as regards function, and with the foregoing in respect to nature. With few exceptions these views are founded on interpretations of Scriptural sources. The general criticism of these theories is, that the notion of "erring conscience" becomes exceedingly confusing when conscience is made its own standard, and its dictates are maintained to be binding upon action though they may be the result of an erroneous process; further, an unclear and unsafe division becomes necessary between the part of revelation, of the innate law, and of the particular revelation of conscience, in defining what norm conscience is to follow in its judgment and testimony.

Concerning the doctrine of Chrysostom, Kaehler (p. 649) says: "Der christliche Cicero...geht ueber das bisher gefundene hinaus, wenn er es auch ganz bestimmt als autonomen und autarkischen Quell der sittlichen Einsicht (*ἡ φύσις τοῦ νοῦ*) und neben der *κρίσις* als das andere urspruengliche Mittel der *διόρθωσις* bezeichnet, hom. 52. 54. in genes. sermo de Anna l. 3. Dies ist die erste klare Aussage ueber das sog. Ivrangehende oder befehlende' Gewissen: *ἡ συνείδησις τοῦ σωτήρος*." Luthardt (p. 110) points out that Chrysostom makes use of conscience not only in the sense of judge, *κρίσις ἀδικημάτων καὶ ἀδικημάτων*, but also as a concrete teacher and lawgiver: *ἀποστολὰ διδασκαλίας* (IV, 522) and *λόγος* (V, 486) *τῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀποστολῆς ὑποδείκνυται* (IV, 512), "wo- durch der Mensch *αὐτοδιδασκός* (ad popul. Antioch. hom. 12, II, 127-130) ist, so dass also hier jene zwei Linien des innern Gerichtshofs und der innern Gesetzgebung im Begriff des Gewissens zusammengehen." Also Hofmann p. 41.

The medieval Synderesis, although used also in a narrower sense (see below C 2), was used in a wider sense to include the practical actions of conscience proper. Kaehler (p. 649): "Das eigentuemlichste dieser ersten wissenschaftlichen Fassung liegt in der Einfuehrung des Begriffs der synteresis, welche mit der conscientia identifiziert und zugleich von ihr unterschieden wird, je nachdem man diesem Worte eine engere oder weitere Bedeutung gibt...Die Scholastik...findet dann in der Synteresis den praktischen Intellekt, d.h. nach ihrer Fassung die Potentia oder den Habitus der sittlichen Prinzipien. Im Unterschiede von dieser soll conscientia deren Anwendung auf das Einzelne bezeichnen."

This terminology influenced the later Lutheran dogmatists. Molanchthon (Luthardt, p. 111) considered the conscientia a syllogismus practicus, in which the lex (or word of God) formed the major premise, while the minor premise and the conclusion are applicatio approbans recte factum vel condemnans delictum, quam applicationem in corde sequitur laetitia et contemnationem dolor. For him synteresis is the lex, a darkened remnant of the Divine image; but the point is that he includes it in conscience. (Def. theol. art. 20).

Hofmann says of the 17th century dogmatic presentation of conscience (p. 58): "(Es)...stagniert in einseitiger Geltendmachung des Objektivitätsprinzips die Theorie vom Gewissen." Gerhardt (I, 93; in Luthardt p. 112) calls conscience "reliquiae quaedam et scintillulae..."; (III, 42) "eas referimus ad librum naturae internum, ad quem etiam pertinet liber syndeiseos, internum conscientiae testimonium, quod Scholastici vocant synteresin; nam ex principiis nobiscum natis practicus ille syllogismus in corde cuiusvis hominis oritur." Luthardt regards Quenstedt as following this doctrine IV, 1, 1 th. 6 "mit Erinnerung an die Stoer und an M. Aurel." Even pietistic ethics, though tending toward the subjective (Hofmann p. 60) has a representative harking back to scholastic terms in Joach. Lane (Oeconomia salutis evglca; Luthardt p. 113): "Conscientia est principium normativum, quod hominis actiones ita dirigit, ut dato de illis testimonio animum eius vel tranqillet vel inquietet."

Dr. Pieper (I, 635): "Das Gewissen betätigt sich in doppelter Weise. Es hat a. eine offenbarende und fordernde Funktion, Rom. 2, 15a; b. eine beurteilende und richtende Funktion, 15b. Aber das Gewissen bezeugt nach dem Fall nicht mehr mit volliger Sicherheit den Willen Gottes."

Dr. Pieper's solution of the clash between a legislative conscience and revelation (I, 635): "Es gibt ein irrendes Gewissen, d.h. der gefallene Mensch haelt fuer erlaubt, sogar fuer geboten, was Gott verboten hat, und er haelt fuer verboten, was Gott erlaubt hat. Daher wird nun nach dem Fall der unwandelbare Wille Gottes mit volliger Sicherheit nur aus Gottes Offenbarung im Wort, naemlich aus der Heiligen Schrift, erkannt."

In philosophical fields Wundt's theory is summarized by Eisler (Eisler, p. 433) as follows: "Das Gewissen aeussert sich in der Herrschaft imperativer Motive, zu deren Ausbildung aeusserer und innerer Zwang beigegeben hat. Die einfache und normale Funktion des Gewissens besteht 'darin, dass es den Kampf der imperativen und impulsiven Motive vorstaerkt und daher sehr haeufig einen Sieg der letzteren auch in solchen Faellen herbeifuehrt, wo der Gefuehlswert der Motive selbst hierzu nicht ausreichen wuerde (Eth. 2, 485).' Es gibt ein gesetzgebendes, ein antreibendes und ein richtendes Gewissen. ib. 'Der einzelne Gewissensakt kann Gefuehl, Affekt, Trieb, Urteil sein; ein Gewissen aber, dass aeusserhalb dieser einzelnen Akte der menschlichen Seele als ein Separatvermoegen zukaeme, gibt es nicht. 481."

C. Theories excluding legislative functions.-From the critique of the preceding theories it is evident that the weak point in views of conscience as a legislative faculty lies just in the legislative function, which leaves no definite place for objective norms, reacts in a variant manner to the same occasions, is subject to other vagaries of character and temperament, and leaves collisions of duty unexplained. Theories recognizing the fact that the standards by which conscience acts are something exclusive of conscience, are capable of reconciling the difficulties connected with the variations in individual and collective consciences, and are more in accord, as far as we are capable of judging, with the Scriptural viewpoint. The leading objections to non-legislative views of conscience are, that no standard or set of standards sufficiently covers all human activity to account for the universal judgments of conscience; and that such theories do not explain the nature of conscience, in leaving unexplained the fundamental principles of right and wrong. These objections depend upon a mechanistic philosophy, denying that right and wrong may be a part of a natural law or aptitude of man as created by a Divine Power.

Rupp (p. 659): "The conscience is not autonomic, or self-legislative, in the sense that its authority has its foundation merely in itself, but only in the sense that its mandates are formulated within itself and are not foreign to its own nature. The conscience is the witness of an authority which, though making itself heard in its own voice, is nevertheless objective. The law to which the conscience binds the will is recognized as force established and maintained by an authority other than the subjective conscience."

Sidgwick defines this group of theories philosophically (p. 100): "Christian and other moralists...have rather represented the process of conscience as analogous to one of jurial reasoning, such as is conducted in a Court of Law. Here we have always a system of universal rules given, and any particular action has to be brought under one of these rules before it can be pronounced lawful or unlawful. Now the rules of positive law are usually not discoverable by the individual's reason; his may teach him that law ought to be obeyed, but what law is must, in the main, be communicated to him from some external authority...It is held that such general rules are implicit in the moral reasoning of ordinary men, who apprehend them adequately for most practical purposes, and are able to enunciate them roughly; but that to state them with proper precision requires a special habit of contemplating clearly and steadily abstract moral notions. In so far as this is the case we cannot strictly call their method intuitional. They follow rules generally received, not intuitively apprehended. Other persons, however, or perhaps all to some extent, do seem to see for themselves the truth and bindingness of all or most of these current rules."

Luthardt defines the Christian conscience (p. 109): "Wenn die Antike im Gewissen einen subjektiven Anhalt der sittlichen Beurteilung und Gewissheit gegenueber den wankenden objektiven Maechten gefunden hatte, so beruhte fuer die Glieder der Kirche aller Anhalt und alle Gewissheit gerade auf der objektiven goettlichen Offenbarung in Christo und ihrer inneren Aneignung und Vergewisserung im Heiligen Geist, so dass es dem Christen nicht in den Sinn kommen konnte, von diesem goettlichen sittlichen Maechten das Gewissen zu isolieren und als Stuetzpunkt zur Orientierung im sittlichen Leben zu gebrauchen."

Kaehler argues against a legislative faculty (p. 653): "Man sollte allerdings nie vergessen, dass laut der Geschichte das Gewissen den Erweis seiner Urspruenglichkeit allein durch seine verurteilende Wirkung geliefert hat. Das deutet auf eine Widerstandskraft des sittlichen Bewusstseins, nicht aber auf die Faehigkeit, spontan zu sittlicher Einsicht, auch nur im einzelsten Faelle, zu fuehren."

Sidgwick presents the current objections (p. 102): "Even granting that these rules can be so defined as perfectly to fit together and cover the whole field of human conduct, without coming into conflict and without leaving any practical questions unanswered--still the resulting code seems an accidental aggregate of precepts, which stands in need of some rational synthesis. In short, without being disposed to deny that conduct commonly judged to be right is so, we may yet require some deeper explanation of why it is so."

1. Consciousness of duty.--The most cautious statements of non-legislative theories of conscience define it as mere consciousness

of one's own action, with reference to duty and obligation; consciousness that according to certain standards accepted by the individual a certain thing should be done; satisfaction or dissatisfaction accordingly follows upon obedience or disobedience to this call of duty. This theory is too general to be of service in investigating the true nature of conscience.

Eisler (p. 49): "Gewissen ist das Bewusstsein des Pflicht-gemaessen, des Sein-sollenden bezw. von dessen Gegenteil."

Norlie (p. 145): "Conscience...is the awareness of the right and its obligations."

Perhaps Schopenhauer's statement may be here included: "Das Wissen des Menschen um das, was er getan hat...Zufriedenheit oder Unzufriedenheit mit uns selbst." (Grundl. d. Moral par. 9; Eisler p. 431).

2. The application of ethical potentiality.--The abstract formulation of the middle ages led to the concept of an ethical potentiality or aptitude (synteresis in the narrower sense; cf. p. 73), the application of which to specific instances of conduct was termed conscience. The defect of this theory was the emphasis put upon the possibility of error in the application to conduct, and the attendant monsters of casuistry, culminating in Jesuitic probabilism.

Luthardt (p. 110) points out that the inner law was termed synteresis (after Jerome in Ezech. V p. 9 ff), called a potentia (Albertus Magnus) or Habitus (Thom. Aq.), the major premise in a syllogism of which the minor is the conscientia actus: "Actus quo scientiam nostram ad ea quae agimus applicamus." This notion was preserved as late as 1541 by Rivius, De Conscientia II III Lips. (Luthardt p. 112). (Foregoing quotation is Thom. Aq. Sum. th. I, 79 13; Eisler p. 430).

Luthardt describes the results of the theory (p. 110): "Hierin liegt daher die Möglichkeit eines Irrtums (consc. erronea) wodurch das Bedeürfnis der kirch. Leitung gegeben ist, welcher die Summen casuum conscientiae dienen sollten. Ein böses Gewissen ist die Hölle, ein gutes das Paradies, variies arboribus bonorum operum consita, während jenes durch contritio, confessio, satisfactio gut zu machen. Da hat denn die Kasuistik weiten Spielraum, und die Gewissensunruhe vielfachen Anlass. Der Ausgang des M.A. ist eine Zeit weitverbreiteter Gewissenbeunruhigung." Similarly Kaehler (p. 649).

Significant is the observation of Luthardt (p. 111): "Während fuer die Renaissance das Gewissen keine Rolle spielte, ist die Reformation aus der Angst des Gewissens geboren, und ihre Lehre will der rechte Trost der Gewissen sein." Cf. passages listed under "Conscience" in Conc. Trigl. ed. of Book of Concord.

3. Comparison of actions with a standard.--The predominant mass of theories in non-legislative types centers about the doctrine that conscience is primarily an act of judgment, whereby conduct is judged to be right or wrong according to a standard accepted as binding and valid by the possessor of the judging conscience. The theory is tenable logically, and the only objection that can be advanced is, that it may be an unjustifiable assumption to call merely a specified type of rational discrimination "conscience." The comparison performed by conscience, however, has the distinctive characteristic of being involuntary, and of disregarding all features of feasibility or satisfaction to the organism.

Augustine's doctrine is summarized by Hofmann (p. 42): "Er spricht haeufig vom Gewissen, aber nur als dem richterlichen Tribunal im eignen Innern, von dem guten und boesen Gewissen... von der legislatorischen Bestimmung des Gewissens, von der ihm inwohnenden Triebkraft zum Guten, von seiner Dignitaet als Apperceptionsvermoegen fuer das Goettliche hat Augustin nirgends Erwachung getan. Es ist dies nicht Zufall, sondern Absicht, sofern Augustin auf dem Standpunkte seiner Lehre von der gaenzlichen Verderbtheit des natuerlichen Menschen und von der Allwirksamkeit der goettlichen Gnade zum Guten alle synergistische Bedeutung des Gewissens zurueckweisen musste."

Que stede (L.c. pars IV, cap. i sect I thes. VI nota p.2, in Hoenecke 363): "Lex est regula universalis jubens aut vetans. At conscientia est examen sui ipsius ad istam regulam." This seems opposed to Luthardt's opinion (see p. 73).

Luther's doctrine, though seemingly not quite static on this point, is summarized by Hofmann (p. 52): "Das Gewissen ist nicht das Gesetz selbst, sondern das 'Zeugnis' im Herzen; 'das Gewissen ist nicht ein Ding, das da wirke (wie das Gesetz), sondern ein Ding, das nur richtet ueber die Werke. Sein eigentlich Werk ist, wie St. Paulus Roem. 2, 15 lehret, beschuldigen oder entschuldigen, binden oder loesen, freudig oder verzagt machen. Darum ist sein Amt nicht tun, sondern von dem getanen, oder das zu tun ist urteilen, obs vor Gott schuldig oder ledig mache' (Walch XIX, 1887)."

Strong, after rejecting notions of conscience as moral intuition, accepted law, remorse or approval, fear or hope, adopts as components judgment and command, the former being the "applying (of) this accepted law to individual and concrete cases in our own experience, and pronouncing our own acts or states either past, present, or prospective, to be right or wrong" (p. 255).

Frank (p. 505): "Das Gewissen bezieht sich auf das ins Herz geschriebene Gesetz, empfaengt von daher seinen Inhalt, insofern es Bewusstsein um dieses Gesetz ist, aber nicht dies allein, son-

dem zugleich ein die Betätigung des Subjekts damit vergleichendes Bewusstsein, woraus sich dann begreift, dass verklagende oder die Anklage abweisende Gedanken daraus hervorgehen."

Graebner (p. 14): "Das Gewissen ist die natuerliche Anlage des Menschen, einen zur Zeit von ihm als bindend anerkannten Massstab fuer Recht und Unrecht auf sein ihm bewusstes Wollen und Wirken anzuwenden." In philosophical terms Rosenkranz (Syst. d. Wiss. 437; Eisler 431): "Urteil des Subjektes selbst ueber den moralischen Wert seines empirischen Handelns gegenueber der Idee des Guten, wie es selbst dieselbe begreift und sich actu auf sie bezieht."

Graebner (p. 20): "Das Gewissen legt den Massstab nicht an inbezug auf Zweckmaessigkeit oder Unzweckmaessigkeit. Ob es Weise oder unversaendig sei, dass er tue, was er tut oder tun will, darueber spricht sich das Gewissen nicht aus. Darueber kann er mit seiner Erfahrung zu Rate gehen, da kann er ueberlegen und Gruende fuer und wider abwaegen. Da kann das Urteil auch, je nachdem die Erfahrung eine andere ist, ein verschiedenes sein. Aber das ist nicht die Taetigkeit des Gewissens."

a. The standard.--The standard normative for this comparison has points of similarity and points of difference in the various non-legislative systems.

Hofmann speaks of a norm for conscience, but he calls it formal rather than material, also one contained in and issuing forth from the person; thus his theory really becomes aligned with legislative views (cf. Hofmann p. 83 ff.)

1) Acknowledged as valid.--The prime requisite for the standard according to which conscience performs its discriminative functions is, that it be acknowledged as binding by the person whose conscience is acting. This acknowledgment implies obligation on the part of the acting person, and a sense of responsibility to the demands of the standard acknowledged. Whether it should be considered a weakness or an error in the function of conscience that it adopt or acknowledge a wrong norm, is questionable; since it is hardly a function of conscience to acknowledge the norm, which would lead back to a legislative conscience, but of the individual on the basis of innate law, reliance on revelation, or circumstance relative to society and government. Theological and philosophical ethics, therefore, stress the necessity and function of education in affecting acknowledgment of objectively right and ^{constructive} standards.

The part that man plays in the acknowledgment of the validity of the normative standard Frank indicates (p. 502): "Auf der andern Seite haengt es doch von der Selbstbestimmung des Menschen ab, nicht blos ob er jener gebietenden Macht sich fügen will, sondern in gewissem Masse auch, was er als Inhalt der an ihm gelangenden Weisung vernimmt." (p. 503) "Man ueberlaesst es dann (in Conflict mit der allgemeinen Ordnung) dem Einzelnen mit seinem Gewissen sich auseinanderzusetzen, fordert aber gleichwohl von ihm den Gehorsam gegen die allgemeine Ordnung. Hier tritt also die subjektive Seite des Gewissens, die Möglichkeit fuer das Subjekt, auf den Inhalt und die Art seiner Verbindlichkeit Einflüsse zu nehmen, die Möglichkeit und Tatsaechlichkeit eines irrenden Gewissens hervor."

Graebner (p. 20): "Nicht notwendigerweise ist es ein wirklich bindender Massstab. Es kann das Gewissen, wie in einer spaetern Thesis angegeben, auch einen falschen Massstab anlegen." cf. quot. p. 28. (p. 27): "Insofern als der Massstab, den das Gewissen anwendet, ein solcher ist, dessen bindende Kraft der Mensch zur Zeit anerkennt, begreift die Aussage des Gewissens auch die Bezeugung einer Verpflichtung in sich...Dass ein Gesetz ein wirkliches Gesetz sei, dazu gehoert erstlich, dass es der Ausdruck des Willens einer Gesetzgeberischen Gewalt sei. Wer nicht das Recht hat, Gesetze zu machen, der kann ueberhaupt kein Gesetz machen, das ein wirkliches Gesetz waere; der kann zwar sagen: 'so soll es sein' aber das gilt nichts...Das Gewissen (p. 30) tritt nun aber auch wirklich dem Massstab bei nach Inhalt und Umfang, u d wie der Massstab selbst verpflichtend ist, so sagt das Gewissen: 'Das bist du schuldig, das ziemt dir, das sollst du, and zwar das, alles, was das Gebot fordert.' Da haben wir wieder eine rechte Zeugenaussage, die uebereinstimmt mit der Aussage, die im Gesetz vorliegt. Das Gesetz ist bindende Norm, und das Gewissen tritt hinzu und sagt: Das ist recht; es ist nicht blos wahr, was das Gesetz sagt, sondern diese Aufforderung ist auch verbindlich."

Rupp (p. 659): "The law to which the conscience binds the will is recognized as force established and maintained by an authority other than the subjective conscience."

Tufts (p. 182 ff.): "The person must himself set up a standard, recognize it as 'law,' judge his conduct by it, hold himself responsible to himself, and seek to do justice. A conscientious person is in so far one who has made the law of God or man an inward law of life--a 'moral law.'"

G.B. Smith (p. 112): "Conscience not only may be educated; it always is the product of education. A man ought always to follow conscience, but ought equally to make sure that he does not identify conscience with a mere inherited emotion, which his reason criticizes."

2) The standard presented in Christian theories.--As the non-legislative conscience is a notion developed particularly by systems of Christian ethics, phases of the standard by which conscience operates are presented most prominently in theories purporting to be Biblical.

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a) The standard a consciousness of relation to God.—GA theory which is most heatedly defended is, that the predominant element of the standard applied by conscience to action is a consciousness of relation to God; the ethical nature of conscience being a concomitant of this primary consciousness of relation. The explicit consciousness is admitted by some not to exist in the heathen; others regard it, however, as generally fundamental for conscience. Against this view stands the fact that Paul distinguishes between an innate knowledge of God and hence consciousness of relation to Him, and conscience; and the further fact that conscience in Scripture, at least, is hardly a consciousness of moral relation, but rather a consciousness of quality of action. And it leads to many difficulties to assume that the nature of conscience is fundamentally different in heathen from that in regenerate Christians, when the functions of conscience remain the same in heathen and regenerate.

Hoenecke regards Luther as indicating the above view when he says (Kirchenp. XXII p. Tr.): "Das ist die Plage aller Gewissen, wenn die Sünde kommt und beisset, dass sie fühlen, wie sie mit Gott uebel daran sind." (Hoenecke p. 364). Calvin clearly declares himself for this view, calling conscience *sensus divini iudicii, quasi sibi adjunctum testem*. "Est enim quiddam inter Deum et hominem medium" (Inst. 3, 19. 15); "solum Deum respicit" (16; quot in Hofmann p. 55 ff., who concludes: "Calvin setzt also in das Gewissen ein unmittelbares und unabweisbares Bewusstsein der Gebundenheit an Gott"). Schoeberlein calls conscience "Das Organ fuer das Rechtsverhaeltnis des Menschen zu Gott" (Grund-lehren des Heils, p. 39; Kaehler 649).

Luthardt really makes the consciousness of a relation to God the complete essence of conscience in his definition (p. 104): "Im Wesen der sittlichen Persoenlichkeit des Menschen ist eine Beziehung zu Gott als der absoluten sittlichen Norm gütgesetzt, welche Beziehung je nach der konkreten sittlichen Welt, in welcher der Einzelne steht, diesem zu mehr oder minder entwickeltem und gestaltetem Bewusstsein kommt, und sich als ein ueber ihm stehendes und doch ihm einwohnendes Sollen gelten macht. Dieses sittliche Bewusstsein in seiner Aktivitaet, wie sie das Sollen und Tunes Menschen begleitet, nennen wir Gewissen."

Hoenecke minimizes the ethical element (p. 364): "Das Gewissen ist Bewusstsein von Gott als dem im Bittengesetz als heilig sich offenbarenden und Heiligkeit fordernden Gott. Es ist das Selbstbewusstsein oder das Bewusstsein des Menschen von dem heiligen Gott, welches das dem Herzen eingeschriebene Gesetz als das Gesetz dieses Gottes und als seine Forderung bezeugt und die anklagenden und entschuldigenden Gedanken in Bewegung setzen." The

Biblical basis for this view is expressed (ib.): "Waere das Gewissen nur eine Kenntniss vom Gesetz, also nur moralischer Natur, so koennte Paulus nicht davon reden als von einem Beweis dafuer, dass die Heiden von Gott wissen;" the latter assumption is clear from the statement (N p. 364): "Nach Roem. 2, 14.15 verglichen mit 1, 19. 20 ist das Gewissen das Bewusstsein von der Verpflichtung durch das Gesetz als Gesetz Gottes, wie immer auch dabei Gott mag vorgestellt werden." This exegetical demonstration does not appear cogent to us. The whole view is based on Philippi (Glaubenslehre, III, 9; Hoenecke 365): "Das Gewissen ist die Beziehung des Gottesbewusstseins auf unser eigenes Selbst, insofern dieses in seiner Selbstbewegung nach innen und nach aussen durch jenes verpflichtet, gebunden und geregelt erscheint." Hoenecke's view leads him to say (p. 365): "Solange nun und insofern das Bewusstsein des Menschen nicht das durch den Glauben an Christum regierte ist, ist es böses Gewissen (Heb. 10, 2) und haelt dem Suender nichts vor als die Schuld seiner Sünden und zwar als eine unbezahlbare Schuld."

Frank admits (p. 505): "Freilich erscheint jene Beziehung des Gewissens auf Gott und goettliche Auktoritaet deutlich nur in denjenigen Stellen, wo von dem christlich bestimmten Gewissen die Rede ist, wogegen in der Ausfuehrung des Apostels ueber das gesetzliche Tun der Heiden (Roem. 2, 14 ff.) nichts davon zu lesen steht."

The fullest expansion of this view of conscience is offered by Harless. "In dem Bewusstsein der Beziehung alles kreatuerlichen Lebens zu Gott hat der Mensch eine Lebensnorm, einen Lebenszweck, ein Prinzip der Sittlichkeit, sei es in dunkler Ahnung, sei es in heller Erkenntnis, gefunden, in welchem er die vom Ich und der Welt freimachende Wahrheit...finden und gewinnen kann, also dass selbst in den truebsten Zustaten abirrender Gedanken noch der gebrochene Strahl dieses Lichtes der Wahrheit leuchtet. Das Bewusstsein der Menschen um diese, die Richtung seines Willens bedingende hoehere Bezogenheit, gleichviel in wie mannigfacher Gestalt, es sich ihm offenbare, nennen wir Gewissen" (p. 51 ff). "Ein reales, substantielles Abhaengigkeitsverhaeltnis der kreatuerlich-menschlichen Geistes von Gott--das ist der wesentliche Tatbestand, welcher in den Phaenomenen des Gewissens dem Menschen zum Bewusstsein kommt" (p. 80). "Wohl aber ist das Gewissen der also geschaffene und organisierte Geist des Menschen, dass diese der Natur des Geistes angeborne hoehere Beziehung, wenn ich mich in meinem persoenlichen Leben nicht in Freude und Liebe von ihr Tragen, ziehen, und leiten lasse, wie eine geistige Naturmacht ungestillten Hungers, getauschter Sehnsucht, verletzter Scham ueber mich kommt, mich unter sich zwingt, und die verkehrte Emancipation meines persoenlichen Lebens von meinem eigentlichsten und bleibenden Naturgrund mich im Bewusstsein unbezahlt er hoeherer Forderungen, unwidersprechlicher Anklage, schmerzlichen Selbstgerichtes, Seelenangst und Beklemmung inne werden laesst." (p. 86)l

Cf. Weiss quot. p. 18.

b) The standard the law of God.--The standard by which conscience judges is very often acknowledged to be the law of God, either revealed in the Scriptures, or accorded to the innate constitution of man in a form made imperfect through the Fall. Both philosophical and theolog-

ical writers point out that a truly valid and objective norm must be derived from a source higher than man, higher not merely by acquiescence of man, but by its own nature.

Locke (Essay, book II, chap. 3, par. 6, quoted by Rashdall p. 8) says that the true ground of morality must be the "will and law of a God, who sees men in the dark, has in his hands rewards and punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender."

Luthardt (p. 110): "Im Abenland steht neben der beurteilenden conscientia das innere sittliche Naturgesetz (Ambros. Aug. Hieron.) scriptum in tabulis--in cordibus, identisch gefasst mit dem mosaischen Sittengesetz."

The terminology of early dogmatics (Kaehler, p. 651): "Nun hatte die alte Dogmatik die notitia dei naturalis, dem Chrysostomos folgend, sowohl als insita aus dem liber naturae internus, ad quem etiam pertinet liber syneidesecos...wie auch als acquisita aus dem lib. nat. externus abgeleitet" (Gerhard loc. 2, 60).

Danaeus (Eth. Christ. II. III, fo. 75a; in Luthardt 112): "Lex illa coelestis verissima nostrae conscientiae stabiliendae et dirigendae norma, lex, liber, doctrina et institutio." Cf. Melancthon's doctrine p. 73; likewise Dr. Pieper's statement p. 74.

Luthardt (p. 104): "Seine Wahrheit aber findet es--im Unterschied sowohl von der falschen subjektiven Befreiung moderner sogenannter Gewissensfreiheit, als im Unterschied von der falschen Bindung durch die neuere Autorität der Kirche von seiten Roms--in der ebenso bindenden wie befreienden Einigung mit der Offenbarung Gottes in Christo."

Graebner (p. 54): "Der Massstab, den nach Gottes Ordnung und Absicht das Gewissen anwenden soll, ist: a. das natuerliche Gesetz; b. jede andere Offenbarung des Gesetzeswillens Gottes je nach ihrem Inhalt und Umfang; c. jedes innerhalb seiner gebuehrlichen Schranken bleibende Gebot derjenigen, welche Gott innerhalb gewissen Grenzen mit verpflichtender Autoritaet bekleidet hat." The last point pertains to the next paragraph.

c) The standard any law compatible with God's law.--Beyond the revealed or innate law of God, Christian theories to some extent recognize as the valid standard of conscience also human regulations, by circumstance authoritative over the individual, and in content compatible with the law of God; i.e. civil government, the authority of masters over servants, parents over children, and similar relations.

Luthardt (p. 117): "Wohl beruht so das Gewissen auf einem unmittelbaren Gefuehl, seinem Inhalt nach aber umfasst es zunaechst anderwaerts beigebrachte Ideen, die auf uns bestimmend einwirken, jedoch zugleich hoechsten Anspruch auf Geltung haben und Gegenstaende der objektiven Vorstellung des zerlegenden und zusammenfassenden Denkens sind (Koenig). So stimmt das Gewissen im allgemeinen mit dem sittlichen Bewusstsein des Lebenskreises ueberein,

dem der Einzelne zugehoert. Dabei aber gewinnt auch ein weiter hinausreichendes Ideal dem Gewissen unmittelbare Anerkennung ab, wie man denn ueberhaupt nie auf absolute, weit guesstige Massstaebe verzichten darf." The latter thought would require more study for approval.

Cf. Graebner quot. on previous page. He continues (p. 54): "Ein absolute freies Gewissen gibt es nicht. Absolut frei ist nur Gott und keine Creatur. Gott ist's allein, der wirklich und ueberall tun kann, was er sich zu tun vorgesetzt hat, und frei darueber entscheidet, was er sich vorsezen will oder nicht. So wird also auch, wo wir von Gewissensfreiheit des Menschen reden, das nicht eine absolute sein duerfen, so dass einem Menschen alles erlaubt oder geboten waere, was sein Gewissen erlaubt oder gebietet. Denn erstens ist sein Gewissen gebunden an Gottes Wort und Willen, zum andern ist aber auch sein Gewissen gebunden an die Gebote derer, unter welche ihn Gott gestellt hat."

On the basis of collation of Rom. 13, 5 and 1 Pet. 2, 19 with Eph. 6, 7 and Acts 3, 23 Frank states (p. 504): "Man sieht, dass es eine hoehere als menschliche, eine goettliche Auctoritaet ist, der sich der Mensch kraft des Gewissens verbunden weiss und um deretwillen er dann auch irdischen Auctoritaeten sich fuegt."

b. The comparison.--The process of the comparison occurring in conscience, with the actions in question for the object and an objective norm for pattern, receives considerable attention in discussions of non-legislative theories.

1) The impulse for the comparison.--The comparison of actions with a norm is considered to be either an involuntary propensity for making such decisions, or a comparison prompted by conscious determination of the individual. The former type of impulse would, of course, belong to the nature of conscience; the latter, which appears to be contradictory to the experience of conscience, a function asserting itself even in opposition to desires of its possessor, would be something separate from conscience and merely leading to its operation. In the latter case, conscience would be wholly acquired.

Cf. quot. from Graebner p. 78 for involuntary nature of conscience.

For the latter view presented above cf. Mosheim, for whom conscience was "der Wille oder ein Vorsatz des Willens, ueber unser Verhalten und Leben zu urteilen" (Kaehler p. 651, quot. Sittenlehre der h. Schrift 3a p. 220); und Ritschl, of whom Kaehler (p. 653) says: "Der dasselbe (Gewissen als Tugend der Gewissenhaftigkeit) demgemaeess, unter Ausschluss eines 'Naturgrundes' aehnlich wie Mosheim als eine Wirkung der Selbstbestimmung zum Guten angesehen, wuelth nur unter Vorausbestimmung einer Erziehung zur Sittlichkeit vorhanden sein kann." This would make Paul's mention of a heathen conscience impossible.

2) The means for the comparison.--A comparing or judging process requires the functioning of a discriminative, intellectual faculty, able to comprehend the regulations of the standard, analyze the compatible and incompatible phases of the action, and render a judgment in reference to the extent of the compatibility of the actions with the standard. This comparing or judging process has been called conscience itself, or merely a part of conscience, or no part of conscience at all, but merely a specialized phase of the intellect in general. Because of the very meaning of the term, in connection with its Biblical use, it becomes difficult to maintain that conscience is only a judging faculty, and not the consciousness attendant upon the judgment; whether it is to be included in conscience or not, however, is an alternative difficult of solution.

S.J. Baumgarten (Glaubenslehre, II par. 9, Anm. 363): "Der Gebrauch seines Verstandes bei Beurteilung seiner Handlungen nach dem Gesetz ist das Gewissen" (quoted by Heenecke, p. 364). Ch. Wolff (Vernuenfftigen Gedanken von des Menschen Tun und Lassen, p. 46; in Kachler 651) wishes to regard conscience as a mere judgment of intellect, dependent upon the development of knowledge. Heenecke's objection (p. 364) that conscience is rather a religious organ, seems to go too far in the other direction.

Strong (p. 255): "Conscience is not the law-book, in the court room, but it is the judge,--whose business is, not to make law, but to decide cases according to the law given to him. ...The moral sentiments are the sheriff,--they carry out the decisions of conscience, the judge; but they are not themselves conscience, any more than the sheriff is the judge." See 5)b) below.

Seeborg (p. 52): "Diese Selbstbeurteilungskale gut oder boese ist das Gewissen. Es ist somit eine Funktion der praktischen Vernunft." Locke (Ess. I, ch. 3, par. 8): "Our opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or depravity of our actions" (Eisler, p. 430).

Hofmann (p. 127): "Nicht das Gewissen urteilt ueber die Einstimmigkeit oder Nichteinstimmigkeit mit der Pflicht, sondern dasselbe Urteilsvermoegen, welches auch sonst diese Geistesfunktion hat. Ohne das Gewissen fehlte allerdings dem Urteil die eine der Praemissen (?), und ohne dasselbe wuerde ueberhaupt nicht in der bezeichneten Weise die urteilende Taetigkeit excitiert, aber in dem allen liegt noch keine Berechtigung, das Gewissen selbst zu einem urteilenden zu machen."

Strong (p. 254) Regards conscience as discriminative and impulsive (emotional).

3) The time relation of the comparison.--The comparison of the action with the norm is regarded as preceding, accompanying, or fol-

lowing the action itself; some theories exclude individual parts of this relation. We believe that a distinction ought to be drawn between mere judgment of an action as to its being right or wrong before the accomplishment of an act, and a judgment of conscience in this connection. For a judgment of conscience has reference to the act as being done by the possessor of the conscience (cf. discussion in next paragraph); and hence every judgment of conscience is, in a sense, conscientia consequens; that is, the judgment of conscience deals with the stimulus of the completed action, whether this completion be in deed or only in thought. The contemplation of an evil deed, and the knowledge that it is evil, is not necessarily productive of a judgment of conscience; the latter appears as consciousness only when the deed is thought of as done, or done, by the judging person. The question then arises whether the reaction of admonition to do the right is not strictly conscientia antecedens. When "conscience tells" one to do a right thing, this, in itself, is merely the obligation incurred by the realization that it is right and in accordance with the accepted standards of duty; a true act of conscience could arise in this connection only negatively, as far as we can judge, in that the negative reaction of conscience arising in response to the thought of doing the opposite of the right act in question would be an admonition to do the right; or the memory of a bad conscience incurred by having done the opposite of the right act in question would serve to urge toward doing the right. A conscientia antecedens in any other sense seems to us incompatible with any non-legislative theory of conscience. The conscientia concomitans, by the very nature of the term, must signify judgments of conscience arising from individual portions of the act in hand, and hence contributing to a state of consciousness accompanying the action as a whole.

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Hofmann (p. 166) speaks of all three species; but he implicitly accedes to our view when he says: "Nur wo ein Mensch ohne alle vorausgehende Ueberlegung handelte, waere es denkbar, dass von einer conscientia antecedens nicht gesprochen werden koemte; aber der voellige Mangel der Ueberlegung ist psychologisch unmoeglich, da das Objekt der Willensstaetigkeit schlechterdings erst in die Vorstellung treten muss, ehe der Wille ueberhaupt nur excitiert wird." This very "Vorstellung" is the mental accomplishment of the wrong deed, leading to a negative judgment of conscience.

Graebner (p. 43): "Insofern als das Gewissen seine Stimme auch vor geschoeher Willensentscheidung und vor vollbrachter Tat, ja selbst in Absicht auf einen nur gedachten Fall erhebt, stellt sich die Aussage des Gewissens als Warnung vor dem Boesen oder Anreizung zum Guten dar." This speaks only of the warning before the actual deed.

Hoenecke (p. 365): "Das vorangehende Gewissen ist das Urteil im Gewissen darueber, was nach dem im Gesetz geoffenbarten Willen des heiligen Gottes zu tun oder zu lassen ist (Matt. 14, 9) waehrend das Gewissen als nachfolgendes ueber das Geschehene zu Gericht sitzt." Here the "Urteil" of the antecedent conscience is really not a judgment or comparison at all, but merely the consciousness of the rightness or wrongness of an action as defined by God's will, hence the product of comparison in general intellectual lines, not necessarily conscience.

Luthardt (p. 117) merely mentions the categories; he says however: "Seine eigentliche Gestalt, seine Grundform ist demnach (als Gegenwirkung des sittlichen Gefuehls gegen die Suende) die ruegende oder richtende, worin aber Gottes Stimme zu uns redet..." This is an admission of the conscientia consequens and the negative judgment as the essential form of conscience.

Eisler (p. 429) speaks of the "mahnendes, warnendes Gewissen," likewise Rosenkranz (Syst. d. Wiss. p. 468; Eisler p. 431).

4) The object of the comparison.--Whose actions are compared in the judgment of the non-legislative conscience remains a divided question among the theorists; some following Paul's usage and including actions both of the possessor of the conscience and of others, some escaping a difficulty by including only one's own actions. Our critique, on the basis of the suggestion previously made (p. 42) that conscience reacts to other person's actions only when those actions are thought of as being done by one's self, would decide in favor of the former theory, including all actions, but with the modification, that other acts do not come under the domain of conscience if they are considered only per se.

Graebner (p. 26) feels the difficulty involved in the first theory and states his position cautiously: "Das Gewissen tut

aber Aussage ueber die rechte Beschaffenheit einer Tat nicht nur, wenn es die eigene Tat betrifft, sondern auch, wo die Tat eines andern in Betracht kommt; nur ist dann das Gewissen nicht so be-
reitet, auf die Sache einzugehen, sondern es muss die Sache mehr ge-
flissentlich vor seinen Richterstuhl gebracht, gezogen werden, ob-
schon auch da oft unser Gewissen von selbst in Taetigkeit rueckt,
wo ein Anderer von uns etwas tut oder getan hat."

Hopkins (Outline Study of Man, 283-285): "Conscience...sets up a tribunal by which his own actions are judged. Not conscience, but moral reason, judges of the conduct of others. This last is science, but not conscience" (quoted by Strong p. 256).

5) The verdict of the comparison.--Together with the whole pro-
pensity of the human being for making the judgment as to action com-
posing conscience, the result of this judgment or comparison, the
"verdict" of the "tribunal," is an involuntary (cf. p. 83) and there-
fore absolute one, unaffected by considerations outside of the norm.

Bernard is cited by Kaehlor (p. 649) as speaking of conscience as an incorruptible judge; similarly speaks Chrysostom (Cf. p. 73).

a) The form of the verdict.--In itself the form of the verdict rendered by the judgment of conscience in light of a norm is regarded as being simply positive or negative: The deed is "right," the deed is "not right." Further content is spoken of in connection with the ultimate judgment or verdict, but this is either admittedly or implicitly regarded as an accompaniment, and not essence, of the verdict. Many theorists regard the verdict of conscience as predominantly negative and reproving. The question thus arises whether there are not merely negative judgments of conscience, and the positive reaction is merely the absence of the negative. This, however, is hardly in accord with the notion of a discriminative process, which would render decisions both positive and negative. The question really arises in connection with the next paragraph, since it deals more with the "reproving" and therefore affective phase of conscience.

Graebner (p. 23): "Insofern als die Taetigkeit des Gewissens in der Anwendung eines Massstabs fuer Recht und Unrecht besteht, ist seine Aussage eine einfache Bejahung oder Verneinung der Rechtsbeschaffenheit des seinem Urteil vorliegenden Willens oder Wirkens... Ob die Nichtuebereinstimmung mit dem Massstab gefaehrlich oder harmlos ist, das sagt der Massstab nicht, insofern als er ein Massstab ist; als solcher zeigt er nur an, ob das Gemessene dem Massstab gemass ist."

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When Harless speaks of the object of the verdict of conscience, he is guided by his whole theory (p. 88): "Das, was der Mensch im einzelnen begehrt, gedacht, gewollt oder getan hat, ist zwar Anlass und Nebenobjekt, nicht aber das Hauptobjekt des reflexiven Gewissensurteils. Das Hauptobjekt ist der Stand der persönlichen Richtung oder die Herzensstellung des Menschen."

A predominantly negative aspect of conscience various theorists have endeavored to explain in accordance with their particular theories; Frank (p. 508): "Ebenausaus verstehen wir, dass die Stimme deren der Mensch im Gewissen inne wird, vielmehr richtenden, das Missverhalten des Menschen negierenden und verurteilenden, als positiv zurechtweisenden Charakter an sich trägt, und dass jedenfalls die positive Weisung nicht fuer sich, sondern in Relation und im Gegensatz zu einem anders gesarteten Verhalten ergeht wornach den natuerlichen Menschen geluestet....Denn gerade das Auseinandergetretensein des menschlichen und des goettlichen Subjektes, die Constatierung und das Innwerden eines dadurch bedingten Zwiespaltes gehoert zu dem Wesen der mit dem Gewissen bezeichneten psychologischen Tatsache." Harless (89): "Wie ist das Gewissen Bewusstsein um eine Guete des Herzens, kraft deren wir selbst unwandelbar jenem unwandelbaren Gute gleich waeren, um welches wir wissen."

Cf. quot. from Kaehler, p. 75. Rickaby (p. 269) cites several instances: "Newman also has put the stress on the reproving office of conscience. Carlyle says we should not observe that we had a conscience if we had never offended. Green thinks that ethical theory is mostly of negative use for conduct (Profeg. to Ethics IV, 1)."

b) Emotional content of the verdict.---That the verdict of conscience has a large emotional or affective content, manifesting itself in a feeling ranging from dissatisfaction to remorse approaching despair, and on the positive side (according to some theories) satisfaction, is a general opinion also of the non-legislative theories of conscience. This content of conscience is so predominant and so distinctive that in a few cases the emotion is declared to be the entire essence of the particular faculty of conscience, although the opposite is also stated. The emotion in conscience is predominantly negative, which gives weight to the theory that in conscience the positive emotional reaction, the "good" conscience as far as it is affective, is merely the absence of "bad" conscience or remorse. We can find no reason why the emotional reaction attendant upon a judgment of conscience should not be incorporated into our concept of the conscience; especial reasons for including it are the fact that con

consciousness is surely an unquestioned part of conscience, and the emotion is the outstanding ingredient of this consciousness; and the emotion or feeling in conscience is of a particular nature, involving the entire person in a consciousness of wrongness and dissatisfaction to an extent not attained by other emotional states. Whether this emotion is to be considered the entire content of conscience or not is a question hard to determine. If it is valid to include in the concept of conscience the emotional process most predominant in its basic consciousness, it is equally valid to include the intellectual process basic for the emotion.

Seeberg (52): "Diese gemeinmenschliche moralische Selbstbeurteilung vollzieht sich auch in dem Nichtchristen, und sie zwingt ihn, das Böse in sich zu sehen, sie straft die Lust der bösen Handlung mit Unlust an sich selbst als ihrem Taeter, wie sie, umgekehrt, die Unlust ueber der Anstrengung des guten Handelns durch die Lust der Selbstbefriedigung belohnt."

For the view that the emotion does not belong to conscience proper, cf. Strong as quoted p. 84.

The quotations concerning the negative aspect of conscience really pertain to the emotional part of it; p. 88.

For the view that emotion is in itself conscience, Rickaby quotes Mackenzie (Manual of Ethics, 3d ed. par. 14): "I should prefer to say simply that conscience is a feeling of pain accompanying and resulting from our non-conformity to principle." The same view, with the addition of a positive reaction, is maintained by Scaer, who defines conscience (p. 13): "Conscience is that God-given feeling or emotion which, before the act, prompts us to do that which we believe to be right and deters us from doing that which we believe to be wrong. And after the act it commends us for having done what we believed to be right, or condemns us for having done what we believe to be wrong." The relation of this conscience-feeling to the preceding judgment Prof. Scaer acknowledges: "As every judgment is followed by some feeling, so a judgment that is concerned with moral questions, i.e. right or wrong, is followed by a moral feeling, which is conscience."

In reference to the positive-negative question of emotion Bosanquet (p. 64) writes: "Plato seems to have been right in admitting that there are relative pleasures, while asserting that there are also pure pleasures (such as the pleasures of smell, or aesthetic and intellectual pleasures). The question may also take a form in which it is the root of modern pessimism: Is pain the positive feeling, and pleasure only negative, i.e. a release from pain? Schopenhauer took the view that this was so. The theory finds support in certain examples in which the same actual states--say of an illness--may be painful at one time and pleasant at another--painful after health, pleasant after worse illness; but these cases may be quite well explained without making all pleasure purely relative."

c) Validity of the verdict.--It is general observation that conscience in its verdict prompts to actions objectively wrong. Three questions, therefore, arise for those holding the non-legislative view of conscience. In answer to the question, where the fault or error in the process leading to an erroneous verdict may lie, also in this branch of theories of conscience the term "erring conscience" has been used. Opinion stands divided whether the error lies in the intrinsic operations of conscience, namely the comparison of actions with a norm and the rendering of a verdict in thought and feeling, or whether it lies in the adoption of a wrong norm. If the latter case is true, the term "erring conscience" is a misnomer, since the error lies in a field outside of the province of conscience, the acknowledgment or evaluation of norms being no part of conscience in non-legislative views of conscience.

Hofmann, though arguing for a very restricted theory, states (p. 173): "Die Tatsache, welche man mit dem irrenden Gewissen bezeichnet, ist ja nicht die, dass das Gewissen eine falsche Aussage ueber den goettlichen Willen gebe, sondern dass das Gewissen seine seku laeren Funktionen (die verpflichtende, richterliche, vollziehende) auch da vollziehe, wo sich ein ungoettliches Gebot mit Gewissensautoritaet umkleidet hat." Thus Graebner, though using the term "erring conscience" says (p. 25) "Nun aber, da das Gewissen eine Zeugenaussage ist, die einer hoeheren Aussage beistimmt, so wird die Aussage des Gewissens eine falsche, sobald es mit seinem Zeugnis einer falschen urspruenglichen Aussage beitrifft, oder mit andern Worten, sobald es einen falschen Massstab anlegt." He describes the method of rectifying conscience (p. 43): "Dass wir darauf bedacht sein...dass wir wachsen in der Erkenntnis, dass wir eine schoene, klare, reiche Erkenntnis haben sollen vom Gesetze Gottes, dass wir nicht in Ungewissheit hingehen und in Suenden tapen, die wir gar nicht als Suede erkannt haben." Strong (p. 255) calls attention to "the duty of enlightening and cultivating the moral reason" and affirms: "Since conscience in the proper sense gives uniform and infallible judgment that the right is supremely obligatory, and that the wrong must be forborne at every cost, it can be called an echo of God's voice, and an indication in man of that which is supreme in the nature of God." Luther's doctrine in the words of Luthardt is: "Wir sollen dem Gewissen nicht einen andern Inhalt--Menschengebote als Gottesgebote--unterschieben und so falsche Gewissen machen" (p. 111; quoted from 14, 128; 30, 406 EA).

Hoenecke (p. 365) ascribes the error to the function of conscience: "Das richtige Gewissen ist da, wo das vorangehende Urteil oder das nachfolgende Richten des Gewissens dem goettlichen Gesetz konform ist, bezw. dem ein geschriebenen Gesetz nach sein-

em wahren Inhalt. Das irrende Gewissen ist da, wo diese Konformität fehlt (Röm. 14, 5.6; 1 Cor. 8, 7)." Luthardt (p. 117) in a seemingly historical discussion ascribes the error to both norm and function of conscience: "Erscheinung des sittlichen Bewusstseins. Durch die Sünde ist das Gewissen Irrungen u. Störungen ausgesetzt teils hinsichtlich des Massstabes (ignorantia juris) oder der Tat (ignorantia facti); daher die Unterteilung in consc. vera (certa od. probabilis), falsa, u. zwischen beiden, dubia; teils hinsichtlich der Beziehung des Einzelnen auf jenen Massstab, u. zwar in betreff der Grenzen oder der Aktivität: Laxes oder skrupuloses; leichtsinniges, traeges, schlafendes, totes. Aber auch das irrende Gewissen ist die Beziehung auf einen (auch nur vermeintl.) höchsten Massstab, also verpflichtend, u. demnach alles, was wider das Gewissen geschieht, wenn auch vielleicht objektiv richtig, so doch subjektiv Sünde (vgl. Röm. 14, 23; Luk. 6, 4). Daher fordert es Weisung durch das obj. positive Gesetz."

A second question usually treated in this connection is, whether sin, and hence conversely regeneration, has an effect upon conscience. What conscience was before the Fall is a matter of speculation, and is carried out by each theorist in accordance with his own system. Views are current of an effect upon the application of the norm, or upon the essence proper of conscience. Likewise conscience is thought by some to be changed for the better in regeneration. Those views seems closer to fact which discern very little change to the real nature of conscience by regeneration; and hence only so much change due to the original Fall, as was suffered by any of the psychological functions of the human being through the loss of the divine image. Such phenomena as the "sleeping" or "torpid" conscience are effects of sin, but not effects on conscience as such, but accumulations due to sin of interests, motives, and passions counteracting and submerging the judgments and affective responses of conscience. Proof for this is the fact that conscience may assert itself in the most hardened sinner, when he "comes to his senses," i.e. realizes his obligations to higher standards and concentrates on the reactions of his conscience.

Harless accedes to the view of Martensen on the conscience before the Fall (463; Harless p. 82 ff.): "Wäre die Sünde nicht in die Welt gekommen, so würde die Bedeutung des Gewissens eine ganz andere sein, denn sie jetzt ist. Alsdann wäre unser Gewissen eben nur das friedliche Bewusstsein davon, dass unser

Leben ein fortschreitendes Leben in Gott sei--in welchem das Gewissen nur latent, aber nicht offenbar waere, so dass von Gewissen als solchem gerade so wenig die Rede sein wuerde, als bei einem ununtertrochen und voellig Gesunden von Wohlbefinden. Jetzt ist es freilich auch noch ein Bewusstsein davon, dass es ein Leben ausser Gotte geworden und nicht mehr das Normale ist."

Luthardt (p. 104): "Zwar ist das Gewissen infolge der suendigen Verderbung teils der Hemmung, teils der Irrung ausgesetzt, wird aber bei aller Hemmung nie voellig erstickt und ist auch, wo es irrt, auf Grund seines Zusammenhangs mit Gott, vom Betreffenden als letzte Autoritaet anzuerkennen."

Graebner (p. 57): "Unter dem Einfluss der Sunde wendet das Gewissen vielfach einen unzureichenden oder falschen Massstab an...Durch die Sunde haben wir die urspruengliche Erkenntnis verloren, die geistliche Erkenntnis Gottes ganz und die Erkenntnis seines Willens, wie sie im Naturgesetz uns eingezeichnet war, zum grossen Teil. Damit haben wir zum grossen Teil das Mass verloren, nach dem unser Gewissen messen soll." (P. 67): "Unter dem Einfluss der Sunde schweigt das Gewissen vielfach, wo es reden sollte, oder werden seine verschiedenen Aussagen auf mancherlei Weise zurueckgedraengt...Eingeschlaefert kann das Gewissen werden, und die Schlummerlieder fuer das Gewissen sind vielfach falsche Lehren, dass einem Menschen die Luege als Wahrheit, der Irrtum als Rechtglaebigkeit eingetrunkt wird."

Mosholm (cf. p. 83) in accordance with his theory of the will operative in conscience, maintains that this will is "in den Wiedergeborenen eine durch die Gnade gewirkter aufrichtiger Wille, nichts Wichtiges ohne vorhergehende Pruefung, ob und wie weit nach dem Gesetze erlaubt sei, zu unternehmen" (quot. by Luthardt p. 113 from Sittenl. der H.S. III, 272).

Feine (p. 291) endeavors to formulate the Biblical doctrine of the effect of regeneration: "Das Gewissen bindet den Menschen an Gottes Willen und hoert mit der richtenden Stimme erst auf, wenn das normale Verhaeltnis zu Gott hergestellt ist. Das Evangelium offenbart erst den vollen Gotteswillen. Daher ist erst das christliche Gewissen normal." This view seems to confuse the office of Christ with a legislative faculty, and does not take into account that sin exists also in the believers:

Hofmann (p. 201) quotes Wuttke (christl. Sittenlehre II par. 170) for a summary of the effect of sin on conscience: "Das sittliche Bewusstsein ist dem suendlichen Menschen getruemt in Beziehung auf die Gruende worauf es ruht, in Beziehung auf das hoechste Ziel, welches er nicht mehr kennt, in Beziehung auf den Umfang, weil es nur an dem Einzelnen und Endlichen haftet, und auf den Inhalt, weil er, die Sunde erwachend, das Boese selbst fuer gut ansieht und in den Begriff des Guten mit aufnimmt und damit verwirrt." But Hofmann acknowledges immediately: "Wie weit nun auch die Schaedigung des Gewissens durch die Sunde sich erstrecken mag, so muss doch a priori behauptet werden, dass es nicht in seiner Substanz Schaden gelitten haben kann." He also quotes Vilmar (Vilmar p. 341), who concludes from the example of the Old Roman conscience prompting to gravitas, virtus, et honor as a civis bonus: "Man sieht, es verhaelt sich mit dem natuerlichen Gewissen genau so, wie mit dem christlichen Gewissen, nur die Substrate sind verschieden." So Prof. Scaer (p. 111): "But his moral faculty, or conscience, suffered least by the Fall." And Ladd (II, 407): "Conscience belongs with its essential nature undestroyed by sin to the natural man."

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A third question remains: If the ultimate verdict of conscience may be faulty, even though this is through no weakness or decay of its essence, is the verdict to be respected and to be considered valid for conduct? It is generally acknowledged that the verdict of conscience should be obeyed. Although in some instances the explanation for this fact rests on the assumption that conscience is a distinctively religious faculty, and its vagaries are the result of misinterpretation rather than of error external to it, a somewhat speculative theory, yet the reason for respecting the validity of the conscience-verdict is plain: Conscience is an activity safeguarding responsibility to right and the habitual performance of right; and the Christian recognizes in it, because of his Divine creation and preservation, an aid and encouragement toward carrying out God's will.

Cf. quot. from Luthardt, p. 91; also p. 92.

6) The function of the comparison.--Although the comparison of actions with an acknowledged standard is a function of conscience in itself, it has been customary to point out other functions which this comparison fulfills, such as reproof (extending even to eternal punishment), presentation of the wrath of God and the imputation of guilt, the reminding of obligation, in the good conscience the bestowal of blessings, and in the bad conscience an execution of sentence upon the sinner. The first and last functions thus named, under the notion of remorse, come under the emotional accompaniment or content of conscience; it is not improper to speak of the pangs of remorse being in themselves punishment. Consciousness of the wrath of God and sense of guilt would really be a derived feeling, composed of the verdict of conscience that one's acts have been wrong, and a knowledge and fear of God's punishment for sin as expressed in the innate and revealed law. The sense of obligation, as has been suggested before (p. 78) is really a concomitant of the acknowledgment

of a standard, not a function of conscience. The assurance of benefits in a good conscience, as far as we can judge, would occur chiefly negatively through the absence of sense of guilt and impending punishment.

Origen (ad Rom. 2, 15, IV p 486; Luthardt p. 110) calls conscience ipse spiritus velut paedagogus, ut eam (animam) de melioribus moneat, vel de culpis castiget et arguat.

Luther speaks of a bad conscience (Hofmann p. 53; quoting Walch VI 217; IV 1640; V. 1104): "Ein Ding so schlimm als die Hölle selbst;" for hell consists essentially of "Furcht und dem Schrecken, dem Zittern und Zagen eines geängsteten Gewissens, das den ewigen Zorn fuhlet und ihm doch nicht entfliehen kann;" the future place of torment will be "nichts" anderes, denn ein böses Gewissen; wenn der Teufel kein böses Gewissen hätte, so wäre er im Himmel" (II, 2529).

Mark 9, 44 is regarded as an allusion to pangs of conscience in hell (so Scaer; opposed Hofmann p. 32 N).

Graebner (p. 35): "Insofern als der Mensch fuer eine Willensentscheidung oder vollbrachte Tat verantwortlich ist, begreift die Aussage seines Gewissens ueber dieselbe auch die der Zurechnung in sich." P. 38: "Insofern als der Massstab, den das Gewissen anwendet, als von einer hoeheren, Vergeltung uebenden Macht gehuetet zur Geltung kommt, schliesst die Aussage des Gewissens auch eine Strafdrohung oder eine Heilzusage ein."

Herzer (pp. 35. 36) mentions as functions secondary to the primary function of conscience as witness, that it "insists" that the Moral Law is binding for man;" the "imputation of the guilt of one's transgressions;" recognition of the fact that "the Law must be enforced, and that punishment must follow the transgression of the Law;" and witness to the promises of grace and every blessing to all that keep God's commandments.

III. Theories Involving Non-Ethical Functions.

A few theorists have expanded the notion of conscience to include functions beyond those pertaining to ethics; the ethical idea, however, remains constant in all. These theories deal with religious functions of conscience, with a few exceptions, in which conscience is made to include good taste or logical thought-processes, expansions of the concept of conscience which are figurative rather than scientific.

Kaehler (p. 652) criticizes the view of Fichte: "Diese ueber-spannte Betonung des Formellen, der...Gewissheit, hat fernerhin dazu verleitet, den Begriff zu dem eines Geschmacksurtheiles in allen praktischen Beziehungen auszudehnen ('die angeborene Noe-

tigung, ein Ideal zu haben und als Richter ueber sich anzuerkennen')".

Hisler (p. 429): "Es gibt neben dem praktischen ein theoretisches (logisches) Gewissen, gleichsam das Ethos im Denken, die Forderung des reinen Denkwillens."

A. General support for religion.--By some theologians endeavoring to give conscience more validity as a moral function, it is given the nature of a "religio-moral complex," and elevated to a central position in theological teaching. Such systems must be considered as speculative and theoretical only, and can have no objective value in view of the Scriptural presentation of the concept.

Rothe (according to Kaehler, p. 653) terms conscience: "Populaere Vorstellung zur Bezeichnung des Komplexes aller derjenigen psychischen Erscheinungen, in denen sich die wesentlich moralische (d.h. personliche, d. Ref.) und damit ausdrucklich zugleich religioese (im Unterschiede von der sittlichen, d. Ref.) Natur des Menschen kundgibt."

Beck (Einl. i. Syst. der christ. L.; Hofmann p. 69): "Das Gewissen ist der geistige Mittelpunkt, welchem der Glaube urspruenglich und wesentlich inne haftet (1 Tim. 3, 9; vgl. 1, 19), der Zentralpunkt aller unserm Geiste noch eigentuemlichen, unmittelbar goettlichen Lebensbestimmung, Ursinn und Urtrieb der Wahrheit, was das blosse Bewusstsein oder Gefuehl nicht ist; beides bis auf einen gewissen Grad haben auch die Tiere, Gewissen nur spurweise;" or (par. 17, Kaehler p. 653): "Sitz der degeniert-natuerlichen Wirklichkeit der Religion."

Schenkel wrote a "Christliche Dogmatik vom Standpunkte des Gewissens aus dargestellt" in which (p. 135 Vol. I, quoted by Hofmann p. 70) he terms conscience "religioeses und sittliches Zentralorgan des menschlichen Geistes." This is generally considered to be overstressed.

Mendenhall (p. 351): "The function of conscience is religious; but it will not create a religion absolutely right."

B. Function in revelation.--Conscience is spoken of as being an organ for receiving or evaluating revelation, as the direct "organ of revelation," or as bringing specific revelation, e.g. the knowledge of impending judgment. Although some of these theories present attempted Scriptural proof, we cannot agree with their interpretation; and parts of these theories are unwarranted by even remotely connected Biblical phraseology, so that they must be relegated to the domain of speculation.

Ladd (II, 407) says: "The Mosaic Torah could not be considered a revealed law if it did not address itself to a revelation within the moral consciousness, where it finds the ear which alone can hearken to such a voice;" p. 531: "The highest and most normal use of conscience is to receive and discern and appropriate the divine revelation of ethico-religious truth." Schonkel (Kaehler p. 653) calls conscience "religioeses und zugleich ethisches Zentralorgan," "um ihm die Kritik der Offenbarungslehren zu uebertragen," says Kaehler.

Ladd (I, 481): "The true conception of conscience cannot be separated from the idea and self of divine self-revelation." Hence he calls it (II, 408) "The special organ and seat of the divine activity in revelation...inspiration." Auberlen calls conscience "das unmittelbare Gottesbewusstsein" (p. 25; Hofmann p. 90).

Stalker (p. 701): "There is no instinct in the soul of man more august than the anticipation of something after death-- of a tribunal at which the whole of life will be revised and retribution awarded with perfect justice according to the deeds done in the body. It is this which imparts to death its solemnity; we instinctively know that we are going to our account."

C. Function in redemption.--Conscience is assigned a place in the plan of redemption by some writers, either, in accordance with the foregoing paragraph, as the point of contact for the Gospel; or ethically restraining from estrangement from God, and leading to repentance; or on dogmatic argumentation in accordance with a specific and speculative theory of conscience. The first notion is based on an exegesis to which we do not subscribe; the second may be regarded in the right way, but is hardly a direct function of conscience, but rather of the Law; and the third, to our mind, is purely speculative.

Oosterzee (p. 276): "In this very conscience does the Gospel seek and find in every man its secret point of contact." 2 Cor. 4, 2; 11 b. Cf. p. 32, and our conclusion.

Hofmann (p. 202): "In dem Gewissen liegen die Anknuepfungspunkte fuer die Erloesung, und dadurch erst wird der Mensch erloesungsfahig." P. 204: "Die Anknuepfungspunkte... Einmal ist's das Erloesungsbeduerfnis, welches im Gewissen kund wird, das andere Mal ist's die Befahigung des Gewissens, auch im deteriorirten Zustande dasjenige in seiner Wahrheit und Erloesungskraeftigkeit zu vernehmen, was von aussen zu seiner Erloesung an den Menschen herantritt."

Frank (p. 502): "Die Tatsache des Gewissens..(die) den Charakter eines Rueckhaltes in dem Menschen an sich traegt, der seinen Fortschritt auf dem Wege der Gottentfremdung zu hemmen geeignet ist." Frank regards the indwelling of God as conditioning the hindrance for sin located in conscience, and explains the indwelling of God therefore as dependent upon the decree of redemption, thus attesting man's "Erloesungsfahigkeit." (p. 507).

GENERAL CONCLUSION

A theory of conscience valid for the Christian, while recognizing constructive thought in the fields of philosophy and psychology, must contain no elements opposed to the Scriptural presentation of conscience. Hence the distinction must be drawn between speculative additions to the theory of conscience, hypotheses e.g. involving the supposition that a direct relation to God is fundamental for conscience--which the Scriptural cues do not warrant--, and terminological additions to the theory of conscience as presented in the Bible, e.g. definitely stating that the discriminative or affective reaction, which is recognized in Scripture, is an essential part, or the essence itself, of conscience. The latter type of expansion upon the Scripturally outlined theory of conscience must be adopted or rejected as it adds to or detracts from a harmonious concept of conscience, and does not or does lead to contradictions with other phases made imperative by the New Testament. The former type of assumption is usually so far reaching that it involves, sometimes destructively, broad portions of Christian doctrine; there is no absolute proof for it; and it does not add materially to a unified working theory of conscience. The following is a summary, on the basis of the preceding discussion, of the theory of conscience to our mind Scripturally as well as logically and psychologically sound.

I. The Nature of Conscience.

Conscience is a universal phenomenon, operative in every normal human being (valid field of Old Testament parallels opposed to the evolutionary doctrine of development of conscience). In its manifestations it is a state of consciousness. This consciousness is com-

posed of a statement of judgment in regard to an act actually or supposedly committed, by the person possessing the conscience, and of a feeling or emotion attendant upon this judgment. This judgment takes place spontaneously, sometimes against conflicting desires; hence it is specialized, and by virtue of this specialization may be included in the concept of conscience. The judgment takes place by virtue of the acknowledgment of some standard as binding upon the individual. This standard may be composed of statements of the law imperfectly a part of man's innate constitution, or of statements of the will of God revealed in Scripture, or of statements of social elements or forces recognized, either directly or because of their Divine institution, as authoritative over the individual. The obligation to these types of authoritative norms is not a function of conscience, but is a component of the acknowledgment of their authority. Hence the judgment of conscience defines duty, though the sense of duty in itself is not conscience. The second element of the consciousness of conscience, and at times its more predominant one, is feeling. This feeling is a state of dissatisfaction amounting to intolerable pain, under circumstances, when the judgment of action in view of standard has rendered the verdict of incompatibility. Whether there is a positive reaction of satisfaction upon judgment of compatibility, is questionable; the absence of negative reaction may, through recollective comparison with past states, in itself be the entire positive reaction. The emotional content of the consciousness of conscience is impulsive, directing volition toward fulfillment of recognized duty. Whether the judgment with the feeling of conscience takes place before the act conceived as accomplished, is problematical; it appears more in accord with a unified theory of conscience to assume that the verdict, rational and emotional, of conscience is consequent upon the conceived act, whether the act be actually achieved or not.

We recognize no effect of sin upon the essence of conscience, beyond that suffered by the reason in general, a possible blunting of discrimination; and as the act of judgment in conscience is a simple one, the effect upon conscience of sin becomes, for the normal human being, negligible. Likewise regeneration has no effect upon the essence of conscience; the indwelling of Christ and the Spirit in the Christian influences the conscience, with respect to its constitution or essence, no more than it does other psychological functions of man.

II. The Function of Conscience.

We find no reason for ascribing to conscience functions beyond the ethical sphere. It may be thought of as operative in regeneration to the extent of assisting the process of repentance; but this function is essentially ethical. We recognize no function of conscience in revelation, either as an active organ of revelation, or as a point of contact for revelation; in the latter case conscience is spoken of in Scripture as discriminating the ethical integrity of the Gospel and its bearer; hence this function is also ethical. In accordance with the conclusions reached regarding the nature of conscience as a judgment, we observe no legislative function in conscience, since such a function leads to an uncertain relation with objective standards, is opposed to a nature primarily rational, and amounts to inclusion in conscience of the Natural or innate Law, which is Scripturally a separate entity. As must be recognized in connection with the nature of conscience, it is the function of conscience to render judgments concerning actions in view of accepted standards. These actions must be conceived of as being done, or done, by the possessor of the conscience; in the former sense conscience reacts also to the actions of others, i.e. in as far as they imply like action on the part of the individual judging, or imply an

ethical relation of the persons judged with the person judging. Functions of reproof and commendation may be ascribed to conscience, but secondarily, and the latter probably only negatively, since both depend more on the emotional than on the rational side of the conscience-consciousness. The consciousness of conscience may act as an incentive to action, especially and directly in its negative aspect as the "bad" conscience, although the thought of a "good" conscience and the desire to attain it may incite to positive activity. Here also we recognize no result of sin or regeneration on the function of conscience. In fact, it is just for the erring person that the functions of conscience are most efficient; and repressions of the functions of conscience are due to sin only in that sinful passions or ambitions are made to submerge the dictates of conscience. The "good" conscience of the Christian may appear to have a particularly positive content; this would probably resolve itself in positive assurance of forgiveness of sin through Christ, and hence removal of the negative reproach of conscience. In accordance with this view of conscience we regard the phrase "erring conscience" as misleading, since the error, which indeed is the result of sin, lies not in the nature or function of conscience, but in acknowledgment of faulty norms. This attitude toward conscience, regarding it as intrinsically sound in its functions, makes the acknowledgment of the authority of conscience most reasonable, since conscience is evidently a capacity given to man for automatically and habitually safeguarding the integrity of his conduct, both in relation to his social sphere and in relation to his Preserver and Judge.

Hence we do not agree with Harless (p. 60): "Was das Wesen des Gewissens sei, ist nicht nach der Form zu bemessen, in welcher es im Reflex unseres Selbstbewusstseins erscheint und in gewissen selbstbewussten Regungen unseres Geistes sich aussert." He is right in calling conscience (§. 90) "eine Vorschule, um das zu lernen, was Christus verlangt, naemlich seine Seele oder sich selbst zu hassen."

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